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ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS. 

Edited by Iwan Muller. A series presenting a comprehensive and de- 
tailed statement of their several views and contributions to philosophy, 
together with brief biographical studies of the men themselves. 

i. Adam Smith. By J. Farrer. Octavo, cloth extra, $1.25. 
" Clearly and forcibly written. * * * The series should prove most valuable." 
Christian Register. 

2. Hamilton. By Prof. Monck. Octavo, cloth extra, $1.25. 

" Contains clear description and intelligent criticism. * * * This able introduc- 
tion should direct renewed attention to the important work of the father of modern 
English philosophy." — London Athenceum. 

3. Hartley and James Mill. By Prof. H. S. Bower. Octavo, 

cloth extra, $1.25. 
" A scholarly volume. * * * The positions of the two philosophers are presented 
with admirable clearness." — Baltimore Bulletin. 

4. Bacon. By Prof. Thomas Fowler. Octavo, cloth extra, $1.25. 
"The work is of a character much needed, and is prepared in an excellent and 

scholarly manner." — Boston Post. 

5. Shaftesbury and Hutchison. By Prof. Thomas Fowler. 

Octavo, cloth extra, % 1.25. 
In preparation for this series. — An introduction to the Study of 

Philosophy, by Prof. Sidgwick ; and volumes on Berkeley, Mill, 
Hobbes, etc. 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK. 



ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS 



SHAFTESBURY 



HUTCHESON 



THOMAS FOWLER, M.A., LL.D. (Edinb.), F.S.A. 

PRESIDENT OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, AND PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN THE UNIVERSITY 
OF OXFORD ; LATE FELLOW OF LINCOLN COLLEGE 



NEW YORK 
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

27 & 29 WEST 23D STREET 
1883 



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PtcSS Of 

G. P. Pzttnam's Sons 
New York 



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PEEFACE. 



There are no two of the "better-known English Philosophers 
whose writings are so closely related as those of Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson. It is, therefore, appropriate that they should 
both be noticed in the same volume. 

The Life of Shaftesbury, which appears in this work, is the 
most detailed which has yet been published. It is mainly 
taken from original documents contained among the Shaftes- 
bury Papers in the Public Record Office. The authorities for 
my statements are almost invariably given. My warmest 
thanks are due to Mr. Noel Sainsbury for the valuable in- 
formation and the efficient assistance which he constantly 
afforded to me during the progress of this part of my book. 
His well-arranged catalogue of the Shaftesbury Papers has 
now rendered this most important series of documents easily 
accessible to the student of history. It is also a great pleasure 
to me to take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to 
Mr. Garnett of the British Museum, who is always ready to 
give every assistance and facility to any one engaged in 



vi PREFA CE. 

serious study in the Museum. It is to him that I owe my 
knowledge of several manuscripts in the British Museum, 
bearing on Shaftesbury's life or writings. 

I have also to express my thanks to the Publishers of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica for their courtesy in permitting me 
to make use of my article on Hutcheson, already published in 
the Encyclopedia. The four chapters, however, on Hutch eson, 
contained in this volume, embody much more matter, and 
are, in every way, more complete, than my article, which was 
necessarily composed with a view to condensation. 

G. 0. C. Oxford, March 20, 1882. 



CONTENTS. 



SHAFTESBURY. 



CHAPTER I. 

PAGB 

Lite and Character, . . . . 1 



CHAPTER II. 
Works and Style 42 

CHAPTER III. 
Shaftesbury's Ethical Theory ...... 63 

CHAPTER IY. 
Shaftesbury's Theories on Religion, Beauty, and Art . . 103 

CHAPTER Y. 
Reception and Influence oe Shaftesbury's Writings . . 135 



HUTCHESON". 

CHAPTER I. 
Life and Works . v| - , . 169 



\ 



viii CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER II. 

PAGE 

Hutcheson's Ethical Theory 183 

CHAPTER III. 

Hutcheson's Writings on Mental Philosophy, Logic, and 
^Esthetics 201 

CHAPTER IV. 
Reception and Influence op Hutchison's Whitings , •. 214 



SHAFTESBURY. 



CHAPTER I. 

LIFE AND CHARACTER. 

The printed materials for a Life of Shaftesbury are somewhat 
scanty. They consist mainly of his published letters, of the 
account of him in the General Dictionary 1 by Dr. Thomas 
Birch, subsequently editor of Bacon's works, a writer and 
compiler of considerable reputation in his day, and, lastly, 
of Toland's Introduction to Letters from the late Earl of 
Shaftesbury to Robert Molesioorth, Esq. This last work was 
published, without the permission either of Lord Molesworth, 
the donor of the letters, or of Shaftesbury's family, who, 
considering- the character of the contents, were naturally very 
indignant at their premature publication. I shall recur here- 
after to this subject, but I mention the circumstance at once, 

1 The General Dictionary (3 734-41) is founded on the Dictionary of 
Bayle, but contains many additional lives. The principal contributors 
are J. P. Bernard, T. Birch, and J. Lockman. The original papers from 
which Dr. Birch's Life of Shaftesbury was printed are contained in the 
Birch MSS. in the British Museum, No. 4254. Two letters which 
passed between him and the Fourth Earl, showing that the Life in the 
General Dictionary was not only extracted from the MS. Life written 
by the Fourth Earl (see below) but also revised by him, are contained in 
No. 4318 of the same collection. It is very curious that Dr. Birch makes 
no acknowledgments to the Fourth Earl in his printed Life. Probably, 
for some reason or other, he had been requested not to do so.. 

B 



SHAFTESBURY. 



because I think that the indignation of Shaftesbury's family 
and friends at the behaviour of Toland should lead us to view 
with some misgiving the unqualified condemnation of the 
" Introduction" expressed by Dr. Birch, who describes it as 
" chiefly founded on conjecture/' and containing " many 
things absolutely false." As the document must, however, 
be regarded with suspicion, I shall never use it as an 
authority, without expressly citing it. 

I have been able, however, by means of the Shaftesbury 
Papers, now deposited in the Record Office, and admirably 
arranged and catalogued by Mr. Noel Sainsbury, both to 
check and to supplement the printed authorities. The papers 
relating to the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, which are very 
numerous, and would, I think, well repay a more careful 
investigation than that which I have been able to give to 
them, include, besides many letters and memoranda, two lives 
of him, composed by his son, the Fourth Earl. One of these 
is a rough draft in the handwriting of the Fourth Earl, 
accompanied by several loose papers, on which are written 
still rougher drafts of sentences or paragraphs ; the other a 
fair copy, occasionally omitting, however, passages or clauses 
of interest which are contained in the other manuscripts. The 
fair copy is evidently the original of the Life in the General 
Dictionary, which usually reproduces it word for word, 
though several portions of the Earl's account are omitted in 
the printed biography, and sometimes small details are sup- 
plied by Dr. Birch which are not in the original. It would 
be needlessly tedious, in the following sketch, to discriminate 
the various authorities for each minute particular; but, 
speaking generally, it may be understood that, when not 
otherwise stated, I am following the account of Dr. Birch as 
extracted from the fair copy of the Life written by the Fourth 
Earl. This sketch of his Father's Life, says its author, " was 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 



once intended to have been prefixed to a new edition of the 
Characteristics, though, upon considering 1 further on it, that 
thought was laid aside. For the lives of persons who spend 
most of their time in study can never afford matter to enliven 
a narrative." We, at this distance of time, can only regret 
that the writer was so modest and reticent as not to leave us 
still further details of his father's life and character. 



Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury 
was born at Exeter House in London, February 26, 1670-1. 
He was grandson of the celebrated and unfortunate Earl 
of Shaftesbury, who was Lord High Chancellor of England 
in the time of Charles II., and son of the second Earl by the 
Lady Dorothy Manners, daughter of John Earl of Rutland. 
The marriage between his father and mother, the father being 
then only seventeen years of age, had been negotiated by no 
less a person than John Locke, who was a trusted friend of 
the first Earl of Shaftesbury, and long an inmate of his 
house. The story is told, with some little exaggerations 
towards the close of the narrative, by the subject of the 
present memoir. " My father was an only child, and of no 
firm health ; which induced my grandfather, in concern for 
his family, to think of marrying him as soon as possible. 
He was too young and inexperienced to choose a wife for 
himself, and my grandfather too much in business to choose 
one for him. The affair, was nice, for, though my grandfather 
required not a great fortune, he insisted on good blood, good 
person and constitution, and, above all, good education and a 
character as remote as possible from that of Court- or Town- 
bred Lady. All this was thrown upon Mr. Lock, who, 
being already so good a judge of men, my grandfather 
doubted not of his equal judgment in women. He departed 

b -l 



SHAFTESBURY. 



from him, entrusted and sworn, as Abraham's head-servant 
that ruled over all that he had, and went into a far country 
(the North of England) to seek for his son a wife whom he 
as successfully found/'' 2 Locke's commission, however, was 
not quite of the roving character here represented. It was 
definitely to the Earl of Rutland's at Belvoir Castle, whither 
he accompanied his pupil, then Mr. Ashley, in the summer of 
1669, and where he seems to have brought the negotiations 
to a successful issue. This second Lord Shaftesbury appears 
to have been a poor creature, both physically and mentally ; 
a born a shapeless lump, like anarchy/' according to what is 
doubtless the overwrought metaphor of Dryden. Any way, 
according to the testimony even of the Fourth Earl, as 
contained in the rough draft of the Life, he " was confined 
almost altogether within doors/' and, when a man, was still 
suffering from the medical treatment he had received for " a 
disorder he had fallen into, when but fifteen years old." At 
the early age of three, his son was made over to the formal 
guardianship of the grandfather. Locke, who, in his capacity 
of medical attendant to the Ashley household, had already 
assisted in bringing the boy into the world, though not his 
instructor, was entrusted with the superintendence of his 
education. The care of the philosopher was extended to his 
health and bodily training as well as to his mental develop- 
ment. And, if Shaftesbury's memory did not deceive him, 
when writing in middle life, it was afterwards shared in by 
his six brothers and sisters. The letter already quoted, 
proceeds : " Of her " (the wife whom Locke " successfully 
found ") " I and six more of us, brothers and sisters, were 

2 Letter from the Third Earl of Shaftesbury to Le Clerc, preserved in 
the Remonstrants' Library at Amsterdam. This letter was published in 
Notes and Queries, First Series, vol. iii. pp. 97 — 99. There are two copies 
of it amongst the Shaftesbury Papers in the Record Office (Bundle 22, 
Letter Books 2 and 5). 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 5 

born ; in whose education Mr. Locke governed according" to 
his own principles (since published by him) and with such 
success that we all of us came to full years, with strong and 
healthy constitutions : my own the worst, though never 
faulty till of late. I was his more peculiar charge, being, as 
eldest son, taken by my grandfather and bred under his 
immediate care : Mr. Lock having the absolute direction of 
my education, and to whom, next my immediate parents, as 
I must own the greatest obligation, so I have ever preserved 
the highest gratitude and duty/' A few lines lower, 
Shaftesbury styles Locke his " friend and foster-father," 
though this sentiment did not prevent him, as we shall 
hereafter see, from severely criticising the principles of 
Locke's philosophy. The actual instruction was given, ^ot 
by Locke, but by a Mrs. Elizabeth Birch, daughter ot a 
schoolmaster in Oxfordshire or Berkshire. This lady, who 
was a proficient in the learned languages, pursued Locke's 
method of teaching Latin and Greek conversationally, 3 and 
that with such success that, at the age of eleven, it is said, 
on the authority of his son, young Ashley could read both 
languages with ease. During part of this time, the governess 
and her pupil were established in a separate house at 
Clapham. At the age of eleven, Anthony Ashley was sent 
to a private school, where he remained till his grandfather's 
death. In November, 1683, some months after that event, 
" his father carried him to Winchester," and entered him 
there as a Warden's boarder. In addition to the rough 
manners, which were common to the English public schools 
at that time, and which must have been specially repulsive 
to a shy, retiring boy, like young Ashley, both masters and 
boys seem to have been addicted to hard drinking. 4 His 

3 See Locke's Thoughts concerning Education, §§ 162, 163. 

4 A deplorable account of the school is given in a letter written by 



6 SHAFTESBURY. 

residence at Winchester, however, was prematurely cut short 
The boys appear to have taunted him with the opinions and 
fate of his grandfather, and, rendered miserable by this 
treatment, he left school in 1686 for a course of foreign 
travel. His new tutor was Mr. Daniel Denoue, a Scotchman, 
1 a very ingenious honest person/' and his travelling-com- 
panions Sir John Cropley (with whom he kept up an 
uninterrupted friendship to the end of his life) and Mr. 
Thomas Sclater Bacon. This change was probably fortunate 
for his mental development, as he was thus brought into 
direct contact with those artistic and classical associations 
which afterwards exercised so marked an influence on his 
character and opinions. "My Father," says the Fourth Earl, 
" spent a considerable time in Italy, where he acquired a 
great knowledge in the Polite Arts. That he had a sound 
judgment in Painting the treatises he wrote on that subject 
plainly evince. He understood Sculpture also extremely well, 
and could himself design to some degree of perfection. Of 
the rudiments of Music too he was not ignorant, and his 
thoughts concerning it have been approved by the greatest 
masters in that science. He made it his endeavour, while 
abroad, to apply himself as much as possible to the improving 
those accomplishments, and for that reason did not greatly 
seek the conversation of other English young g-entlemen on 
their travels/'' A youth on his travels, who had imbibed 
Shaftesbury's tastes, would probably, not even now, be much 
attracted by the society and conversation of his contem- 
poraries, and the English public-school education of those 
days probably left fewer traces of culture, and inspired boys 

Lord Ashley to his father, on what seemed to he the hopeless case of his 
brother Maurice, in July, 16S9. A copy of the letter is contained in an 
Entry Book, marked No. 2, in Bundle 22 of the Shaftesbury Papers in 
the Record Office, 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 



less with the love of letters, than it does even in our own. 
But what Shaftesbury (or, as I ought rather to call him at 
this period of his life, Lord Ashley) failed to find among- the 
young- men of his own age, he seems to have been fortunate 
enough to meet with amongst their tutors. With them, 
even when he could not learn anything from them, he could 
at least converse on congenial topics. It must not, however, 
be inferred from this account that young Ashley was what 
we should now call a milksop or a prig. " His learning/'' 
says his son, speaking of a somewhat later period in his life, 
" though very extensive, was of an ingenious gentleman-like 
sort, without any mixture of pedantry or conceit." He 
spoke French so fluently, and with so perfect an accent, that, 
in France, he was often mistaken for a native ; " and the ease 
and agility he showed in performing those exercises, in which 
that nation excel, contributed to the leading them into that 
opinion/' 

In 1689, the year after the Kevolution, Lord Ashley 
returned to England, and might at once have been returned 
to Parliament for one of those boroughs in which his family 
had an interest 5 He preferred, however, for the present, to 
devote himself to study, and, for nearly five years from this 
time, he appears to have led a quiet, uneventful, and studious 
life. There can be no doubt that the greater part of his 
attention was directed to the perusal of those classical authors, 
and to the attempt to realize the true spirit of that classical 
antiquity, for which he had conceived so ardent a passion. 

5 It was not till a few years later that an Act of Parliament (7 and 8 
Will. III. c. 25, s. 8) was passed, disqualifying minors from being elected 
to the House of Commons. Even after this time, however, they some- 
times sat by connivance, as, for instance, Charles James Fox for Mid- 
hurst and Lord John Eussell for Tavistock. See Sir Erskine May's Law 
of Parliament. 



8 SHAFTESBURY. 

"Perhaps no modern/' says Toland in his Introduction, 
" ever turned the Ancients more into sap and blood, as they 
say, than he. Their doctrines he understood as well as them- 
selves, and their virtues he practised better.'" He had no 
intention, however, of becoming a recluse, or of permanently 
holding- himself aloof from public life. " But he admired in 
them nothing so much," proceeds Toland, " as that Love of 
one's Country, that passion for true Freedom, which they 
perpetually inspire, and of which they afford such numerous 
examples." Accordingly, on the death of Sir John Trenchard 
the member for Poole, he availed himself of the opportunity 
of entering Parliament, and was returned for that borough, 
May 21, 1695. This Parliament was dissolved in October 
of the same year, but Lord Ashley was, as a matter of course, 
again returned for Poole in the new Parliament which met 
in November. He soon found occasion for asserting that 
" passion for true freedom," of which Toland speaks in con- 
nexion with his study of the classics. The Bill for regulating 
Trials in cases of Treason, which had been dropped, in con- 
sequence of differences between the Lords and Commons, in 
1691, was re-introduced early in the first session of the new 
Parliament. One of its provisions was that a person indicted 
for treason or misprison of treason should be allowed the 
assistance of Counsel. Lord Ashley rose, in his place in the 
House of Commons, to speak in favour of the Bill. But so 
overcome was he by shyness and natural modesty, that, 
according to the account given by his son, he " could not 
utter a syllable of what he intended, by which he found how 
true Mr. Lock's caution to him had been not to engage at 
first setting out in an undertaking of difficulty but to rise to 
it gradually/' 6 He soon recovered himself, however, suffi- 

6 This is much the same advice which Locke subsequently gave to his 
young cousin, Peter King, who afterwards became Lord King and Lord 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 



eiently to take advantage of the situation, and, with more 
effect than if he had made the most eloquent speech, he simply- 
said, before sitting- down : " If 1, sir, who rise only to speak my 
opinion on the bill now depending:, am so confounded, that I 
am unable to express the least of what I proposed to say; 
what must the condition of that man be, who is pleading for 
his life without any assistance and under apprehensions of 
being deprived of it?" "The sudden turn of thought/'' 
proceeds the Fourth Earl, " which by some was imagined to 
have been premeditated, though it really was as I mentioned, 
pleased the House extremely; and, it is generally believed, 
carried a greater weight than any of the arguments which 
were offered in favour of the bill." 7 The Bill passed the 
Commons on Dec. 18, 1695, and, after the insertion of 
the Lords' Amendments, was at length agreed to by the 
Upper House. Another Bill, in which Lord Ashley took an 
interest, was one imposing a property qualification on Mem- 
bers of Parliament, and incapacitating electors who were guilty 

Chancellor : " I cannot forbear saying this much to you, that when you 
first open your mouth at the bar, it should be in some easy plain matter 
tbat you are perfectly master of." Locke to King, June 27, 1698, 
printed in Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors. 

7 This story is told of Charles Montague, subsequently Earl of Halifax, 
in a Life of LLalifax (p. 30), published in 1715, and is repeated of him 
by Johnson in the Lives of the Poets. The Fourth Earl does not seem 
to be aware that it had been told of any one but his father, but Dr. Birch 
adds a reference to the Life of Halifax, and says the story "has been 
erroneously related of that Earl.'' If we may judge from internal 
evidence, it is far more appropriate to a shy and retiring man, new to 
Parliamentary life, like Lord Ashley, than to a practised speaker and 
debater, like Montague, who had sat in the House of Commons from the 
Convention of 1688-9 onwards. I may add that the story is related 
with much detail by the Fourth Earl of his father ("he had prepared a 
speech which those he showed it to thought a very proper one upon the 
occasion,"), and that in Horace Walpole's Catalogue of Royal and Noble 
Authors it is told of Shaftesbury and not of Halifax. 



io SHAFTESBURY. 

of corruption or treating-. In a letter to Thomas Stringer, 
who had been his grandfather's steward, dated Feb. 15, 
1695 (that is, 1696 N.S.), he complains bitterly of the party- 
spirit which was then so rampant in the House, aud of the 
treatment received by any member who asserted his inde- 
pendence. " You could, I believe, scarcely imagine with 
yourself, who these are in the world, or who they are in the 
House, who oppose this and all other such bills as this might 
and main ; and who they are that are condemned for flying in 
the face of the government, as they call it, by being for such 
things as these are, and pressing such hard things on the 
prerogative or court. In short, you would hardly believe that 
your poor friend, that now writes to you, has sentence (and 
bitter sentence too) every day passing upon him, for going, as 
you maybe sure he goes and ever will go on such occasions as 
these ; whatever party it be that is in or out at court, that is 
in possession of the places and afraid of losing their daily 
bread by not being servile enough, or that are out of places 
and think, by crossing the court and siding with good and 
popular things against it, to get into those places of profit 
and management.'" 8 Throughout this Parliament, Ashley 
seems to have adopted a thoroughly independent line of 
action. His motto was emphatically " Measures not men.'" 
Though, in the strictest sense of the term, a Whig, alike by 
descent, by education, and by conviction, he was always 
ready to support any measures, from whatever quarter they 
came, whether from Somers or Montague, or from Godolphin 
or Harley, provided that they appeared to him to promote 
the liberty of the subject and the independence of Parlia- 
ment. Hence, in the tangled politics of that age, when each 
party was often taking the side which, from its antecedents, 
might least be expected, he could never, apparently, be 
8 Ashley to Stringer, first published in the General Dictionary. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. u 

reckoned on to give a party vote. Of course, he incurred the 
displeasure and suffered from the disparagement of those 
whom he opposed. Toland, speaking of the "Apostate 
Whigs/' who " could not endure him," says : " They gave 
out that he was splenetic and melancholy; whimsical and 
eaten up with vapours : whereas he was in reality just the 
reverse, naturally cheerful and pleasant, ever steady in his 
principles, and the farthest in the world from humoursome or 
fantastical." "They gave out that he was too bookish, 
because not given to play, nor assiduous at court ; that he 
was no good companion, because not a rake nor a hard 
drinker, and that he was no man of the world, because not 
selfish nor open to bribes.'" According to the same authority, 
who is here supported by independent testimony, "the prin- 
cipal heads which offended him'" in the action of many of 
his old friends, called by Toland "the Apostate Whigs/ - ' 
were " their opposing the Bill for Triennial Parliaments, that 
for regulating trials in cases of High Treason, that for ascer- 
taining the Judges' Commissions and Salaries, that for 
qualifying Members of Parliament by estates in land and 
excluding them from offices and pensions, that for reducing 
the standing forces, and some other bills of the like nature, 
either explaining or restraining the Prerogative/'' At a time 
when the newly established order in Church and State was 
safe neither from foes without nor foes within, it is not so 
plain that those who were shy of restraining the Royal 
Prerogative, of increasing the independence of Parliament, 
and of multiplying the occasions for changing the public policy, 
were actuated solely by motives of sycophancy or corruption. 
There were many cross-currents in the politics of those years, 
and, perhaps, the pilot who seemed to pursue a vacillating 
course might not unreasonably claim the favourable judgment 
of his contemporaries. But that Lord Ashley, who was pro- 



12 SHAFTESBURY. 

bably able to see great issues and to realise leading" principles 
more readily than he was to enter into the ever-shifting" com- 
plications of practical politics, acted in perfect good faith, and 
was inspired solely by an ardent desire for the public interests, 
there can be no doubt. 9 Unfortunately, his health was so 
treacherous that, on the Dissolution in July, 1698, he was 
obliged to retire from Parliamentary life. " The fatigues of 
attending regularly upon the service of the House (which in 
those active times generally sat long as well as upon Com- 
mittees at night) in a few years so impaired my Father's 
health, who was not of a robust constitution, that he was 
obliged to decline coming again into Parliament on the Disso- 
lution in 1698/'' l "He was in some little time," says 
Toland, " from one of the healthiest and most sprightly youug 
noblemen in England, so violently seized with an asthma, 
that he could with great difficulty endure the fatigue of 
Parliamentary attendance; and at last could not bear with the 
smoke of London, which suffocated him to such a degree that 
he was forced to quit even the neighbourhood of it." Those 
who are acquainted with the events of Locke's life will recollect 
that he too, shortly after his return to England, had been 
obliged to retire from London, in consequence of the " pesti- 
lent smoke of this city," and that he too, like his pupil, 
suffered from asthma. 2 Many are the subsequent complaints 

9 In the rough draft, though not in the fair copy, of the Life by the 
Fourth Earl, occurs the following paragraph : " Several gentlemen in the 
House of Commons, who were of the same sentiments with my father, 
formed a little society by the name of the Independent Club, of which he 
was a member and had the chief hand in setting up, but this club was of 
no long duration." 

MS. Life by the Fourth Earl. 

2 See Locke's Letter to Limborch, March 12, 1689; my Locke in 
English Men of Letters, p. 56, or Mr. Fox-Bourne's Life of Locke, 
vol. ii. p. 150. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 13 

of Shaftesbury about the " town-smoke," and the east winds 
which carried it as far as his " little house " at Chelsea. 3 
The smoke of London seems to have been more oppressive in 
those days than even in our own, or perhaps it is an affliction 
which we have learnt to bear more patiently than oui 
ancestors. 

Lord Ashley, however, was able for a time to escape both 
from the smoke of the city and from the troubled waters of 
English politics. " My Father being* then released from the 
confinement of the House was at liberty to spend his time 
wherever it was most agreeable to him ; he went directly into 
Holland, where he became acquainted with several learned 
and ingenious men who resided in that country, which in- 
duced him to continue there about a twelvemonth." Amongst 
the " learned and ingenious men " with whom he became 
acquainted, or whose acquaintance he renewed (for a letter 
written to Furly, June 27, 169 1, 4 commending to his care his 
brother Maurice, proves that he had himself passed through 
Holland on his travels as a youth), were Le CI ere (Joannes 
Clericus), the philosopher, theologian, and critic, who was 
now engaged in editing the Bibliotlieque Universelle, one of 
the earliest literary and scientific reviews ; Bayle, then a Pro- 
fessor at Rotterdam, subsequently the author of the celebrated 
dictionary which bears his name; Benjamin Furly, the Eng- 
lish quaker merchant, at whose house Locke had resided 
during his stay in Rotterdam, and who was always so ready to 
show kindness and hospitality to his countrymen sojourning 
in Holland • and probably Limborch and the rest of the lite- 
rary circle of which Locke had been a cherished and honoured 

3 See, for instance, the letters to Molesworth. 

4 See Original Letters, 2nd ed., p. 5i, but the letter is there wrongly 
dated. The original oE this letter is amongst the Shaftesbury Papers in 
the Record Office (Bundle 20, No. 3). 



14 SHAFTESBURY. 

member nine or ten years before. To Lord Ashley this society 
was probably far more congenial than the aristocratic and 
political surroundings which he had left behind him in 
England. Unrestrained conversation on the topius which 
most interested him — philosophy, politics, morals, religion — 
was at this time to be had in Holland with less danger and in 
greater abundance than in any other country in the world. It 
is to this period, in all probability, that we must refer a story 
told of him and Bayle. 5 Lord Ashley, as he would then 
be, if I am right in referring the story to this visit, had con- 
cealed his name and title, passing himself off as a student in 
Physic, in order that he might pursue his literary avocations 
with the greater freedom. Towards the end of his stay, 
however, he wished to be known to Bayle under his real name, 
and requested Furly, who was in the secret, to invite them 
both to dinner. Bayle received a formal invitation to meet 
Lord Ashley. On the morning of the day fixed for the party, 
he accidentally called upon his friend, the medical student, and 
was pressed to stay. It was impossible for him to do so, he 
said, " for I must be punctual to an engagement where I am 
to meet my Lord Ashley." " The second interview," proceeds 
the Fourth Earl, "caused some mirth, and their intimacy was 
rather increased than lessened after the discovery; for they 

5 The Fourth Lord tells this story in connexion with his father's visit 
to Holland in 1703-4, but, after the prolonged visit in 1698-9, Shaftes- 
bury must have been too well known, at all events within his own circle, 
to have passed off, a second time, under an assumed name. Even had 
not his name and rank become known in 1699, they were almost certain 
to transpire within the three or four years which elapsed between the two' 
visits. Moreover, in one of his letters to Furly (dated Jan. 30, 1701-2), 
contained amongst the Shaftesbury Papers, he says expressly : " I 
received lately a present from Mr. Bayle of his Dictionary ; for 
which pray return him my humble thanks. I shall do it myself in a 
post or two." In the General Dictionary, the story is assigned to the 
earlier visit. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 15 

never ceased a correspondence together after my Father's 
return to Monsieur Bayle's death." 6 To the period of this 
visit to Holland must also probably be referred the surrep- 
titious impression or publication, during" his absence, of an 
imperfect edition of the Inquiry concerning Virtue. " During 
my Father's stay in Holland " (though here again the Fourth 
Earl refers the event to the third visit), " an imperfect edition 
of his Inquiry after Virtue was printed 7 surreptitiously, 
taken from a rough draught, sketched when he was but 
twenty years of age. He was greatly chagrined at this, and 
immediately bought up the whole impression before many of 
the books were sold, and set about completing the treatise 
which he published himself not long after. 8 The person who 
treated him so unhandsomely he soon discovered to be Mr. 
Toland, who made this ungrateful return for the favours he 
had received from him. For my Father then allowed him 
(at his earnest importunity) an annual stipend, though he 
never had any great opinion of him. In this manner ray 
Father frequently bestowed pensions on men of learning who 

6 Des Maiseaux, in his Life of Bayle prefixed to the Dictionary, repre- 
sents Shaftesbury as intervening on Bayle's behalf, in 1706, with Lord 
Sunderland, who suspected him of maintaining communications with the 
French Government, and who seems to have been on the point of asking 
for his expulsion from Holland. 

" In the rough draft of the Life, the word "published'' is struck out, 
and the word " printed " inserted. In the General Dictionary (the 
account in which was seen and corrected by the Fourth Earl), the im- 
pression or publication of this imperfect edition is referred to Lord 
Ashley's absence from England in 1698-9. In the First Edition of the 
Characteristics (1711), the Inquiry is described as "printed first in 
1699," and "formerly printed from an imperfect copy; now corrected and 
published intire." I have not been able to see any copy of Toland's 
edition, or to find any mention of it in a Catalogue. 

8 As the complete edition did not appear till 1711, this statement pro- 
ceeds on what is probably the false impression of the Fourth Earl as to 
the date of Toland's edition. 



1 6 SUA F TESB UR Y. 

stood in need of such assistance, and gave sums of money 
besides to those whom by experience he found deserving 1 .'" 
Of Toland's character, and of Shaftesbury's generosity to 
struggling men of letters, I shall have other opportunities of 
speaking. 

Lord Ashley returned to England after an absence of over 
a twelvemonth, and on Nov. 10, 1699, not long after his 
return, he succeeded to the title of Earl of Shaftesbury by the 
death of his father. For some time he was occupied with 
arranging his private and family affairs, to which he always 
appears to have devoted exemjnary attention. He took his 
seat, however, in the House of Lords, Jan. 19, 1699-1700, 
and attended with tolerable regularity during the rest of the 
session. 9 Parliament was dissolved on the 19th of December, 
1700, and the General Election, which ensued, was the occa- 
sion of a fierce contest between the Whigs and Tories. 
Shaftesbury, who, of course, exerted his influence on the 
Whig side, though he acknowledged that the Whigs had 
in recent years " been shameful in their over great condescen- 
sions to the Court/'' and by this conduct had "lost their 
interest much in the country," 1 took a very active part in 
the elections of his own neighbourhood. " We are now in 
the midst of our elections," he writes to Eurly, Jan. 11, 
1700-1, 2 "of which the West of England having much the 
greatest share, and I being here placed with my fortune and 
all my interest, you may imagine I am not a little solicitous 
at this time of danger, having explained to you the extremity 



9 Journals of the House of Lords. The statements in the General 
Dictionary and in the Life by the Fourth Earl, that he did not attend 
the House during this session, are disproved by the Lords' Journals. 

1 Original Letters. Shaftesbury to Furly, Nov. 15, 1700. Shaftes- 
bury Papers, Bundle 20, No. 15. 

s Original Letters. Shaftesbury Papers, Bundle 20, No. 53. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. ly 

of our affairs by these rash counsels for a dissolution at this 
conjuncture, which I am satisfied the King- ere this is fully 
convinced was a wrong measure, enough to ruin us all." He 
hopes, however, that "the whole force of the new Tory Ministry 
will not be able to create a Tory Parliament;" " though," he 
adds, " it will come very near." Shaftesbury, as we have 
seen, had no scruple in asserting his independence on indi- 
vidual measures, by whichever side they might be introduced, 
but there can be no doubt as to his general loyalty to 
his party. "The only thing to be hoped and prayed for," 
he proceeds in the same letter, " is that the Tory party 
may not be superior : for, if but ever so little inferior, 
their numbers will be of service rather than of injury : for, 
as it is said of water or fire, so it may be said of them, that 
they are good servants, but ill masters; and, as by principles 
they are slaves, so they are only serviceable when they are 
kept so." " Let our friends in Holland know their friends 
here, and take notice that it is that party that hate the Dutch 
and love France, and the Whigs the only contrary party that 
can now save them and England." 

Shaftesbury's hopes were disappointed, and the new House 
of Commons, which met on the 6th of February, 1700-1, 
contained a large majority of Tories. The Journals of the 
House of Lords show that Shaftesbury was peculiarly 
regular in his attendance throughout this session, and indeed 
there were personal as well as party reasons why he should be 
so. What is known as the Second Treaty of Partition, which 
had been concluded between England, Holland, and France 
in March 1700, had been divulged in the summer of this year, 
and the general discontent, which it excited not only amongst 
the Tories but also amonj. st several of the Whigs, had 
undoubtedly contributed to the Tory success in the general 
election. The new House of Commons attempted to gratify 

c 



1 8 SHAFTESBURY. 

its resentment by impeaching- not only the Earl of Portland, 
who had taken an- active part in negotiating the treaty, but 
also the late ministers, Admiral Hussell, now Earl of Orford, 
Charles Montague, now Lord Halifax, and Lord Somers, 
whose share in the matter seems to have been limited to a 
reluctant acquiescence or to mere privity. And, not content 
with impeaching them, they presented an address to the King, 
asking him to remove them from his councils and presence 
for ever. The Lords presented a counter-address, praying 
that the King would be pleased to pass no censure or punish- 
ment upon the Lords impeached, during the dependence of 
the impeachment, Shaftesbury being placed on the Committee 
for drawing up the address. The business of the impeach- 
ments occupied a considerable time, but at last fell through 
altogether, in the month of June, from the failure of the 
Commons to appear in support of their charges. Shaftesbury 
was, no doubt, loyal to his friends and his party throughout 
these proceedings. The result of the impeachments must 
have been a great triumph to the Whigs, and it contributed, 
together with the growing jealousy of France, to which the 
existing ministry was supposed to be partial, to discredit the 
Tory majority in the lower house. Foreign affairs had taken 
a curious turn since the conclusion of the Second Partition 
Treaty. Charles the Second, King of Spain, the succession 
to whose dominions had been so unceremoniously parcelled 
out by the three powers, died on the 1st o November, 1700. 
Philip Duke of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin, was named 
in his will as heir to the undivided Spanish Monarchy, and, 
failing him, Charles Archduke of Austria. The temptation 
was too strong for Louis the Fourteenth, and, notwithstanding 
the recent treaty, he accepted the throne for his grandson. 
Of course, the Balance of Power was now completely changed. 
Not long after the meeting of the English Parliament in 






LIFE AND CHARACTER. T9 

February 1700-1, a message was conveyed to the House of 
Lords that the States General had felt themselves obliged to 
acknowledge the title of the Duke of Anjou, without any 
conditions. This necessity was laid upon them by the fact 
that Louis had adroitly turned out the Dutch garrisons which 
manned the border fortresses of the Spanish Netherlands, and 
had replaced them by French troops. William made overtures 
to France for an accommodation, but in vain. The result was 
the conclusion of a new alliance at the Hague, on the 7th of 
September, between England, Holland, and the Emperor. 
This is known in history as the Grand Alliance. Only nine 
days afterwards (Sept. 16, 1701), James the Second died at 
St. Germains, and Louis, in spite of the treaty of Ryswick, 
acknowledged his son as James the Third, King of England. 
The King of France had thus offered an affront which neither 
William nor the English nation could tolerate, and a war bad 
now become inevitable. But the prospect of a war with 
France and the possibility of a Jacobite invasion soon turned 
the tide against the Tories and in favour of the Whigs. Both 
the king and the nation were weary of the Tory ministry, 
and, on November 11, Parliament was dissolved, in the hopes 
that a Whig majority, zealous for a French War and the 
Protestant Succession, would be returned. . Nor were these 
hopes disappointed. The City of London set the example, 
and the nation at large responded by returning a working 
majority, ready to support a Whig policy. To this result, 
and all that he conceived must follow from it, Shaftesbury 
had for some months been looking forward with eager ex- 
pectation. Writing to Furly on the 4th of the previous 
March, he says : " No French King of Spain is a plain course, 
as plain as No King James, no owning a Prince of Wales, no 
Popery nor Slavery/' " The People of England will (if the 
Court will let them) engage in a war, and never yield nor 

c 2 



20 SHAFTESBURY. 

hear of yielding- whilst France is to have anything- to do 
with Spain/' On the 1st of April, he says : " I, who am 
naturally so inactive, am working day and night for the 
common interest of Holland and this country." On the 
15th/ he hopes that "this session will be the last of this 
Parliament," and " doubts not but the Tories will so work 
that the King will be glad to be rid of them, and will be so, 
soon after the Parliament rises ; for England cannot have 
justice till this Parliament be dissolved." The distrust of the 
King, expressed at the end of this letter, is remarkable : " He 
might do everything, had he resolution. The spirit of the 
people is greater and greater. They do not betray the 
common cause nor themselves, but, if he betray himself, what 
can we say or do ? " Just before Parliament rose, he writes 
(June 20) : "The House of Commons will be no sooner up, 
but I believe all England will be ready to petition the King 
to dissolve them." Subsequently, he began to complain of 
the King's delay, and even despaired of the Dissolution taking 
place. He foresees (Sept. 15) "inevitable ruin, if the King 
resolves again to meet this unhappy Parliament." When, at 
last, the much wished-for Dissolution came, Shaftesbury 
exerted himself to the utmost, and with the most marked 
success. Writing to Furly, Dec. 29, just after the elections 
were over, he says : " I had the strongest obligation on earth 
upon me to act with vigour, as I have done, since the 
opportunity the King has most happily given us. And it 
has pleased Providence to bless me with great success. For, 
having my province (and that a very hard one) in two 
counties long in the hands of the most inveterate of the 
adverse party, I notwithstanding carried all that I attempted 
in both. In one of them (viz. Wilts), which my brother " 

3 This letter (No. 22 in Bundle 20 of Shaftesbury Papers) is wrongly 
dated in Original Letters. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 21 

[Maurice Ashley] " and his friend represent instead of two 
inveterate Tories, we have there mended the elections by 8, 
which is a difference of 16 in Parliament; and in Dorsetshire 
(my own county) we have gained also considerably." His 
frieud Sir John Cropley was brought in for Shaftesbury, 
" which was ever entirely in their hands since my Grand- 
father's death, but which I have now entirely recovered and 
made zealous.'''' He adds : "asa token that the King himself 
is right as we would wish, he yesterday gave me most hearty 
thanks for my zeal and good services on this occasion, and 
this before much company." The Fourth Earl informs us 
that " the King told " his Father " that he had turned the 
scale, and my Father after this was so well approved of by the 
King that he had the offer of being Secretary of State, which 
his declining constitution would not allow him to accept ; 4 
but, although he was disabled from engaging in such a course 
of business, he was not from giving the King his advice, who 
frequently consulted him on matters of the highest im- 
portance." On Dec. 30 the houses met, and on Dec. 31 the 
King made the famous speech, which sent a thrill of en- 
thusiasm throughout the nation, and which was afterwards 
printed in French, Dutch, and English, framed, and hung up 
in the houses of sound patriots and good Protestants through- 
out England and Holland. In this speech he told his 
Parliament, if they were not wanting to themselves, but 

4 In a memorandum dated July 9, 1703, preserved among the Shaftes- 
bury Papers (Bundle 20, No. 73), Shaftesbury himself writes: " My zeal 
for the Eevolution and the late King's cause made me active for the 
support of that Government and for the establishment of the Protestant 
Succession ; and it was my good fortune to have my services well thought 
of by the King and acknowledged by him with great favour. I had the 
honour of many offers from him ; but, thinking I could best serve him 
and my country in a disinterested station, I resolved absolutely against 
taking any employment at Court." 



22 SHAFTESBURY. 

would exert the ancient vigour of the English nation, they 
had yet the opportunity of securing 1 to themselves and their 
posterity the quiet enjoyment of their religion and liberties ; 
he conjured them to disappoint the only hopes of their 
enemies by their unanimity ; he declared how desirous he was 
of showing himself the common father of all his people, 
and he entreated them, in their turn, to lay aside all parties 
and divisions. " Let there be no other distinction heard of 
among us, for the future, but of those who are for the 
Protestant Religion and the present Establishment; and of 
those who mean a Popish Prince and a French Government." 
The Fourth Earl says, " it was pretty well known " that his 
father had the greatest share in composing this speech, and 
Dr. Birch repeats the statement in the General Dictionary. 
Lord Stanhope, however, and Lord Campbell ascribe its com- 
position to Somers, and Lord Hardwicke states that he 
recollects seeing a draft of the speech among Somers' papers 
in his own handwriting. 6 Shaftesbury and Somers seem 
always to have been intimate friends, and, as the speech 
undoubtedly expresses the sentiments of them both, they may 
both have had a hand in composing it. On the 2nd of January, 
1701-2, Shaftesbury was one of the Committee appointed to 
draw up an address "to assure His Majesty, that this House 
will stand by and assist him, in reducing the exorbitant 
power of France and settling the balance of Europe." 

With the connivance of some of the Whigs, Harley hatl 
been elected Speaker of the new House of Commons. In a 
letter to Furly, dated Jan. 30, 1701-2, 6 Shaftesbury says of 

s See Miscellaneous State Papers, edited by Lord Hardwicke, 
London, 1778. The greater part of Somers' Manuscripts was destroyed 
by a fire which broke out at Lincoln's Inn in 1752. 

6 This letter, from which I have already quoted, is wrongly dated, as 
1702-3, in Original Letters. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 23 

him : " H. Harley is ours at the bottom. I cannot call him 
truly a Man of Virtue ; for then he had not been lost to us 
by any disobligation or ill-usage, which he has had sufficient. 
He is truly what is called in the world a Great Man, and it is 
by him alone that Party has raised itself to such a greatness 

as almost to destroy us But I believe there is hopes 

of gaining him. If He " [meaning the King] , " who has done 
so much to divide and break and ruin his own party and 
friends, will but do half so much to piece 'em up and unite 
'em, the thing will be easy, and the cause our own. This 
Gentleman and others will then soon come over/' In a 
subsequent letter (Feb. £7), however, he regards Harley as 
" desperately engaged " to the other party. 

Had the King's life continued, Shaftesbury's influence at 
Court would probably have been considerable, but, unfortu- 
nately for the prospects of the Whigs, William died on the 
8th of March, 1701-2. Though no change was made in 
the foreign relations of the kingdom, Anne, who had been 
taught to regard the Whig party with abhorrence, studiously 
excluded its leading representatives from office and from 
court. Somers was not only not sworn of the new Privy 
Council, but his name was even struck off the Commission of 
the Peace. Shaftesbury was deprived of the Vice- Admiralty of 
Dorset, which had been in the family for three successive 
generations. "This slight/' says his son, "though it was 
a matter of no sort of consequence to my Father, was the 
only one that could be shown him, as it was the single thing 
he held under the Crown." After the first few weeks of the 
new reign, Shaftesbury returned to his retired mode of life, 
but his letters to Furly show that he still retained a keen 
interest in politics. Though he calculates that the Tory 
party is as two to one in the House of Commons which was 
elected in the summer of 1702, he declares himself not dis- 



24 SHAFTESBURY. 

heartened, but rejoices to hear so well of the cause of liberty 
in Holland. He must be cautious, however, in what he 
says (and the necessity, or supposed necessity, for caution 
may account for his letters to Furly now becoming- less 
frequent), "for, as times are now turning with us, we must 
take more care of our expressions than we were used/'' In 
November of this year, he speaks of the necessity of with- 
drawing from public affairs, both for his mind's sake and 
his health's sake, " because my efforts in time of extremity, 
for this last year or two, have been so much beyond my 
strength in every respect.'" The house at St. Giles' seems 
to have been broken up in December, 1702, and Shaftesbury 
now determined \on paying a prolonged visit to Holland, 
living meanwhile at his house in Chelsea. He was detained 
in England for some time by the arrangements connected 
with the apjproaching marriage of one of his sisters, "our 
law-affairs being most dilatory." But in August he was 
at length ready to start. His health was now " mightily 
impaired by fatigues in the public affairs," and he was very 
anxious to lead a quiet and retired life. Like Locke, he 
appears to have had great faith in the air of Holland, and 
specially of Rotterdam, which is "happily as good or better 
than any." He was not disinclined to meet a friend 
occasionally at Furly's house, but, excepting Furly and 
his family, he did not wish to have any callers at his 
lodgings, "by which rule I kept myself so easy and private 
the last time." There was a difficulty, however, about the 
passage ; for he feared " nothing so much as falling alive 
into French hands," and " our Admiralty affairs grow every 
day so much worse as yours I hope grow better." 7 At 
Rotterdam he lived, he says in a letter to his steward 

1 Shaftesbury to Furly, June 25, 1703. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 25 

Wheelock, 8 at the rate of less than 200/. a year, and yet 
had much u to dispose of and spend beyond convenient 
living.'" The contrast between his expenses in Holland 
and at St. Giles' seems to have struck him forcibly. Unless 
the " mass of gardens and housing' can be brought into a 
cheaper way of maintenance," he will neither live at St. 
Giles', nor "keep in repair a place that eats up the estate 
belonging to it and makes its master a begg'ar." It appears 
that Shaftesbury returned to England, much improved in 
health, in August, 1704. During his absence from the 
House of Lords, his proxy was held, at least for a time, by 
Lord Somers. 9 Indeed, after his return from Holland, he 
seems to have attended Parliament only on very rare 
occasions. Though he had received immediate benefit from 
his stay abroad, symptoms of consumption were constantly 
alarming him, his eyes were very troublesome, and he 
gradually became a confirmed invalid. His occupations 
were now almost exclusively literary, and, from this time 
forwards, he, was probably engaged in writing, completing, 
or revising the Treatises which were afterwards included in 
the Characteristics} He still continued, however, to take a 
warm interest in politics, both home and foreign, and 
especially in the war against France. That he shared to 
the full in the national prejudices against the French is 
curiously shown in a letter to Arent Furly, a son of 
Mr. Furly and a great favourite of Locke, written Feb. 
18, 1704-5 : "Whatever flashes may now and then appear, 
I never knew one single Frenchman a free man. Nor do 

8 Shaftesbury to Wheelock, Dec. 18, 1703. 

9 Somers to Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury Papers, Bundle 20, No 87. 

1 Speaking of a somewhat later period, his son says : " The last five 
years of my father's life he employed himself altogether in writing, which 
was his principal amusement." Eough Draft of Life. 



26 SHAFTESBURY. 

I think it in nature possible, if they have early sucked 
that air, or been bred, though in foreign nations, amongst 
people and books of their own kind/'' Writing to the same 
correspondent on Dec. 5, 1705, he says: "Your former and 
latter advices, first of the successful attack, and next of the 
surrender of Barcelona" [due to the enterprise of the Earl 
of Peterborough and Sir Cloudesley Shovel], " with the whole 
progress of your councils, were of all news I ever received 
the most welcome." In a letter to Furly, the father, 
written on the 11th of October, 1706, from Hampstead, 
whither he had retired on account of the smoke of Chelsea, 
he doubts " whether the Whigs and Court, joining together, 
have interest enough, to carry their main point in Parliament, 
namely, the Union with Scotland, without which we shall be 
in great confusion because of the Succession.'''' The Govern- 
ment and the Court, he acknowledges in this letter, are every 
day growing better. In another letter to Furly, dated St. 
Giles', Dec. %, 1706, he speaks of the "sad prospect" it is 
" for either nation," England and Holland, ie to think of the 
fair prospect France has of getting such a part of Britain 
under the title of a new king, which, if the Queen's death 
at this instant should fatally happen, I scarce see how it 

would be prevented Nothing in truth but this 

happy alliance and the strong friendship between us and the 
Dutch can save this blow." Happily, on the 6th of March 
following (1706-7), the Bill for uniting the two kingdoms 
received the Royal Assent, and thus became law. 

Writing to Furly on March 26, 1708, Shaftesbury says 
that, though he is sure he has no partiality "for those who 
are called our ministry," yet he must do them justice, and he 
thinks that "they deserve far better of their country and 
Holland, and particularly of their sovereign, than as they are 
at present rated by some, both here in England and with 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 27 

you/'' At this time there was a rapprochement between 
Shaftesbury and Godolphiu, which forms one of the principal 
topics in the letters written to Robert (subsequently Viscount) 
Molesworth between September, 1708, and November, 1709, 
the collection prematurely published by Toland. The vigorous 
prosecution of the war against the French, and a loyal and 
hearty co-operation with Holland, were amongst the most 
cherished articles of Shaftesbury's political creed, and to 
these he regarded Godolphin, notwithstanding bis Tory con- 
nexions and antecedents, a faithful adherent. In fact, in 
the course of these last few years, Marlborough and Godol- 
phin, the General and the Treasurer, as they were called, 
had become such moderate Tories that they might almost be 
counted as Whigs. Moreover, the young Earl of Sunderland 
and Lord Cowper had now for some time been respectively 
Secretary of State and Lord Chancellor, and, in November, 
1708, even Somers was restored to office as Lord President 
of the Council. Thus, the favourable expressions with which 
Shaftesbury had come to speak of the ministry and the pre- 
vailing policy by no means marked an act of tergiversation 
on his part, but rather a cheerful recognition of the turn 
which affairs had taken since the beginning of the Queen's 
reign. That he was no trimmer, or timidly inclined to con- 
ciliate the party in office, is clear from the manly letter 
which he wrote, in 1711, to Harley, recently created Earl of 
Oxford, when thanking him for facilitating his arrangements 
for travelling abroad : 2 " Your conduct of the public will be 
the just earnest and insurance of your greatness and power ; 
and I shall then chiefly congratulate with your lordship on 

2 This letter is printed in the General Dictionary. The date March 
29, there giyen, is an error for May 29. Harley was not created Earl of 
Oxford and Mortimer till May 24. In Shaftesbury's Entry Book of 
Letters, the date is correctly copied. 



28 SHAFTESBURY. 

your merited honours and advancement, when by the happy 
effects it appears evidently in the service of what cause, and 
for the advantage of what interest, they were acquired and 
employed." 

Another topic prominent in the letters of Shaftesbury to 
Molesworth (who seems to have been specially selected as 
his confidant in this matter) is the love affair which occupied 
his mind in 1708 and the early part of 1709. He was now 
nearly forty years of age, but does not appear hitherto to 
have thought of marrying. His friends, however, and 
Molesworth among them, seem to have been urgent upon 
him to provide a successor to the title, as his brother ^Maurice 
did not appear any more inclined to marry than himself. 
The young lady whom Shaftesbury selected, and for whom 
he seems to have contracted a real affection, was the 
daughter of an " old lord," a person of great wealth and high 
position. It was apparently a case of love at first sight. 
" There is a lady, whom chance has thrown into my neigh- 
bourhood, and whom I never saw till the Sunday before last, 
who is in every respect that very person I had ever framed a 
picture of from my imagination, when I wished the best for 
my own happiness in such a circumstance.'''' " Every cir- 
cumstance suited exactly, all but her fortune." 3 This was 
not too small, but too large, and Shaftesbury was afraid of 
being thought a fortune-hunter. He was ready to take her 
without any dowry at all, but the " old lord " seems to have 
been afraid of engaging his daughter to a person in Shaftes- 
bury's precarious state of health, and the affair came to 
nothing. It is curious that Shaftesbury found, or imagined 
that he found, a rival in Charles Montague, Lord Halifax. 
Halifax, however, did not marry a lord's daughter, and we have 
now no clue to the young lady's name. Shortly after this 

3 Letters to Molesworth. Letter I. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 29 

match dropped through; Shaftesbury sought and obtained the 
hand of Miss Jane Ewer, a distant relative, the daughter of a 
gentleman in Hertfordshire, " with little or no fortune, and 
not in the highest degree of quality neither," but possessing 
the more important recommendations of " a right education," 
and of " simple innocence, modesty, and the plain qualities of 
a good mother and a good nurse." 4 The marriage took place 
in the autumn of 1709, and on Feb. 9, 1710-11, was born, 
at his house at Reigate in Surrey, his only child and heir, 
the fourth Earl, to whose account of his father I have so often 
referred. This match was in every respect a happy one, and 
the Countess appears to have tended her husband with the 
most affectionate solicitude. He, however, neither had, nor 
affected to have, much sentiment, though he had doubtless 
much regard and respect, for this lady of his second choice. 
" Were I to talk of marriage, and forced to speak my mind 
plainly, and without the help of humour and raillery, I should 
doubtless offend the most part of sober married people, and 
the ladies chiefly: for I should in reality think I did wonders, 
in extolling the happiness of my new state, and the merit of 
my wife in particular, by saying that I verily thought my- 
self as happy a man now as ever." 5 It was well that it was 
even so ; for, if we may trust Shaftesbury's account of the 
education of young girls at that time, 6 there must have been 
few, in the upper ranks of society, who were not calculated to 
make his home less happy than it was before. 7 

4 Letters to Molesworth. Letter XIII. 

5 Letters to Molesworth. Letter XIV. 

6 See Original Letters, Shaftesbury to Furly, Nov. 3, 1708. 

7 Mr. Garnett of the British Museum has kindly called my attention to 
two letters, written by Locke to Shaftesbuiy (then Lord Ashley), contained 
in the Forster Collection in the South Kensington Museum, dated re- 
spectively 5 Aug. and 15 Aug. 1699. In the former of these, Locke 
recommends to his former pupil, as a suitable wife, a "young lady, hand- 



30 SNA FTESB UR Y. 

"With the exception of a Preface to the Sermons of Dr. 
"vYhicheote, one of the Cambridge Platonists or Latitudi- 
narians, published in 1698, 8 Shaftesbury appears to have 
printed, nothing- himself till the year 1708. About this time, 
the French Prophets, as they were called, that is, the poor 
Cevenol Protestants, who had been hunted out of their native 
mountains and valleys by the troops of Louis XIV., and 
some of whom had taken refuse in England, attracted much 
attention by the extravagancies and follies of which they were 
guilty. Various remedies of the repressive and persecuting 
kind were proposed, but Shaftesbury maintained that fanati- 
cism was best encountered by " raillery " and " good 
humour." In support of this view he wrote a letter to 
Lord Somers, dated September, 1707. But the letter was 
not printed till the following year, and then without the 
name of either the author or the person to whom it was 
addressed. It was answered in the course of that and the 
next year by no less than three pamphlets. In May, 1709, 
Shaftesbury returned to the subject, and printed another 
Letter, entitled Sensus Communis : An Essay on the Freedom 
of Wit and Humour. In the same year, he also published 
The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody j and, in the follow- 
ing year, Soliloquy or Advice to an Author. None of these 
pieces, I believe, were printed either with his name or his 
initials. In 1711, appeared the Characteristics of Men, Man- 
ners, Opinions, Times, in Three Volumes, also without any name 
or initials on the title-page, and without even the name of a 

some, well-natured, well-bred, discreet, with a great many other good 
qualities/' and a fortune of twenty thousand pounds to boot, besides ex- 
pectancies. In the latter, he makes the sensible remark that " how much 
soever the world wonders that you do not marry, it is certain that you are 
the best judge when tbat ought to be." 

8 These Sermoiis, which had become very rare, were republished 
Edinburgh, with an introduction by Dr. W. Wishart, in 1742. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 31 

printer. There are, however, several capital letters at the 
end of the Preface, of which the first three, A. A. C, were 
intended to designate the name of the author. ' These three 
handsome volumes contain, in addition to the four treatises 
already mentioned. Miscellaneous Reflections, now first printed, 
and the Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit, described as 
"formerly printed from an imperfect copy, now corrected 
and published intire/" and as "printed first in the year 
1699." 9 

The declining- state of Shaftesbury's health rendered it 
necessary for him to seek a warmer climate, and in July, 
1711, he set out for Italy. The Duke of Berwick, natural 
son of James the Second, and now a Marshal of France, was 
in command of the French troops which lav encamped on the 
borders of Piedmont. It was necessary for Shaftesbury, in 
order to enter Italy, to pass through his army, but the Duke, 
we are informed, entertained him in the most friendly and 
polite manner, and conducted him safely to the dominions of 
the Duke of Savoy, one of our allies. He settled at Naples 
in November, and lived there considerably over a year. His 
health had now become so precarious that his son considers 
this a long time, and can only account for the prolongation 
of his life by referring it to "the excellence of the air of 
Italy and the uncommon care of my mother in attending 
him/" His principal occupation at this time must have con- 
sisted in preparing for the press a second edition of the 
Characteristics, which appeared in 1718, soon after his death. 
The copy, most carefully corrected in his own handwriting, 
is still preserved in the British Museum. The prints in this 

9 Lowndes speaks of an edition printed in 1709, bat I cm find no 
trace of such a book, and the description of the Treatise quoted in the 
test seems inconsistent with the existence of an intermediate edition. 



32 SHAFTESBURY. 

edition, as well probably as those which had appeared in the 
former edition, were all invented by himself, and designed 
under his immediate inspection. He was also engaged, 
during his stay at Naples, in writing the little treatise 
(afterwards included in the Characteristics) entitled, A Notion 
of the Historical Draught or Tahlature of the Judgment of 
Hercules, and the Letter concerning Design. The former 
was published in 1713 ; the latter, though it occurs in a large 
paper copy of the second edition, preserved in the British 
Museum, does not seem to have been generally included in 
the editions of the Characteristics till 1732. A little before 
his death, he had also formed a scheme of writing a Discourse 
on the Arts of Painting, Sculpture, Etching, &c, but, when 
he died, he had made but little progress with it. 1 " Medals, 
and pictures, and antiquities, " he writes to Furly, " are our 
chief entertainments here." His conversation was with men 
of art and science, " the virtuosi of this place." 

It is sad to find, in Shaftesbury's last letter to Furly, 
dated Naples, 19 July, 1712, that his view of the political 
condition of his own country and of the future of Europe 
had become so gloomy. ft You have known my heart many 
years, and that hitherto on all occasions I gave comfort, and 
was ever on the promising side ; till the fatal villainy of the 
seditious priest Sacheveril, and the fall of the old Ministry 
and Whigs, never was I dejected till this turn." Not only 
had Godolphin, and the leading Whigs, Somers, Halifax, 
Sunderland, Cowper, and Orford, ceased to take part in 
the royal counsels in or before the autumn of 1710, but, 
on the 31st of December, 1711, the great Duke of Marl- 
borough himself had been dismissed from all his employ- 

1 Amongst the Shaftesbury Papers, there is a common-place hook 
(Bundle 27, No. 15) which seems to contain heads and notes for this 
work. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 33 

merits. The Duke of Ormond succeeded Marlborough as 
Commander of the forces in Flanders, and at home Harley 
and St. John, the latter of whom had been created Viscount 
Bolingbroke a few days before Shaftesbury's letter to Furly 
was written, were now at the height of their power. But 
it was not so much the displacement of one party by 
another that troubled Shaftesbury, as the change in Eng- 
lish foreign policy which accompanied it. The Whigs, as 
well as Marlborough and Godolphin, had been eager sup- 
porters of the war and of the Grand Alliance. The Tories, 
in these matters, were suspected of being at least lukewarm, 
if not of rendering themselves subservient to the interests of 
France. In the negotiations which preceded the Treaty of 
Utrecht, it was plain that the English ministers were en- 
deavouring to make separate terms, and were basely deserting 
the interests of the allies. Marlborough, in his speech on the 
address in the House of Lords, at the beginning of June, 
had said : " The measures pursued in England for a year past 
are directly contrary to her Majesty's engagements with the 
Allies, have sullied the triumphs and glories of her reign, 
and will render the English name odious to all other nations.'" 2 
It was not merely, therefore, the petulance or despondency 
of an invalid, when Shaftesbury, in the letter quoted above, 
wrote to Furly, " to condole on the most sad shame and 
reproach of our nation, which I never thought to have lived 
to see, and which makes my sad health and little prospect of 
recovery the less grievous to me, as a means to end that 
sense of shame which I shall ever retain for my country, 
even though it should recover itself from these calamities such 
as it is like to bring on the rest of the world as well as on 
itself." As if conscious that he is writing his last letter to 

2 Lord Stanhope's Reign of Queen Anne, p. 528. 

D 



34 SHAFTESBURY. 

this constant and trusted correspondent, he adds, towards the 
conclusion: "But Providence is in all; and every honest 
man carries his reward within his breast. I have mine (I 
bless God) in a good conscience of having done my best, and 
even brought myself to this weak state of health by my 
cares and labours for the good interest and cause of liberty 
and mankind.'''' 

Shaftesbury did not live to see the actual conclusion of 
the peace of Utrecht, which was signed on March 31, 1713. 
He died the month before, Feb. 4, O.S., when he had not yet 
completed his. forty-second year Writing to Wheeloek on 
the 10th of January, and taking a tender farewell of him 
and his household, he speaks of his state as desperate, and 
his pains inexpressible. Crell, a young Pole, who was one of 
his proteges and had become his Secretary, wrote to Furly a 
few clays after his master's 3 death : " His Lordship was in a 
perfect resignation to the will of God, that he did not only 
bear his pains and agonies with patience, but also with perfect 
cheerfulness and the same sweetness of temper he always 
enjoyed in the most perfect health.'" 

Shaftesbury's amiability of character seems to have been 
one of his principal characteristics. All accounts concur in 
representing him as full of sweetness and kindliness towards 
others, though he may sometimes himself have been the 
victim of melancholy and despondency. Nor was his bene- 
volence confined to manner, expression, and words. His 
purse seems always to have been open, not only to the neces- 
sitous poor, but to persons in a higher station in whom he 

8 The use of the word servant at this time is curiously illustrated in 
Shaftesbury's last letter to Furly. Though he had sent Crell to Leyden 
and Cambridge, and was now employing him in the capacity of secretary, 
he speaks of him as one of his head-servants. Similarly, Crell speaks of 
Shaftesbury as his master. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 35 

discovered signs of promise or merit. Like Locke, he had a 
peculiar pleasure in bringing forward young men. Not only 
did he help them with money, but he was always ready to 
give them his advice and even his instruction. Michael 
Ainsworth, a native of St. Giles', the young man who was 
the recipient of the Letters addressed to a Student at the 
University, was maintained by him at University College, 
Oxford. The keen interest which Shaftesbury took in his 
studies, and the desire that he should be specially fitted for 
the profession which he had selected, that of a Clergyman of 
the Church of England, are marked features of the letters. 
Crell, the young Pole mentioned above, whom he maintained 
at Leyden and Cambridge, and Harry Wilkinson, a boy who 
was sent into Furly's office at Rotterdam, and to whom several 
of the extant letters are addressed, afford other instances of 
Shaftesbury's beneficence. The two young Furlys, though 
they were in no need of pecuniary assistance, were always 
objects of interest to him, and Arent, with whom he had 
read some of the classical authors,* seems to have been an 
especial favourite with him, as he was also with Locke. His 
kindness to literary men has already been noticed, in speaking 
of Toland. Le Clerc received 200/. from him for his dedica- 
tion of Menander. 5 When Des Maiseaux arrived in London, 
Shaftesbury pressed his services upon him. " If there be any 
service that I can do you, or that your circumstances need my 
assistance, I beg you would be free with me as with a friend. 
For T intend you shall use me so." 6 His careful solicitude 
for the welfare of the poor in his own neighbourhood, for the 
good order of his household, and for the exercise of due 
hospitality, not only to his tenants and neighbours, but also 

4 Original Letters. Shaftesbury to A. Furly, Dec. 5, 1705. 
s Kough draft of Life by the Fourth Earl. 
• Birch MSS. in British Museum, No. 4288. 
D 2 



36 SHAFTESBUR Y. 

to strangers and foreigners, are still attested in the directions 
given to his housekeeper. 7 She is to learn the character of 
the servants, whether men or women, and "to inform my 
Lord, that no ill customs be concealed, or anything of ill 
example carried on, to the prejudice of the family or con- 
trary to Religion or good manners/'' She is earnestly recom- 
mended to show hospitality to strangei's, " so much the more 
as they are the more strangers and from distant parts, but 
especially foreigners, if any pass this way in my Lord's 
absence.'" She is to u esteem it as a chief concern in charge 
with her to know the characters and condition of the neigh- 
bouring poor; that so my Lord may know by her what 
families deserve encouragement and reward, that charity may 
be rightly placed, and that what meat is distributed out of 
the house may be sent to honest families in distress, each in 
their turn/' The pernicious practice of distributing meat at 
the gate was specially forbidden, it being "to the great 
injury of the modest poor, and to the encouragement of 
vagabonds and others in this shameless and dissolute life." 
She is to enquire particularly of the children on the estate, 
" and of their schooling (which my Lord allows them), to 
make her remarks on the hopeful and sober children growing 
up, whom my Lord may be further kind to, or take afterwards 
into his service within doors or without." Lastly, all occur- 
rences in the family are to be communicated to my Lord by 
letter, in his absence, every Saturday night. These details 
are worthy of attention, because they show that Shaftesbury's 
benevolence was not confined to his ethical theories, but that 
it governed and pervaded his acts. No philosopher probably, 

7 Shaftesbury Papers, Bundle 22, No. 3. These papers contain a 
set of elaborate directions to the principal servants on his estate and in 
his household. The instructions for " Mrs. Cooper " are dated May 24, 
1707. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 37 

at least in modern times, ever attempted to show forth his 
philosophy in his life more completely than Shaftesbury. It 
has been said of Spinoza that he was .intoxicated with the 
idea of God. It might be said with equal truth of Shaftes- 
bury that he was intoxicated with the idea of Virtue, and 
Virtue with him meant, above all things, benevolence and 
care for others. 

Nor was Shaftesbury's benevolence simply of a private 
character. Though the asthma from which he suffered 
prevented him from appearing much in Parliament, he was 
always intensely interested in public affairs, and ready to 
sacrifice to what he deemed the public interest his time, his 
money, and even his health. To the intensity of his political 
interests and the severity of his studies combined, his son 
ascribes the shortness of his life. " His life would probably 
have been much longer, if he had not worn it out by great 
fatigues of body and mind, which was owing to his eager 
desire after knowledge as well as to his zeal to serve his 
country ; for he was so intent on pursuing his studies that 
he frequently spent not only the whole day but great part 
of the night besides in severe application, which confirmed the 
truth of Mr. Locke's observation on him that the sword was 
too sharp for the scabbard/' 8 

In the popular mind, Shaftesbury is generally regarded as a 
writer hostile to religion. But, however short his orthodoxy 
might fall if tried by the standards of any particular church, and 
however mistaken might be the conception which he had formed 
for himself of the effects of the Christian teaching prevalent in 
his day, his temperament was pre-eminently a religious one. 
This fact is shown conspicuously in his letters, where he had 
no reason for making any secret of his opinions. The belief 
in a God, all wise, all just, and all merciful, governing the 

8 Rough Draft of Life by the Fourth Earl. 



38 SHAFTESBURY. 

world providentially for the best, pervades all his works, his 
correspondence, and his life. Nor had he any wish to under- 
mine established beliefs, except where he conceived that they 
conflicted with a truer religion and a purer morality. We 
have seen that he charged himself with the education of at 
least one young man for the purpose of enabling him to 
enter Holy Orders in the Church of England. He expresses 
the most genuine admiration for the character of the Bishop 
of his own diocese, Bishop Burnet. 9 To Dr. Whichcote's 
Sermons, he wrote a most appreciative Preface, hoping that 
" if they who are set against Christianity cannot be won 
over by anything that they may find here/'' yet that " the 
excellent spirit which is shown here will make such as are 
already Christians to prize and value Christianity the more." 
According to his son, 1 " whenever his health permitted, he 
was constant in attending the services of the Church of 
England, and received the Holy Communion regularly three 
or four times a year. He had read the Scriptures so 
diligently that, to assist his memory, he made short obser- 
vations in the margin of almost every chapter throughout 
the Old and New Testament." In a letter to his brother 
Maurice, quoted both by the Fourth Earl and in the General 
Dictionary , he speaks with great satisfaction of their having 
received the Communion together, and of their joining " in 

blessing that good Providence which had given 

us such established rites of worship as were so decent, chaste, 

innocent, pure, and had placed us in a church where 

zeal was not frenzy and enthusiasm ; prayer and devotion not 
rage and fits of loose extravagance ; religious discoveries not 
cant and unintelligible nonsense ; but where a good and 
virtuous life, with a hearty endeavour of service to one's 

9 Letters to a Young Man at the University. Letter X. 
1 Eough Draft of Life. 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 39 

country and to mankind, joined with a religious performance 
of all sacred duties and a conformity with the established 
rites, was enough to answer the highest character of 
Religion.'''' This language is not very fervid, but it is as 
remote as possible from that of a scoffer. As his son very 
truly says, it was not Religion that he derided, but the 
appearance of it. The light air, approaching often to banter, 
with which at times he unfortunately discussed sacred topics, 
is no proof that he did not recognize their saeredness. " He 
was naturally of a cheerful temper, which he carried with him 
in all parts of life, and with this turn of mind he looked 
upon Religion as well as Philosophy, and thought good 
humour very consistent with the most pleasing subject in the 
world." 2 

As regards personal habits, Shaftesbury is reported to have 
been remarkably abstemious at a time when riotous living 
was the rule amongst the upper classes of society, and not 
the exception. " He never impaired his health by intempe- 
rance, for he was sober in every respect, to such a degree as 
might be called properly enough even abstinence." 3 

His friends he attached warmly to him, and he seems to 
have won the sincere admiration of many of the most 
eminent among his contemporaries. Sir John Cropley 
(whose house at Betch worth was frequently his home) was 
his fast friend throughout life. With Furly he kept up a 
long and intimate correspondence, and his Dutch friends 
generally seem to have been faithful to him, and he to them. 
The personal relations between him and Locke, notwith- 
standing the wide divergence of their philosophical views, 
appear never to have cooled. With Robert (afterwards Lord) 
Molesworth and Lord Somers he was always on terms of the 

s Kough Draft of Life. 
3 Eou<j;h Draft of Life, 



4 o SHAFTESBURY. 

strictest confidence. Somers writes to him not merely as a 
political ally, but as a friend and as one for whom he has a 
real regard. Molesworth, who had no special reason fcr 
flattering" him, speaks of him as "possessing right reason in 
a more eminent degree than the rest of mankind," and of 
his character as "the highest that the perfection of human 
nature is capable of." 4 Even Warburton, in his Dedication 
of the Divine Legation to the Free-Thinkers, is compelled to 
" own that this Lord had many excellent qualities, both as a 
man and a writer. He was temperate, chaste, honest, and a 
lover of his country." 

As an earnest student, an ardent lover of liberty, an 
enthusiast in the cause of virtue, and a man of unblemished 
life and untiring beneficence, Shaftesbury probably had no 
superior in his generation. His character and pursuits are 
the more remarkable, considering the rank of life in which 
he was born and the circumstances under which he was 
brought up. In many respects, he reminds us of the imperial 
philosopher, Marcus Aurelius, whose works we know him to 
have studied with avidity, 5 and whose influence is unmistake- 
ably stamped upon his own productions. 

4 E. Molesworth to Shaftesbury, Nov. 12, 1709. Shaftesbury Papers, 
Bundle 21, No. 180. 

5 " Among the writings which he most admired, and carried always with 
him, were the moral works of Xenopbon, Horace, the Commentaries and 
Enchiridion of Epictetus as published by Arrian, and Marcus Antoninus. 
These authors are now extant in his library, filled throughout with 
marginal notes, references, and explanations, all written with his own 
hand." Life in the General Dictionary. As Dr. Kippis says, in the 
Life in the Biographia Britannica, Plato ought undoubtedly to have 
been added to this list. Amongst the Shaftesbury Papers (Bundle 27) 
there are included neat transcripts of translations of the Enchiridion and 
of Bk. 1, chs. 1 — 28, of the Commentaries of Epictetus, but whether these 
are copies of translations made by Shaftesbury himself I cannot say. 

It may here be mentioned that in the same bundle there is a " Design 



LIFE AND CHARACTER. 41 

Lord Shaftesbury's body was brought back to England by 
sea and buried at St. Giles'. His wife long survived him. 
His son lived to be an estimable nobleman, and evidently 
looked back with pride and reverence on his father's memory. 
His brother Maurice, notwithstanding his miserable failure 
to acquire any knowledge of Latin and Greek at Winchester, 
published a translation of Xenophon's Cyropadia, with an 
Introduction to his sister, which passed through some 
editions. This sister, Elizabeth, married a Mr. Harris, 
ancestor of the present Earl of Malmesbury, by whom she 
had a son, James Harris, author of several semi-philosophical 
works, such as Hermes, Philological Enquiries, &c., which at 
one time had a wide circulation. Though Shaftesbury was 
one of the eai'liest of English moralists, and died so long 
ago as 1712-13, the present Earl is only his great- 
grandson. 

for a Socratic History," to be gathered from the original sources, in 
Shaftesbury's own handwriting. Several notes and memoranda had 
already been collected. Also, in the second edition of the Biographia 
Sritannica, are printed numerous Latin notes on the Satires and Epistles 
of Horace, written in the margin of his copy of that author. 



42 SHAFTESBURY. 



CHAPTER II. 

WORKS AND STYLE. 

All the works which Shaftesbury designed to be printed, 
with the exception of the Preface to Dr. "YVhichcote's 
Sermons, are contained in the editions of the Characteristics 
dating- from 1732 onwards. Of the style and contents of the 
several treatises comprised in this collection, I shall have 
occasion to speak presently. It is sufficient to state here that 
the Characteristics have passed through several editions, most 
of which are distinguished for the elegance of their execution 
and the excellence of their typography. The most sumptuous 
of these is the celebrated Baskerville Edition, printed at Bir- 
mingham in 1773 ; the most recent is that edited, with an 
Introduction and Notes, by the Rev. W. M. Hatch for 
Longmans and Co. in 1870, of which, owing to the untimely 
death of the Editor, only one volume was published. 

But, in addition to the works which he intended for pub- 
lication, several letters of the Author of the Characteristics 
have at various times found their way into print. The earliest 
collection of this kind was that entitled Several Letters 
written by a Noble Lord to a Young Man at the University , 
first printed in 1716. By whom they were published I am 
not aware. They are addressed to Michael Ainsworth, a 
student at University College, Oxford, who had been taken, 
as a child, out of a poor and numerous family into Shaftes- 



WORKS AND STYLE. 43 

bury's household. The Earl, " finding" his ingenuity/ 5 "em- 
ployed him in nothing servile/' but " put him abroad to the 
best schools// At first he was destined for some other pro- 
fession, but, " the serious temper of the lad disposing him to 
the ministry," his patron maintained him at the University 
and enabled him to carry out his wishes. 1 These are the only 
published letters of Shaftesbury which, from a literary and 
philosophical point of view, present much interest. They 
breathe the same disinterested love of God and Virtue which 
are so distinctive of the Characteristics, and, being written 
with more freedom and, apparently, with no design of being- 
published, they present the author in a less formal light, and 
more, as it were, at home. " Honest Michael/ 5 as he is 
generally called in the originals, must have been much de- 
lighted with these scraps of his patron's philosoph}', and still 
more with the interest which the great man took in his 
studies and difficulties. Shaftesbury seems much pleased at 
his protege having been bold enough to commence the study 
of Greek. " 'Twas providential, surely, that I should happen 
once to speak to you of the Greek language ; when you asked 
concerning the foundations of learning, and the source and 
fountain of those lights we have, whether in morality or 
divinity. " "I pray God prosper you in your daring attempt, 
and bless you with true modesty and simplicity in all the 
other endeavours and practices of your life, as you have had 
courage and mighty boldness in this one.'" a Michael had 
fallen across Simplicius' Commentary on Ejnctetus, and ex- 
pressed the pleasure with which he had read it. No descrip- 
tion of study could be more acceptable to his patron than 

1 Copy of a letter to Bishop Burnet, dated May 23, 1710, introducing 
the youth as a candidate for Holy Orders, in Shaftesbury Papers, Bundle 
22, No. 7. 

3 Letter Y. 



44 SHAFTESBURY. 



this. For Shaftesbury, like Epictetus himself, thinks little 
of learning which has no ethical end, which " has not a direct 
tendency to render us honester, milder, juster, and better." 
He recommends Michael to suspend for a while his reading- of 
Epictetus, and to study, as more within his compass, the Table 
of Cebes, the easier portions of Marcus Antoninus, and the 
First and Second Alcibiades of Plato. But he must not be 
so absorbed by his studies as to neglect his health. "For 
never do we more need a just cheerfulness, good humour, or 
alacrity of mind, than when we are contemplating God and 
Virtue. So that it may be assigned as one cause of the 
austerity and harshness of some men's divinity, that in 
their habit of mind, and by that very morose and sour temper 
which they contract with their hard studies, they make the 
idea of God so much after the pattern of their own bitter 
spirit." In this same letter (the most interesting of the series), 
the master advises his pupil, whose " endeavour and hope it 
is to know God and goodness," to lay aside all fear, "which is 
so wholly unworthy of God, and so debasing to his standard 
of reason," and " to look impartially into all authors, and upon 
all nations, and into all parts of learning and human life ; 
to seek and find out the true jmlchrum, the honestum, the 
tcaXov, by which standard and measure we may know God, 
and know how to praise him, when we have learnt what is 
praise- worthy." " Be this your search," he continues, " and 
by these means and by this way I have shewn you. Seek for 
the kcl\6v in every thing, beginning as low as the plants, the 
fields, or even the common arts of mankind, to see what is 
beauteous, and what contrary. Thus, and by the original 
fountains you are arrived to, you will, under providence, attain 
beauty and true wisdom for yourself, being true to virtue : 
and so God prosper you." 

Among the most interesting features of these letters are 



WORKS AND STYLE. 45 

the apparently discordant passages which they contain on 
Locke. In the first letter, after decrying" the " riddles of the 
schoolmen/' he proceeds to say : " However, I am not sorry 
that I lent you Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding ; 
which may as well qualify for business and the world, as for 
the sciences and an university. No one has done more 
towards the recalling of philosophy from barbarity into use 
and practice of the world. No one has opened a better and 
clearer way to reasoning." Above all, his attempt to bring 
the use of reason into religion ought to be welcomed by 
Church of England men, as furnishing them with the only 
weapon with which they can combat visionaries and enthu- 
siasts. But, in the eighth letter, there occurs an elaborate 
attack on Locke's philosophy, especially on his ethical theories, 
and on his rejection of innate or, as Shaftesbury would prefer 
to call them, connatural ideas. " Mr. Locke, as much as I 
honour him on account of other writings (namely, on govern- 
ment, policy, trade, coin, education, toleration, &c), and as 
well as I knew him, and can answer for his sincerity as a 
most zealous Christian and believer, did however go in the 
self-same track" as Hobbes, " and is followed by the Tindals, 
and all the other ingenious free authors of our time." " 'Twas 
Mr. Locke that struck the home blow : for Mr. Hobbes' 
character and base slavish principles in government took off 
the poison of his philosophy. 'Twas Mr. Locke that struck 
at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the 
world, and made the very ideas of these (which are the same 
as those of God) unnatural, and without foundation in our 
minds." The passage is too long to quote at length, but it is 
the less necessary that I should do so, as I shall have occasion to 
recur to the subject in a subsequent chapter. 3 It may be enough 

3 See ch. 3, pp. 100—102. 



46 SHAFTESBURY. 



to say here that I can see no inconsistency between these two 
judgments. In the first passage, Shaftesbury is commending' 
Locke's style and method, his treating philosophical cpjestions 
not as a pedant but as a man of the world, and his insisting 
on the competence of reason to deal with all questions alike, 
as well of religion and morals as of philosophy and common 
life. In the second passage, he is combating Locke's par- 
ticular account of the origin of our moral and religious ideas 
and of the ultimate source of moral obligations. On these 
points, Shaftesbury's system differed fundamentally from 
that of Locke, and, therefore, we need feel no surprise that, 
when he has occasion to compare the two, he speaks with 
warmth and with a full consciousness of the issues at stake, 
much as he might esteem the character of his old master and 
even the general tone and spirit of the Essay. 

The originals of most of these letters were added some 
years ago to the Shaftesbury Papers, as well as a few other 
letters to Ainsworth, which, however, are not of much 
importance. Letter VI. of the printed series is wanting, as 
well as Letter IX., though most of the concluding paragraph 
of the latter occurs in a letter dated May 8 [? 1710]. Letter 
X. has been considerably tampered with. The bulk of the 
original letter refers exclusively to private matters, such as 
the position which Ainsworth was to occupy, as Chaplain, in 
Shaftesbury's family. The paragraphs on the high-church 
clergy, their " insolence, riot, pride, presumption," &c, have 
been transferred from another letter written to Ainsworth, 
when he was about to enter Priest's orders. This letter was 
dated Reigate, 11 May, 1711. A copy of it is contained 
in a letter-book, Shaftesbury Papers, Bundle 22, No. 7. The 
omitted portions of Letter X. are interesting, as illustrating 
the social position of the Clergy at that time* Shaftesbury 
was evidently anxious to do all in his power to further the 



WORKS AND STYLE. 47 

interests and increase the consideration of young- Ainsworth. 
For that purpose, he determined to give his protege a good 
start in his profession, by taking him into his own household, 
in the capacity of chaplain. Michael, whose poor parents, 
we must recollect, were probably still living in the parish, 
was occasionally to dine at my Lord's own table, and at all 
times was to have "the convenience of the second table, with 
those of good condition and gentile circumstances.'" This 
advantageous offer is made, " not fearing that you will receive 
any prejudice by it in your modesty and humility." 

In 1721, Toland published a small volume of letters, with 
a somewhat lengthy introduction. This collection contains 
fourteen letters from Shaftesbury to Molesworth, together 
with two from Sir John Cropley, Shaftesbury's intimate 
friend, also addressed to Molesworth. These letters are 
interesting as illustrating Shaftesbury's political relations 
during the years 1708 and 1709, but they relate chiefly to 
his unsuccessful love-affair with the daughter of the " old 
lord/' and his subsequent marriage with Miss Ewer. They 
ought certainly never to have been published during the life- 
time of the two ladies, and we need feel no surprise at the 
bitter terms in which the Fourth Earl speaks of the editor. 
Toland was a swaggering Irishman, who bragged of his 
acquaintance with men like Locke and Shaftesbury, often 
exaggerating mere notice or friendliness into intimacy. 4 
Being in needy circumstances, there is no doubt he was 
under a strong temptation to turn a penny by writing or 

4 See the correspondence between Molyneaux and Locke, in 1697, 
where there are several paragraphs referring to Toland's conduct in 
Ireland. See also Limborch to Locke, Aug. 3, 1699 ; Sept. 5, 1699. 
Limborch complains that, though he had never seen him, Toland boasted 
of his acquaintance and confidence. 



48 SHAFTESBURY. 



editing books in season and out of season, but this particular 
offence was unpardonable. He had received much kindness 
from Shaftesbury, as well probably as from Molesworth, and 
he has the effrontery to own that the latter had no intention, 
in presenting him with the letters, that he should publish 
them so soon. 

In the account of Shaftesbury in the General Dictionary, 
an extract from a letter to Stringer, and two letters addressed 
respectively to Lord Oxford and Lord Godolphin were pub- 
lished for the first time. From two of these I have already 
made quotations. 

In 1746, and again in 1750 and 1758, all these letters 
were published together in one volume. The last named 
edition, which counts as the fourth volume of an edition of 
the Characteristics, also contains the Preface to Dr. "Which- 
cote's Sermons. 

A volume, entitled Original Letters of Locke, Sidney, and 
Shaft eshiry, was published by Mr. T. Forster in 1880, and an 
enlarged edition, by his permission, in 1847. Mr. Forster's 
grandfather, Edward Forster of Walthamstow, had married a 
grand-daughter of Benjamin Furly, an English merchant in 
Rotterdam, whose name has already occurred so frequently in 
these pages. As Shaftesbury's letters are all addressed to 
Furly himself, his sons, or his clerk, Harry Wilkinson, there 
could be little doubt of their authenticity, even if the 
originals were not extant. But, with a few exceptions, the 
originals, which are undoubtedly in Shaftesbury's hand- 
writing, are now included amongst the Shaftesbury Papers in 
the Record Office. In addition to these, there are in the 
same collection, a few other letters addressed to Furly, inte- 
resting as specimens of the epistolary correspondence of the 
time, though not of much intrinsic importance. The letters 



WORKS AND STYLE. 49 

to Furly himself are mainly political, and illustrate Shaftes- 
bury's zeal for liberty, his affection for the Dutch States, his 
fear and hatred of France, and the eagerness with which he 
welcomed and clung- to the Grand Alliance. 5 They betray 
the keenest sense of an identity of interests between England 
and Holland, a feeling 1 which was no doubt reciprocated by 
Furly, and which mainly accounts for the frequency of 
the correspondence. But these letters not only exhibit 
Shaftesbury's patriotism and passion for liberty, but also his 
kindness of heart and love of his friends. His affection and 
respect for the Furly family, and his interest in all their 
doings are apparent throughout. Still more, perhaps, are we 
struck with these amiable characteristics in the letters to 
Harry Wilkinson and the two young Furlys. He is ever 
ready to guide, advise, or help them, and he writes not in the 
conventional manner of a patron, but with a genuine human 
concern for them and their affairs. Perhaps, in his corre- 
spondence with Wilkinson, as in that with Ainsworth, he 
harps too frequently, for our taste, on the virtues of humility, 
modesty, and obedience, but then, in those times, these were 
subjects on which elders spoke more freely to their juniors 
than we do in ours. It might be well, perhaps, for the 
young men of our day, if parents and instructors, instead of 
constantly goading their ambition, would occasionally address 
to them some such wholesome language as this : " I had 
rather at any time receive from you one sound proof of your 
honesty, fidelity, good nature, modesty, and humility, than a 
thousand of your ability, good fortune, and success.'" 

6 Most of these letters are unsigned. In a letter dated Aug. 5 [1700], 
Shaftesbury says: " With a little caution, one may write anything by 
the post ; only 'tis best not to put a name to it, for we know one another's 
hands, and, though others may know them, yet it is not the same ad- 
vantage to them, as when they have the name." 

E 



50 SHAFTESBURY. 



So far as I am aware, T have now given an account of all 
the published letters of Shaftesbury, except the letter to Le 
Clerc on his recollections of Locke, which was published in 
Notes and Queries, Feb. 8, 1851, and from which I quoted at 
the beginning- of the last chapter. 

The Preface to Dr. Whichcote's Sermons was written in 
1698, when Shaftesbury was only twenty-eight years of age. 
What is mainly interesting in it is to find that he has already 
adopted the Benevolent Theory of Morals. Whichcote's 
Sermons had attracted him by the favourable light in which 
they represented human nature, by their frank recognition of 
a " secret sympathy " in man with virtue and honesty, and 
by the contrast which they thus offered to the philosophical 
teaching of Hobbes and the theological teaching of the 
Calvinistic divines. Hobbes, " in reckoning up the passions 
or affections by which men are held together in society, forgot 
to mention kindness, friendship, sociableness, love of 'company 
and converse, natural affection, or anything of this kind." 
The Calvinistic divines, in order to support their distorted 
scheme of theology, had magnified the corruption of the 
human heart. But " our excellent divine, and truly Christian 
philosopher," by appearing " in defence of natural goodness/' 
may be called " the preacher of good nature." 



Of the treatises composing the Characteristics, the first is 
entitled "A Letter concerning Enthusiasm." The circum- 
stances which occasioned its production have already been 
mentioned. It is somewhat rambling and inconsecutive, and 
partakes more of the nature of an ephemeral pamphlet 
than of a philosophical treatise, though, at the same time, it 
must be acknowledged that it contains individual passages of 



WORKS AND STYLE. 51 

great force, and even beauty. The main thesis is that there 
is a true and a false enthusiasm, and that the only way of 
distinguishing- between them is by applying the test of 
ridicule. To judge of anything aright, especially in matters 
of religion and morality, we must be in a good humour. 
" Good Humour is not only the best security against 
Enthusiasm, but the best foundation of Piety and True 
Religion." " Nothing beside ill humour, either natural or 
forced, can bring a man to think seriously that the world is 
governed by any devilish or malicious power," and it is ill 
humour, he thinks, which is the cause of atheism. 
Opinions which claim to be exempted from raillery and from 
discussion afford presumptive evidence of their falsity. 
" Gravity is of the very essence of Imposture.'''' So far as 
ridicule and raillery add point and illustration to an 
argument, we may go along with Shaftesbury. But it must 
not be forgotten that ridicule, especially when applied to sacred 
matters, is, from mere force of contrast, very easily excited, 
and that many opinions, of which we have no reasonable 
doubt, might, with a little dexterity, be represented in the 
most ludicrous light. The fact that a practice or opinion is 
open to ridicule is only an argument against it, when, under- 
lying the ridicule, there is some valid reason, which admits of 
being stated in a sober, though perhaps a less pointed, form. 
Ridicule, m fact, is a weapon of rhetoric rather than of 
logic; useful indeed, but requiring justification for its 
employment. 

Less open to question are the attacks which Shaftesbury 
makes in this treatise on unworthy notions of God and on 
the spirit of religious persecution. We can only know Gafi 
aright, when we have learnt to distinguish between what As 
praise-worthy and blame- worthy in ourselves. " Methinks) it 
would be well for us, if, before we ascended into the higher 

k 2 



52 SHAFTESBURY. 



regions of Divinity, we would vouchsafe to descend a little 
into ourselves, and bestow some poor thoughts upon plain, 
honest Morals. When we had once looked into ourselves, 
and distinguished well the nature of our own affections, we 
should probably be fitter judges of the Divineness of a 
character, and discern better what affections were suitable or 
unsuitable to a perfect being. We might then understand 
how to love or praise, when we had acquired some consistent 
notion of what was laudable or lovely." " Eeason, if we will 
trust to it, will demonstrate to us, that God is so good as to 
exceed the very best of us in Goodness. And after this 
manner we can have no dread or suspicion to render us 
uneasy ; for it is Malice only, and not Goodness, which can 
make us afraid." To attempt to bring about uniformity in 
religious beliefs by legal compulsion is at once to fan the 
spirit of sectarianism and to check the growth of a true 
theology. " If Magistracy should vouchsafe to interpose 
thus much in other sciences, I am afraid we should have as 
bad Logic, as bad Mathematics, and in every kind as bad 
Philosophy, as we often have Divinity in countries where a 
precise orthodoxy is settled by law." " To prescribe bounds 
to Fancy and Speculation, to regulate men's apprehensions 
and religious beliefs or fears, to suppress by violence the 
natural passion of Enthusiasm, or to endeavour to ascertain it, 
or reduce it to one species, or bring it under any one modifi- 
cation, is in truth no better sense, nor deserves a better 
character, than what the Comedian declares of the like project 
in the affair of love — 

Nihilo plus agas 
Quam si des operam ut cum ratione insanias." 8 

History has shown that Ridicule, and not Punishment, is 

6 Terence, Eun. Act I. Sc. 1. 



WORKS AND STYLE. 53 

the most effective weapon against Fanaticism. " It was here- 
tofore the wisdom of some wise nations, to let people be fools 
as much as they pleased, and never to punish seriously what 
deserved only to be laughed at, and was, after all, best cured 
by that innocent remedy/' 

The second treatise, on the "Freedom of Wit and Humour," 
is even more desultory than the first. Its main object seems 
to be to defend the position taken up in the Letter on Enthu- 
siasm, that false or dangerous opinions are best disposed of 
by raillery and ridicule. But the author wanders into a dis- 
cussion on the moral and political system of Hobbes, to which 
he applies with much effect his favourite weapon of banter, 
and, in opposition to it, starts his own theories, more fully and 
formally developed in the subsequent treatises, — of the origin 
of society in the family relation, of the reality and disin- 
terested character of the benevolent affections, and of the 
analogy between art and virtue or the applicability to human 
actions and human characters of the idea of beauty. As all 
these topics will come before us in the next chapter, where 
I shall consider at length Shaftesbury's ethical system, it is 
unnecessary to dwell upon them here. In discussing his main 
topic, Shaftesbury remarks very well that " it is the perse- 
cuting spirit that has raised the bantering one/' and that, 
though he can " very well suppose men may be frighted out 
of their wits, he has no apprehension they should be laughed 
out of them." It may be noticed that this treatise contains a 
covert sneer at the Christian Scriptures for not recognizing 
the virtues of private friendship and public spirit. The rela- 
tions of Christ to his Apostles, and of the Apostles and first 
preachers of Christianity to one another, surely supply ex- 
amples of some of the closest and most sacred friendships 
which have ever obtained among: men. Patriotism is un- 



54 SHAFTESBURY. 



doubteclly a virtue of which it is not easy to find traces in 
the New Testament, but, when all the world was under one 
empire, there could be little opportunity for the display of 
public spirit amongst the subject races, unless it took the 
form of opposition to the existing' government, an opposition 
which, in all probability, would have been not only futile but 
most disastrous to the interests of the country in which it 
originated. 

The treatise, third in order, is entitled " Soliloquy, or 
Advice to an Author." Under this vague title are included a 
number of miscellaneous reflections, the connexion of which 
is sometimes not very obvious. The importance of self-con- 
verse and self-knowledge ; the character of the classical 
Dialogue ; the advantages which would accrue to kings and 
nobles from bestowing a liberal and discriminating patronage 
on arts and letters ; the value and history of criticism ; a 
comparison of the different styles which obtained in Greek 
Literature ; the spirit of truthfulness which ought to guide 
the good workman, whether in art, letters, or actions ; the 
worthlessness of the school logic and philosophy, and its 
powerlessness in directing the conduct of life ; the superiority 
of ethical to all other knowledge, and of the gratification of 
the benevolent affections to all other pleasures; the parallelism 
between beauty of external form and beauty of character, a 
correct taste in art and in morals ; the foundation in nature, 
as distinct from mere fashion and custom, of both ethical and 
sesthetic distinctions : these are among the various topics, 
discussed with much ease, but with rather too much prolixity, 
in this third Treatise. Speaking of it in the Miscellaneous 
Reflections, the author himself says of it : " His pretence 
has been to advise Authors .and polish Styles; but his aim 
has been to correct Manners, and regulate Lives/' The 



WORKS AND STYLE. 55 

literary character of the piece is disfigured by the irrelevant 
introduction at the end of some scoffing" remarks on religious 
controversy and the heroes of the Old Testament. Those 
who are familiar with the writings of Mr. Ruskin will find 
that Shaftesbury maintains with him that it is only the good 
man who can be the good artist. " For Knavery is mere 
dissonance and disproportion," and, as Strabo says, 7 "it is 
impossible to be a good poet, unless you are first a good man." 
Another peculiar feature in the Treatise is the scorn which 
Shaftesbury pours on the prevalent taste for reading books of 
strange adventure and descriptions of barbarous countries. 
The scientific interest which now attaches to the manners, 
opinions, and institutions of savages had, at that time, been 
only imperfectly awakened, and the significance of the study 
of primaeval man was understood but by few writers, and by 
them but very imperfectly. A rude love of the grotesque and 
the marvellous was what probably attracted most readers to 
this kind of literature, and hence, valuable as are the fruits 
which have since resulted from this taste, the reproof was 
then by no means undeserved. 

The Second Volume contains the two treatises which, from 
the point of view of the Moralist, are far the most important 
in the work. The " Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit," 
which constitutes the fourth treatise, may be regarded as 
Shaftesbury's formal contribution to the Science of Ethics, 
It raises the questions, What is Virtue ; Wherein consists the 
Obligation to it ; What are its relations to Religion, to Society, 
and to the Individual. As the answers to these questions, 
and Shaftesbury's moral system generally, will be examined 
at length in the succeeding chapter, it would simply involve 

7 ov\ oiov re ayadov yevecrdai TroirjTrjv, p,rj irporepov yevrjdevTaavftpa ayadov. 
Strabo, Bk. I., cb. 2, quoted by Shaftesbury. 



56 SHAFTESBURY. 



repetition were I to enter upon them here. I shall, therefore, 
at present dismiss this treatise, merely remarking that no one 
wishing to acquaint himself even superficially with the history 
of moral speculation in England, during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, can afford to pass it by without a careful 
reading. 

The Moralists, "a Philosophical Rhapsody," as it is entitled, 
is thrown into the form of a Dialogue, and is obviously 
written in imitation of the Dialogues of Plato. This form 
of composition had already been applied to the discussion of 
questions of philosophy and natural theology in the Divine 
Dialogues of Dr. Henry More, and was soon to be rendered 
famous by the Dialogues of Bishop Berkeley, whose Eylas 
and Pkilonous was published four years after the first appear- 
ance of the Moralists. "With the exception of a few pages at 
the beginning and the end, the interest is well sustained 
throughout. Bishop Hurd says that, in English, there are 
three dialogues, and but three, that are fit to be mentioned, 
namely, the Moralists of Lord Shaftesbury, Mr. Addison's 
Treatise on Medals, and the Minute Philosopher of Bishop 
Berkeley; but he goes on to blame them all for using 
fictitious, instead of real, characters. 8 As the Inquiry con- 
cerning Virtue is Shaftesbury's principal contribution to 
Ethics, so the Moralists is mainly intended to unfold his 
views on Eeligion and Theology. It is an elaborate ex- 
position of Theism and Optimism, with occasional excursions 
into the domains of Art and Morals. Leibnitz, whose 
Theodicee was published in the following year (1710), was 
surprised to find that the most striking features of his own 
theories of God and the Universe had been anticipated before 



8 Preface to the Moral and Political Dialogues, quoted in the Article 
on Shaftesbury in the Diograpliia Britanniea. 



WORKS AND STYLE. 57 

his book saw the light. 9 Shaftesbury, in the person of 
Theocles, expounds his optimistic system, and, as an example 
of legitimate enthusiasm, breaks out into a passionate address, 
a sort of prose hymn, to Nature and her Author. His faults 
of style (of which I shall speak presently) are conspicuous 
even in this Dialogue, but yet there is an undoubted charm 
about it, and to the student of the history of English 
literature it is peculiarly interesting on account of its con- 
nexion with Pope's Essay on Man. The philosophical and 
theological views which it embodies I must reserve for exa- 
mination in future chapters. 

The Third Volume, in the original edition, was entirely 
occupied with the piece entitled " Miscellaneous Reflections.'" 
Curiously enough, this piece is described in the later editions 
of the Characteristics as having been first printed in the year 
1714, though it was then merely reprinted, with hardly any 
alterations, from the first edition of 1711. It was designed 
partly to defend, partly to supplement the treatises which had 
preceded it. In the second Miscellany, Shaftesbury takes 
great pains to show that he had not intended, in his first 
Treatise, to decry Enthusiasm generally and absolutely, but 
only the abuses and misapplications of it. " So far is the 
Author from degrading Enthusiasm, or disclaiming it in him- 
self, that he looks on this passion as the most natural, and its 
object as the justest in the world. Even Virtue itself he 
takes to be no other than a noble Enthusiasm justly directed, 

9 J'y ai trouve* d'abord presque toute ma Theodicee (mais plus 

agreablement tournee) avant qu'elle eut vu le jour Si 

j'avois vu cet ouvrage avant la publication de ma Theodicee, j 'en aurois 
profite comme il faut, et j'en aurois enrprunte de grands passages." Des 
Maizeaux, Eecueil de diverses Pieces par M. Leibnitz, &c, tome ii., 
p. 283. 



58 SHAFTESBURY. 



and regulated by that high standard which he supposes is the 
nature of things." ' The philosophical value of the piece is 
marred by digressions on such subjects as the derivation of 
the Jewish religion from the Egyptian, the policy of the 
Church of Home, the self-seeking of the clergy, &c. But, 
notwithstanding the desultory character of these miscellaneous 
reflections, they are easy and agreeable reading, and contain 
several passages which illustrate or give point to the more 
formal discussions in the fourth and fifth treatises. In 
Misc. III., eh. 2, for example, there occurs a peculiarly happy 
statement of one of Shaftesbury's most distinctive doctrines : 
" Thus we see, after all, that 'tis not merely what we call 
Principle, but a Taste, which governs men. They may think 
for certain, ' This is right, or that wrong.' They may believe 
' This a crime, or that a sin ; This punishable by man, or that 
by God.' Yet, if the savour of things lies cross to Honesty, 
if the Fancy be florid, and the Appetite high towards the 
subaltern beauties and lower order of worldly symmetries and 
proportions, the conduct will infallibly turn this latter way." 
In Misc. IV., ch. 1, he somewhat ostentatiously proclaims 
his indifference to Metaphysics, and assumes the position 
afterwards taken by what is called the " Common-sense " 
Philosophers. " There is no impediment, hindrance, or sus- 
pension of action, on account of these wonderfully refined 
speculations " about our own existence and personal identity. 
"Argument and debate go on still. Conduct is settled. 
Kules and measures are given out and received. Nor do we 
scruple to act as resolutely upon the mere supposition that loe 
are, as if we had effectually proved it a thousand times to 
the full satisfaction of our metaphysical or Pyrrhonean anta- 
gonist." " It is in a manner, necessary," he adds in the next 
chapter, " for one who would usefully philosophize, to have a 
1 Misc. II., ch. 1. 



WORKS AND STYLE. 59 

knowledge in this part of Philosophy sufficient to satisfy him 
that there is no knowledge or wisdom to be learnt from it, 
For of this truth nothing- besides experience and study will 
be able fully to convince him/' The proper study of mankind 
is conduct, its sources, its sanctions, and its kinds, with a 
view to practice. The individual man, however, can only be 
understood as a portion of a larger system. Hence, our main 
business is to determine what course of action is natural and 
becoming to him in his relations to his fellow-men and. to the 
Universe of which he is a part. But Virtue, as exhibited 
mainly in the social affections, is " his natural good, and Vice 
his misery and ill." 

In the less philosophical portions of the Treatise, Shaftes- 
bury severely criticises the sensational character of the 
English Drama, "that monstrous ornament which we call 
rhyme," and the ruggedness of style prevalent amongst 
English authors. This last, he thinks, might be remedied by 
" a more natural and easy disengagement of their periods," 
and by " a careful avoiding the encounter of the shocking 
consonants and jarring sounds to which our language is so 
unfortunately subject/' 

The Miscellaneous Reflections conclude with a vigorous 
defence of " free-thinking " and of an impartial criticism of 
the history and contents of the sacred text. Shaftesbury 
takes his stand on the common platform of Protestantism, 
and, with great effect, quotes passages from Jeremy Taylor 
and Tillotson on the uncertainty of theological tradition and 
the necessity of referring all disputed evidence to the supreme 
judgment of the Reason. But, while claiming this liberty 
for others, the author, with something of a grimace which 
must have been more provoking than reassuring to his 
clerical antagonists, protests that he has never, " in practice, 
acquitted himself otherwise than as a just conformist to the 



6o SHAFTESBURY. 



lawful church/' and that he is " fully assured of his own 
stead} 7 orthodoxy, resignation, and entire submission to the 
truly Christian and Catholic doctrines of our Holy Church, 
as by Law established.'" This language must not be regarded 
as altogether ironical. But of Shaftesbury's religious senti- 
ments, and the equivocal attitude in which he stood towards 
the Established Church, I shall have occasion to speak in a 
subsequent chapter. 

The second and succeeding editions of the Characteristics 
contain a Seventh Treatise, written in Italy towards the 
close of Shaftesbury's life. It is of a purely aesthetic character, 
and is entitled " A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tabla- 
ture of the Judgment of Hercules." The object of the piece 
is to suggest, for the use of the painter, a delineation of the 
meeting between Hercules and the two goddesses, Virtue and 
Pleasure, as described in the story of Prodicus which is related 
in the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia. The sugges- 
tions show that Shaftesbury possessed considerable skill as a 
connoisseur, and that he was deeply interested both in Art 
and Classical Literature. Accompanying this piece, which 
was sent to Lord Somers, was " A Letter concerning the Art 
or Science of Design/' the general publication of which seems 
to have been delayed till it appeared in the edition of the 
Characteristics issued in 1732. 2 The letter is, perhaps, more 
interesting than the treatise. It is curious to find Shaftes- 
bury, about eleven years before the birth of Reynolds and 
fifteen before that of Gainsborough, prophesying that, if the 
war were followed by a suitable peace (though the peace of 
Utrecht, I am bound to add, would by no means have com- 

2 See p. 32. The Fourth Earl, in his MS. Life, complains that this 
letter had not yet been published, though it had been his father's express 
wish to have it printed immediately. 



WORKS AND STYLE. 61 

mended itself to him as satisfying- this condition), "the figure 
we are like to make abroad, and the increase of knowledge, 
industry, and sense at home, will render United Britain the 
principal seat of arts/' It is equally curious to find him 
condemning the works of Sir Christopher Wren, especially 
Hampton Court and St. Paul's, and thinking that " the many 
spires arising in our great city, with such hasty and sudden 
growth, may be the occasion that our immediate relish shall 
be hereafter censured, as retaining much of what artists call 
the Gothic kind." Perhaps it was this unfavourable criticism 
of Wren, who long survived Shaftesbury, that occasioned the 
delay in the publication of the letter. 



Shaftesbury, it is plain, took great pains in the elaboration 
of his style, and he succeeded so far as to make his meaning 
transparent. The thought is always clear. We are spared 
the trouble of deciding between different interpretations of his 
doctrines, a process so wearisome in the case of most philosophi- 
cal authors. But, on the other hand, he did not equally succeed 
in attaining elegance, an object at which he seems equally to 
have aimed. There is a curious affectation about his style, a 
falsetto note, which, notwithstanding all his efforts to please, 
is often irritating to the reader. The main characteristic of 
Shaftesbury's style is, perhaps, best hit off by Charles Lamb, 
when he calls it "genteel. - " He poses too much as a fine 
gentleman, and is so anxious not to to be taken for a pedant 
of the vulgar, scholastic kind, that he falls into the hardly 
more attractive pedantry of the eesthete and virtuoso. The 
limce labor is almost everywhere apparent. The efforts at 
raillery and humour are sometimes so forced as to lose their 
effect, and he is too apt' to inform his reader beforehand, 
when he is about to put on his light and airy manner. As 



62 SHAFTESBURY. 



Dr. Blair says/ " He is stiff even in his pleasantry, and 
laughs in form like an author, and not like a man." We 
often feel inclined to say : Why this stilted phraseology ? 
Why all this art and contrivance? Surely the natural frame 
of mind and the natural course of conduct, of which he 
speaks so much, would be most fittingly commended in 
natural tones and simple language. But, notwithstanding 
all these defects, which are, I think, unduly exaggerated by 
some of Shaftesbury's critics, he possesses the great merits of 
being easily read and easily understood. There is, perhaps, no 
other English philosopher whose works can be read so rapidly, 
or whose leading ideas can be appropriated with equal 
facility, by a student of average intelligence. Hence, probably, 
the wide popularity which his works enjoyed in the last 
century; and hence, undoubtedly, the agreeable feeling with 
which, notwithstanding all their false taste and their tiresome 
digressions, they still impress the modern reader. 



8 Lectures on Rhetoric. Lect. XIX. 



CHAPTER III. 

Shaftesbury's ethical theory. 

Shaftesbury is emphatically a Moral Philosopher. Meta- 
physical inquiries, as we have seen, he regarded as fruitless, 
and to Psychology, except so far as it afforded a basis for Ethics, 
he paid no attention. Logic he probably despised as merely 
an instrument of pedants. And, though the main object of 
the Moralisfs is to propound a system of Natural Theology, 
yet, with Shaftesbury, morals and religion are so interdepen- 
dent, that this Dialogue may, perhaps, justly be viewed, as 
simply extending and confirming the argument contained in 
the Inquiry concerning Virtue. What the constitution of 
Man was designed to be, and ought to be, that the constitu- 
tion of Nature actually is. Hence Virtue obtains the sanction 
of Religion, while Religion itself is but the recognition and 
imitation of Supreme Goodness. 

The leading ideas in Shaftesbury's ethical theory are that 
of a system or the relation of parts to a whole, Benevolence, 
Moral Beauty, and a Moral Sense. The individual man him- 
self is a system, consisting of various appetites, passions, and 
affections, all united under the supreme control of reason. Of 
this system, the parts are so nicely adjusted to each other, 
that any disarrangement or disproportion, however slight, 
may mar and disfigure the whole. " Whoever is the least 
versed in this moral kind of Architecture will find the in- 
ward fabric so adjusted, and the whole so nicely built, that 



64 SHAFTESBURY. 



the barely extending- of a single passion a little too far, or the 
continuance of it too long, is able to bring irrecoverable ruin 
and misery .'" "It may be said properly to be the same with 
the affections or passions in an animal- constitution, as with 
the chords or strings of a musical instrument. If these, 
though in ever so just proportion one to another, are strained 
beyond a certain degree, ''tis more than the instrument will 
bear : the lute or lyre is abused, and its effect lost. On the 
other hand, if, while some of the string's are duly strained, 
others are not wound up to their due proportion, then is the 
instrument still in disorder and its part ill performed. The 
several species of creatures are like different sorts of instru- 
ments. And even in the same species of creatures (as in the 
same sort of instrument) one is not entirely like the other, 
nor will the same strings fit each. The same degree of 
strength which winds up one, and fits the several strings to a 
just harmony and consort, may in another burst both the 
strings and instrument itself. Thus, men who have the 
liveliest sense, and are the easiest affected with pain or 
pleasure, have need of the strongest influence or force of other 
affections, such as Tenderness, Love, Sociableness, Compas- 
sion, in order to preserve a right Balance within, and to 
maintain them in their duty, and in the just performance of 
their part ; whilst others, who are of a cooler blood, or lower 
key, need not the same allay or counterpart, nor are made by 
nature to feel those tender and endearing affections in so 
exquisite a degree/' 2 

But morality and human nature cannot be adequately 
studied in the system of the individual man. There are 
parts in that system, both mental and bodily, which have an 

1 Inquiry concerning Virtue, Book II., Part 2, § 1. 
* Inquiry, Book II., Pt. 1, § 3. 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 65 

evident respect to something' outside it. Neither Man, nor 
any other animal, though ever so complete a system of parts 
as to all within, can be allowed in the same manner complete 
as to all without; hut must be considered as having" a further 
relation abroad to the System of his Kind. So even this 
System of his Kind to the Animal System ; this to the 
World (our Earth) ; and this again to the bigger world and 
to the Universe. 3 No being can properly be called good or 
ill, except in reference to the systems of which he is a part. 
" Should a historian or traveller describe to us a certain 
creature of a more solitary disposition than ever was yet 
heard of; one who had neither mate nor fellow of any kind, 
nothing of his own likeness towards which he stood well 
affected or inclined, nor anything without or bej'ond himself 
for which he had the least passion or concern : we might be 
apt to say perhaps, without much hesitation, ' That this 
was doubtless a very melancholy creature, and that in this 
unsociable and sullen state he was like to have a very dis- 
consolate kind of life/ But if we were assured that, not- 
withstanding all appearances, the creature enjoyed himself 
extremely, had a great relish of life, and was in nothing 
wanting to his own good, we might acknowledge perhaps, 
( That the Creature was no Monster, nor absurdly constituted 
as to himself/ But we should hardly, after all, be induced 
to say of him, f That he was a good Creature/ However, 
should it be urged against us, ' That, such as he was, the 
creature was still perfect in himself, and therefore to be 
esteemed good; for what had he to do with others V : in this 
sense, indeed, we might be forced to acknowledge, ' That he 
was a good creature, if he could be understood to be absolute 
and complete in himself, without any real relation to anything 

3 Moralists, Part I L, Sect, 4. 



66 SHAFTESBURY. 



in the Universe besides/ For should there be anywhere in 
Nature a Sgstem, of which this living- creature was to be 
considered as a part, then could he nowise be allowed good, 
whilst he plainly appeared to be such a part as made rather 
to the harm than good of that system or whole in which he 
was included." 4 

Before, then, we can pronounce on the goodness or badness 
of any being, we must know the relations in which it stands 
to other beings. Moreover, in a being capable of passions 
and affections, it is by these and not by its bodily structure 
that we estimate its worth. " So that, in a sensible creature, 
that which is not done through any affection at all makes 
neither good nor ill in the nature of that creature ; who then 
only is supposed good, when the good or ill of the system to 
which he has relation is the immediate object of some passion 
or affection moving him." 

" Whatsoever, therefore, is done which happens to be ad- 
vantageous to the species, through an affection merely towards 
self-good, does not imply any more goodness in the creature 
than as the affection itself is good. Let him, in any par- 
ticular, act ever so well ; if, at the bottom, it be that selfish 
affection alone which moves him, he is in himself still vicious. 
Nor can any creature be considered otherwise, when the 
passion towards self-good, though ever so moderate, is his 
real motive in the doing that to which a natural affection 
for his kind ought by right to have inclined him." 

" When, in general, all the affections or passions are suited 
to the public good, or Good of the Species, then is the natural 
temper entirely good. If, on the contrary, any requisite 
passion be wanting, or if there be any one supernumerary or 
weak, or anywise disserviceable, or contrary to that main end ; 

4 Inquiry, Bk. I., Pt. 2, § 1. The quotations which follow are 
selected from the same section, 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 67 

then is the natural temper, and consequently the creature 
himself, in some measure corrupt and ill. - " 6 

These passages, which are afterwards explained and qualified 
so as to include a reasonable self- regard amongst the condi- 
tions, though not amongst the constituents, of goodness, are 
sufficient to show that, in Shaftesbury's ethical system, Bene- 
volence, if not the sole, is at least the principal moral virtue. 
Of the relation of Benevolence to Self- Regard in this system, 
however, I shall have occasion to speak expressly, when con- 
sidering his test or criterion of right and wrong in actions. 

The idea of a moral and social system, the parts of which 
are in a constant proportion to each other, and so nicely 
adjusted that the slightest disarrangement would mar the 
unity of the design, almost necessarily suggests an analogy 
between Morality and Art. As the beauty of an external 
object consists in a certain proportion between its parts, or in 
a certain harmony of colouring ; so the beauty of a virtuous 
character consists in a certain proportion between the various 
affections, or in a certain harmonious blending of the various 
springs of action as they contribute to promote the great ends 
of our being. And similarly, I suppose, the beauty of a ■ 
virtuous action may be explained as consisting in its relation 
to the virtuous character in which it has its source, or to the 
other acts of a virtuous life, or to the general condition of a 
virtuous state of society. This analogy between Art and 
Morality, or, as it may otherwise be expressed, between the 
beauty of external objects and the beauty of actions or cha- 
racters, is never long absent from Shaftesbury's mind. I 
select two or three passages which exhibit the thought in a 
characteristic manner. 
• " Is there a natural Beauty of Figures ? And is there not 

» Book II., Pt. 1, § 3. 

■b a 



68 SHAFTESBURY. 



as natural a one of Actions ? 6 No sooner the eye opens upon 
figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the Beautiful results, 
and Grace and Harmony are known and acknowledged. No 
sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections 
and passions discerned (and they are most of them as soon 
discerned as felt) than straight an inward eye distinguishes, 
and sees the Fair and Shapely, the Amiable and Admirable, 
apart from the Deformed, the Foul, the Odious, or the 
Despicable. How is it possible therefore not to own that, 
■as these distinctions have their foundation in Nature, the 
discernment itself is natural and from Nature alone ?" 7 

" By Gentlemen of Fashion I understand those to whom 
a natural good genius, or the force of good education, has 
given a sense of what is naturally graceful and becoming. 
Some by mere nature, others by art and practice, are masters 
of an ear in music, an eye in painting, a fancy in the 
ordinary things of ornament and grace, a judgment in pro- 
portions of all kinds, and a general good taste in most of 
those subjects which make the amusement and delight of the 
ingenious people of the world. Let such gentlemen as these 
be as extravagant as they please, or as irregular in their 
morals ; they must, at the same time, discover their incon- 
sistency, live at variance with themselves, and in contradiction 
to that principle on which they ground their highest pleasure 
and entertainment. Of all other Beauties which Vir- 

tuosos pursue, Poets celebrate, Musicians sing, and Architects 
or Artists, of whatever kind, describe or form, the most de- 

6 Cp. Cicero, De Officiis, Lib. I., Cap. 4. "Eorum ipsorum, quae 
adspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulcbvitudinem, venustatem, 
convenientiam partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab 
oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulcbritudinem, con- 
stantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandum putat." 

7 Moralists, Part III., Sect. 2. 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 69 

lightful, the most engaging and pathetic, is that which is 
drawn from real life and from the passions. Nothing affects 
the heart like that which is purely from itself and of its own 
nature; such as the Beauty of Sentiments, the Grace of 
Actions, the Turn of Characters, and the Proportions and 
Features of a Human Mind." 8 

" One who aspires to the character of a man of breeding 
and politeness is careful to form his judgment of arts and 
sciences upon right models of perfection. If he travels to 
Rome, he enquires which are the truest pieces of architecture, 
the best remains of statues, the best paintings of a Raphael 
or a Carache. However antiquated, rough, or dismal they 
may appear to him at first sight, he resolves to view them 
over and over, till he has brought himself to relish them and 
find their hidden graces and perfections. He takes particular 
care to turn his eye from everything which is gaudy, luscious, 
and of a false taste. Nor is he less careful to turn his ear 
from every sort of music, besides that which is of the best 
manner and the truest harmony. 'Twere to be 

wished we had the same regard to a right Taste in life and 
manners. What mortal being, once convinced of a difference. 
in inward character and of a preference due to one kind above 
another, would not be concerned to make his own the best ? 
If Civility and Humanity be a Taste; if Brutality, Insolence, 
Riot be in the same manner a Taste : who, if he could reflect, 
would not choose to form himself on the amiable and agreeable 
rather than the odious and perverse model ? Who would not 
endeavour to force Nature as well in this respect as in what 
relates to a Taste or Judgment in other arts and sciences ? 
For, in each place, the force on Nature is used only for its 
redress. If a natural good Taste be not already formed in 

8 Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, Part IV., Sect. 2. 



70 SHAFTESBURY. 



us, why should not we endeavour to form it, and become 
natural ?" 9 

Closely connected with the analogy between Art and 
Morality, as we may see indeed from the passages already 
quoted, is the idea that Morals, no less than Art, is a matter 
of Taste or Relish. To employ the author's own words, 
" The Taste of Beauty and the Relish of what is decent, just, 
and amiable, perfects the character of the Gentleman and the 
Philosopher. And the study of such a Taste or Relish will, 
as we suppose, be ever the great employment and concern of 
him who covets as well to be wise and good, as agreeable and 
polite. 

" Quid Yerum atque Decens euro et rogo, et omnis in hoc sum." 1 

This idea leads us to the last of the distinctive features 
which I noticed in Shaftesbury's ethical philosophy. The 
faculty which approves of right and disapproves of wrong 
actions is, with him, a Sense, and more than once he 
anticipates Hutcheson by calling it a "Moral Sense." 2 The 
" Relish/' « Taste/' or " Good-Taste," of which he speaks 
when comparing Morality with Art, however much it may 
have been improved by cultivation, originates in a "natural 
sense of Right and Wrong," a " Moral Sense," a " Sense of 
Just and Unjust, "Worthy and Mean." " Sense of Right 
and Wrong" is "as natural to us as natural affection itself, 
and a first principle in our constitution and make." " And 

9 Advice to an Author, Part III., Sect. 3. 

1 Miscellaneous Eeflections, Misc. 3, Ch. 1. 

2 This is the case, not in the margin alone, as Dr. Yfhewell seems to 
have thought, hut once in the Text : " For, notwithstanding a man may 
through custom, or by licentiousness of practice, favoured by Atheism, 
come in time to lose much of his natural moral sense; yet " &c. Inquiry, 
Book I., Pt. 3, § 2. The expression occurs several times in the margin 
of Book I., Pt. 3. 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 71 

this affection being an original one of earliest rise in the Soul 
or affectionate part, nothing beside contrary affection, by 
frequent check and control, can operate upon it, so as either 
to diminish it in part or destroy it in the whole." 3 These 
views are in accordance with the whole bent of Shaftesbury's 
mind. When he is discussing questions of Art, he does not 
attempt any refined analysis of our artistic judgments, but is 
content with appealing to a "Taste" or "Relish," which, 
however, requires cultivation. Similarly, in morality, almost 
the whole stress is laid on the beuevolent affections and the 
" Moral Sense," while but little is said either of the con- 
trolling power of the Reason over the Passions, or of the 
share which the Reason takes in estimating the character of 
our acts. " Be persuaded/' he says in one of his letters to 
Michael Ainsworth, 4 " that wisdom is more from the heart 
than from the head. Feel goodness, and you will see all 
things fair and good." At the same time, it would be 
erroneous to suppose that Shaftesbury entirely ignores the 
office of the reason in the moral economy. Witness the 
following passage, which contains an admirable statement of 
the mutual relations of the Will, the Desires, and the Reason, 
" Appetite, which is elder brother to Reason, being the lad of 
stronger growth, is sure, on every contest, to take the ad- 
vantage of drawing all to his own side. And Will, so highly 
boasted, is, at best, merely a top or foot-ball between these 
youngsters ; who prove very unfortunately matched, till the 
youngest, instead of now and then a kick or lash bestowed to 
little purpose, forsakes the ball or top itself, and begins to lay 
about his elder brother. 'Tis then that the scene changes. 
For the elder, like an arrant coward, upon this treatment, 



8 Inquiry, Book I., Part 3, § 1. 

4 Letters to a Young Man at the University, Letter VL 



72 SHAFTESBURY. 

presently grows civil, and affords the younger as fair play 
afterwards as he can desire/'' 5 

Such are the leading traits of Shaftesbury's moral system. 
It will be apparent at once to any reader familiar with specu- 
lations of this kind that the statement, so far as it has gone, 
leaves many important questions unanswered and many 
serious difficulties unsolved. I shall, therefore, supplement it, 
before proceeding to the task of criticism, by attempting to 
extract from Shaftesbury's writings such answers as I can to 
what I conceive to be the fundamental questions of ethics. 
In making this attempt, one is constantly baffled by the 
absence of any systematic treatment, and by the want of 
depth and thoroughness which is so marked a defect in his 
whole way of thinkiug. His main aim appears to have been 
to represent virtue in an acceptable and attractive form to the 
man of taste and fashion, and hence he is far more concerned 
in drawing an analogy between art and morals, and in 
showing that moral appreciation is a " taste " or " relish/' 
than in attempting to determine accurately the moral criterion 
or to analyze with precision the moral sentiments. So far, 
however, as answers can be found, and, in some cases, there is 
substantially no doubt what the answer is, I believe that the 
following account may be taken as correctly expressing his 
views, even though he may not have consciously formulated 
for himself the questions to which I have endeavoured to 
supply the answers. 

I. With respect to the practical test or criterion of right 
and wrong, that is to say the question, what is it which 
constitutes one act or feeling right and another wrong, the 
first remark to be made is that he says almost nothing of 
actions, what he almost exclusively concerns himself with, in 
this relation, being " temper " and character. As, however, 
character must give birth to actions, and a man's actions are 

Advice to an Author, Part I., Sect. 2. 



SHAFTESBURY 'S ETHICAL THEORY. 73 

determined by his character, if we can ascertain what, in this 
system, is the test of a good or bad character, we shall also 
have ascertained what is the test of right or wrong 1 action. 
Now, from the passages already cited, it might seem as if 
the only test of a good character, and, therefore, of a right 
action, were the fact of its commending itself to our " moral 
sense/'' But the " moral sense," as we shall see presently, 
must be educated. Hence, there must be some consideration 
or considerations external to itself, in accordance with which 
its education must be guided. However unconscious and 
automatic its judgments may ultimately become, they must, 
if they admit of guidance and rectification, be at first, at all 
events, consciously formed in accordance with some rule or 
principle. And this rule or principle, unless it be dictated 
by some arbitrary will, an alternative which Shaftesbury 
would have most emphatically rejected, must be based on 
some property or properties in the actions and characters 
themselves. There is one such property in characters and 
actions which Shaftesbury recognizes as at once supplying a 
test by which they may be judged and a standard by the 
constant application of which the organ of judgment itself,, 
the " moral sense/" may be trained and brought to perfection. 
This property is the tendency of a character, disposition, 
feeling, or action to promote the general good, or, as he 
usually phrases it, the " good of the species." That this is 
Shaftesbury's ultimate test of right and wrong, moral good 
and evil, the criterion by which the "moral sense" is or 
ought to be guided in its decisions, is abundantly evident 
from the whole tenor of his writings, but the following 1 
passages may be quoted as presenting the doctrine in a clear 
and emphatic form. 

" To love the Public, to study universal Good, and to pro- 
mote the interest of the whole world, as far as lies within our 



74 SHAFTESBURY. 



power, is surely the Height of Goodness, and makes that 
temper which we call Divine." 6 

Hence he infers that no description of the Deity, which 
represents him as otherwise than generous and benevolent, 
can be a true one. 

" When, in general, all the affections or passions are suited 
to the public good, or good of the species, then is the natural 
temper entirely good."" 7 

" And having once the Good of our Species or Public in 
view, as our end or aim, 'tis impossible we should be mis- 
guided by any means to a false Apprehension or Sense of 
Eight or Wrong/' 8 

Lastly, Philosophy itself is described as "the Study of 
Happiness/' and, consequently, " every one, in some manner 
or other, either skilfully or unskilfully philosophizes." 9 

But, while a tendency to promote the general happiness is 
thus adopted as the test of character and action, the idea is 
nowhere practically applied, as it is by later writers, to the 
determination of disputed cases of conduct or the decision of 
rival claims between particular duties or particular virtues. 

It should be noticed, in this connexion, that, though, from 
the stress which it lays on the exercise of the kindly feelings, 
Shaftesbury's system is rightly called a Benevolent Theory of 
Morals, it by no means excludes a due regard to the preserva- 
tion and interests of the individual. The relation of the self- 
regarding to the sympathetic affections is expressly determined 
in the following passage, which, notwithstanding its length, 
I think it useful to quote in full : — 

" Now, as in particular cases, public affection, on the one 

6 Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sect. 4. 

? Inquiry concerning Virtue, Book I., Pt. 2, § 2. 

8 Inquiry, Book 1., Pt. 3, § 2. 

» Moralists, Part III., Seofc. 3. 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 75 

hand, may be too high ; so private affection may, on the 
other hand, be too weak. For, if a creature be self-neglect- 
ful and insensible of danger, or if he want such a degree of 
passion in any kind as is useful to preserve, sustain, or defend 
himself; this must certainly be esteemed vicious, in regard of 
the design and end of Nature. She herself discovers this in 
her known method and stated rule of operation. 'Tis certain 
that her provisionary care and concern for the whole animal 
must at least be equal to her concern for a single part or 
member. Now, to the several parts she has given, we see, 
proper affections, suitable to their interest and security ; so 
that, even without our consciousness, they act in their own 
defence, and for their own benefit and preservation. Thus 
an Eye, in its natural state, fails not to shut together of its 
own accord, unknowingly to us, by a peculiar caution and 
timidity ; which if it wanted, however we might intend the 
preservation of our eye, we should not in effect be able to 
preserve it by any observation or forecast of our own. To be 
wanting-, therefore, in those principal affections which respect 
the good of the whole constitution, must be a vice and 
imperfection, as great surely in the principal part, the Soul 
or Temper, as it is in any of those inferior and subordinate 
parts to want the self-preserving affections which are proper 
to them. And thus the Affections towards Private 

Good become necessary and essential to Goodness. For, 
though no creature can be called good or virtuous merely for 
possessing these affections ; yet, since it is impossible that the 
Public Good, or Good of the System, can be preserved with- 
out them, it follows that a creature really wanting in them 
is in reality wanting in some degree to goodness and natural 
rectitude, and may thus be esteemed vicious and defective." * 

1 Inquiry, Book II., Pt. 1, § 3. 



76 SHAFTESBURY. 



The germ of thought in this passage is perfectly sound, but 
it might have been well, had Shaftesbury developed, it further, 
and. shown, in detail, how essential are sobriety, temperance, 
forethought, and. the whole group of prudential virtues, as 
well as the much higher and. more dignified, virtue of self- 
respect, not only to the well-being of the individual himself, 
but also to the evolution, and indeed the very existence, of 
society. Sympathy and a sense of common interests are, 
doubtless, elements essential to knitting society together, but, 
unless the majority of men could be calculated on as having 
also a rational regard to their own individual interests, all 
social and political speculation would be futile, and society 
would soon be dissolved into chaos. It may be added that, if 
a creature cannot be called good or virtuous merely for possess- 
ing the self- regarding affections, neither could he be called 
good or virtuous, merely for possessing the benevolent affec- 
tions, if self-regard were altogether wanting. A man who was 
habitually intemperate, however benevolent he might be, 
could no more be called good or virtuous, than a man, how- 
ever temperate and self-restrained, who was habitually un- 
kind or unjust. 

II. As to the ultimate origin of the distinction between 
virtue and vice, right and wrong, Shaftesbury supplies a 
sufficiently explicit answer. The distinction is to be found 
in the original make of our nature. Apart from the reason 
(whose office is not initiative, but directive), the original 
elements of our moral nature consist of the self- regard in a- 
affections, the benevolent affections, and the moral sense. 
The first of these is recognized in all schemes of ethics, but 
it was the tendency of Hobbes' philosophy, which was at that 
time fashionable in England, to ignore or explain away the two 
latter. That they, however, are as much an original part of 
our nature as the first, is constantly and emphatically asserted 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY, yj 

by Shaftesbury. A single passage will suffice to show bow 
firmly be held and bow clearly be stated this position. 

" "Pis impossible to suppose a mere sensible creature 
originally so ill-constituted and unnatural as that, from the 
moment he comes to be tried by sensible objects, he should 
have no one good passion towards his kind, no foundation 
either of pity, love, kindness, or social affection. 'Tis full as 
impossible to conceive that a rational creature, coming first 
to be tried by rational objects, and receiving into his mind 
the images or representations of justice, generosity, gratitude, 
or other virtue, should have no liking of these, or dislike of 
their contraries; but be found absolutely indifferent towards 

whatsoever is presented to him of this sort Nor 

can anything besides art and strong endeavour, with long 
practice and meditation, overcome such a natural prevention or 
prepossession of the mind in favour of this moral distinction. - " 2 

The reader should observe that there are two positions 
maintained in the above passage : 1st, that moral distinctions 
are natural, inasmuch as they are furnished by the moral 
sense, which, though reflective rather than initiative, is a 
natural and original part of man's mental constitution; 2nd,, 
that the benevolent affections are independent springs of 
action equally with the self- regarding affections, and that, 
therefore, the extra-regarding virtues, justice, benevolence, 
and the like, are not capable of explanation as cunning 
disguises of self-interest, but have their roots in human 
nature itself. Like Plato and Aristotle, Shaftesbury finds 
the origin of society, not in individuals living as scattered 
units, but in the family relation : — 

" This kind of society will not, surely, be denied to man, 
which to every beast of prey is known proper and natural. 

3 Inquiry, Book I., Pt. 3, § 1. 



yS SHAFTESBURY. 



And can we allow this social part to man, and go no farther ? 
Is it possible he should pair, and live in love and fellow ship 
with his partner and offspring', and remain still wholly wild, 
and speechless, and without those arts of storing, building, 
and other economy, as natural to him surely as to the beaver, 
or to the ant, or bee ? Where, therefore, should he break 
off from this society, if once begun ? For that it began 
thus, as early as generation, and grew into a household and 
economy, is plain. Must not this have grown soon into a 
Tribe? And this Tribe into a Nation? Or, though it re- 
mained a Tribe only, was not this still a society for mutual 
defence and common interest? In short, if Generation be 
natural, if natural affection and the care and nurture of the 
offspring be natural, things standing as they do with man, 
and the creature being of that form and constitution he now 
is, it follows : That Society must be also natural to him, and 
that out of society and community he never did, nor ever can 
subsist." 3 

The following passage is peculiarly interesting, as showing 
that Shaftesbury had already formed the idea, familiar pro- 
bably to many of my readers, that the philanthropic senti- 
ments which we now find in the higher races of mankind 
were originally developed from the family affections: — 

" If Eating and Drinking be natural, Herding is so too. 
If any Appetite or Sense be natural, the Sense of Fellowship 
is the same. If there be anything of nature in that affection 
which is between the sexes, the affection is certainly as natural 
towards the consequent offspring ; and so again between the 
offspring themselves, as kindred and companions bred under 
the same discipline and economy. And thus a Clan or Tribe 
is gradually formed ; a Public is recognized : and besides the 

» The Moralists, Part II., Sect. 4 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 79 

pleasure found in social entertain ment, language, and dis- 
course, there is so apparent a necessity for continuing this 
good correspondency and union, that to have no sense or 
feeling of this kind, no love of country, community, or any- 
thing in common, would be the same as to be insensible even 
of the plainest means of self-preservation and most necessary 
condition of self-enjoyment/'' 4 

III. In giving a complete account of any system of Moral 
Philosophy, one of the questions to be answered is, What is 
the analysis which it offers of the process preceding action ? 
The step which immediately precedes action is obviously an 
act of Will ; but the question remains, How is the Will itself 
determined, or what is the mental process preceding the final 
act of volition. Waiving the question, to which I shall 
presently recur, whether the Will has any self- determining 
power, all moralists would agree that the reason and the 
feelings have at least some share on its decisions. What, 
then, are their respective provinces in determining volition, 
and, consequently, action ? From Aristotle and Plato down- 
wards, the common theory of moralists has been that the 
first impulse to action comes from feeling, though the man 
whose moral organization is under due control never acts on 
mere feeling, but invariably submits it to reflection ; that is 
to say, he considers what will be the consequences of gratifying 
his feeling, and, if he be a wise or virtuous man, he gratifies 
the feeling or not, according as the consequences on the whole 
appear to be beneficial or otherwise. Where there are many 
conflicting or co-operating feelings, the process is, of course, 
much more complex. There one feeling intensifies, modifies, 
or counteracts another, and the result, or, at least, the result 
so far as it is independent of any capricious act of Will, is 

4 Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, Part III., Sect. 2. 



8o SHAFTESBURY. 



determined by the number and relative strength of the 
feelings in operation, which feelings have, however, through- 
out the process, been constantly revised, modified, directed, 
and co-ordinated by the reflective action of Reason. The 
office, therefore, of Reason, according to this theory, is sub- 
sidiary to that of the feelings. The end is invariably sug- 
gested by desire, while reason devises the means for its 
accomplishment. But most ends are merely means for the 
accomplishment of other ends, and all ends but one may be 
regarded as merely means to the accomplishment of that 
end, namely, the ultimate aim and object of the individual, 
whether it be his own pleasure, the full development of his 
own nature, the general happiness, or whatever it may be. 
Now, in their capacity of means, all ends, except the ultimate 
end, admit of comparison both amongst themselves and with 
reference to the ultimate end ; hence there is hardly any end 
which does not at times come into conflict with other ends, 
and thus invite the intervention of the reflective and judicial 
functions of the Reason. The result, in most cases, is a 
constant alternation of reason and desire, often rendering it 
difficult to disentangle the elements, and say what part of 
the process is rational and what emotional. The one clear 
principle, however, to bear in mind, though it is often lost 
sight of by moralists otherwise acute and profound, is that 
the end, however much it may afterwards be made the subject 
of comparison and reflection, is always, in the first instance, 
suggested by some passion, appetite, desire, or affection, some 
cause, in fact, having its source in the emotional part of our 
nature. The operation of the Reason is a subsequent one, 
and consists in devising means for the accomplishment of the 
end ; or in tracing the consequences of attaining that end 
upon any other ends we may have in view, or, as this last 
function might otherwise be described, in comparing the 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 81 

values of various subsidiary ends by reference to some higher 
end. The horse and the rider, the breeze which fans the sail 
and the rudder by which the course of the boat is directed, 
have been favourite metaphors to express this relation of the 
passions to the reason. When we come to ask what was 
Shaftesbury 's opinion on this question, we are baffled by the 
paucity of passages having any direct bearing on it and by 
the fact that he hardly seems to have recognized its im- 
portance. The passage, however, already quoted on p. 71, 
implies that Appetite and Reason both concur in the deter- 
mination of action, and that, though Appetite, the " elder 
brother/' the " lad of stronger growth," takes the initiative, 
the process which results in action is, or ought to be, all 
along controlled by the skill and courage of Reason, the 
younger, though the sprightlier, lad of the two. 

IV. But if there are few passages in Shaftesbury's works 
bearing on the question just discussed, there is no difficulty 
in finding any number of utterances on the allied question, 
AY hat is the analysis of the act of approbation or disappro- 
bation which follows on action, or How do we know one 
action to be right and another wrong. The prominence of 
the conception of a " Moral Sense " in Shaftesbury's system 
has already been noticed. The sentiment by which we ap- 
prove or disapprove of a moral action is constantly compared 
with " taste" in art. Just as a connoisseur, immediately on 
perceiving a picture or a statue, pronounces on its merits, so 
a man with a cultivated " Moral Sense " no sooner contem- 
plates an action, a quality, or a character, than he is able at 
once to distinguish it as lovely or unlovely, moral or immoral, 
right or wrong. Though, however, the Moral Sense admits 
of being strengthened and refined by cultivation, just as it 
may to a great extent, if not altogether, be lost "through 
custom or by licentiousness of practice," it has its roots in 

G 



82 SHAFTESBURY. 



the very constitution of the human mind. It is a " natural 
sense of Eight and Wrong 1 ." To quote a passage already- 
cited, it is " an original affection of earliest rise in the sonl 
or affectionate part." At the same time, this sense, though 
its emotional character is always uppermost in Shaftesbury's 
mind, seems to include a certain amount of judgment or 
reflection, that is to say, a rational element. Witness the 
following passage : — 

" If a Creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate ', 
yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others 
do, so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest, and 
make that notice or conception of Worth and Honesty to be 
an object of his affection, he has not the character of being 
virtuous : for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable of having 
a Sense of Right or Wrong, a Sentiment or Judgment of 
what is done, through just, equal, and good Affection, or the 
contrary." 6 

Shaftesbury's doctrine, on this head, may, perhaps, briefly 
be summed up as follows. Each man has from the first a 
natural Sense of Right and Wrong, a " Moral Sense" or "Con- 
science" (all which expressions he employs as synonymous). 
This sense is, in its natural condition, wholly or mainly 
emotional, but, as it admits of constant education and im- 
provement, the rational or reflective element in it gradually 
becomes more prominent. Its decisions are generally de- 
scribed as if they were immediate, and, beyond the occasional 
recognition of a rational as well as an emotional element, 
little or no attempt is made to analyze it. In all these 
respects, Shaftesbury's " Moral Sense" differs little from the 
" Conscience " subsequently described by Butler, the main 
distinctions being that with Butler the rational or reflective 



6 Inquiry, Book I„ Pt 2, 3. 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 83 

element, assumes greater prominence than with Shaftesbury, 
while, on the other hand, the "Conscience" of the one writer 
is invested with a more absolute and uniform 6 character than 
is the " Moral Sense " of the other. I shall presently proceed 
to criticize this part of Shaftesbury's doctrine, but it will be 
convenient to consider it in connexion with other peculiarities 
of his system. 

V. As to the sanctions of morality, that is to say, the con- 
siderations or influences which impel men to right-doing or 
deter them from wrong-doing, Shaftesbury's answer is per- 
fectly clear. The principal sanction with him is the appro- 
bation or disapprobation of the Moral Sense. As nothing 
can be more delightful than the witness of a good conscience, 
so nothing can be more painful than the remorse which 
follows on a bad action. " To a rational creature it must be 
horridly offensive and grievous, to have the reflection in his 
mind of any unjust action or behaviour which he knows to be 
naturally odious and ill-deserving." 7 With this sanction is 
combined, in the case of those who have any true sense of 
religion, the love and reverence of a beneficent, just, and wise 
God, whose example serves "to raise and increase the affection 
towards Virtue, and to submit and subdue all other affections 
to that alone." "Nor is this Good effected by Example 
merely. For where the theistical belief is entire and perfect, 
there must be a steady opinion of the Superintendency of a 
Supreme Being, a witness and spectator of human life, and 
conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the universe ; so 
that in the perfectest recess, or deepest solitude, there must 
be One still presumed remaining with us, whose presence 

6 I do not use the word " authoritative," because I do not admit that 
the moral sense of Shaftesbury is, in normal cases, less authoritative than 
the Conscience of Butler. See Ch. 5, pp. 144-47. 

"> Inquiry, Book II., Pt. 2, § 1. 

G % 



84 SHAFTESBURY. 



singly must be of more moment than that of the most august 
assembly on earth. In such a presence, 'tis evident that, as 
the shame of guilty actions must be the greatest of any, so 
must the honour be of well doing, even under the unjust 
censure of a world. And, in this case, 'tis very apparent 
how conducing a perfect Theism must be to virtue, and how 
great deficiency there is in Atheism/' " And thus," as he 
says presently, " the perfection and height of Virtue must be 
owing to the Belief of a God." 8 

These two, the Moral Sense and the love and reverence of 
God, and these two alone, are, with Shaftesbury, the proper 
sanctions of right conduct. The sanction on which Locke 
had almost exclusively rested morality, namely, the fear of 
future punishment and the hope of future reward, is treated 
as being exactly on the same level as the sanctions of law 
and of public opinion. All these sanctions may be efficacious 
in restraining the wrong-doer by appealing to his private 
interests, and, consequently, they ought not to be neglected 
by the legislator and the moralist; 9 but, inasmuch as they 

8 Inquiry, Book I., Pt. 3, § 3. 

9 " It is certain that the principle of Fear of Future Punishment and 
Hope of Future Reward, how mercenary or servile soever it may be 
accounted, is yet, in many circumstances, a great advantage, security, and 
support to Virtue." Inquiry, Book I., Pt. 3, § 3. 

" To this it is that, in our friend's opinion, we ought all of us to aspire, 
so as to endeavour that the excellence of the object, not the reward or 
punishment, should be our motive ; but that, where, through the corruption 
of our nature, the former of these motives is found insufficient to excite 
to virtue, there the latter should be brought in aid, and on no account be 
undervalued or neglected." Moralists, Part II., Sect. 3. He presently 
proceeds to show, in the same section, how the argument against a 
providential order from the apparent disadvantages, under which Virtue 
often suffers in this life, may be at once answered on the hypothesis of a 
future existence. " Though the appearances hold ever so strongly 
against Virtue, and in favour of Vice, the objection which arises hence 



SHAFTESBURYS ETHICAL THEORY. 85 

make no appeal to man's moral nature, right conduct, secured 
by such means, cannot strictly be called good or virtuous. 
" Neither the fear of future punishment nor the hope of 
future reward can possibly be of the kind called good 
affections, such as are acknowledged the springs and sources 
of all actions truly good. Nor can this fear or hope consist 
in reality with Virtue or Goodness, if it either stands as 
essential to any moral performance, or as a considerable 
motive to any act of which some better affection ought alone 
to have been a sufficient cause;" 1 Shaftesbury's teaching on 
this subject is so different from that of most of the divines 
and moralists of his time, and, moreover, contains so large an 
element of truth, that I shall add one or two further illus- 
trations of it: — 

" If there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is 
considered only as powerful over his creature, and enforcing 
obedience to his absolute will by particular rewards and 
punishments; and if on this account, through hope merely of 
reward or fear of punishment, the creature be incited to do 
the good he hates, or restrained from doing the ill to which 
he is not otherwise in the least degree averse : there is in this 
case no Virtue or Goodness whatsoever. The creature, not- 
withstanding his good conduct, is intrinsically of as little 
worth as if he acted in his natural way, when under no dread 
or terror of any sort. There is no more of Rectitude, Piety, 
or Sanctity in a creature thus reformed, than there is Meek- 
ness or Gentleness in a tiger strongly chained, or Innocence 
and Sobriety in a monkey under the discipline of the 
whip." 

against a Deity may be easily removed, and all set right again on the 

supposal of a future state For he needs not be over-and-above 

solicitous as to the fate of Virtue in this world, who is secure of Here- 
after." 

1 Inquiry, Book I., Pt. 3, § 3. 



86 SHAFTESBURY. 



Nay, these slavish fears and selfish hopes are actually 
destructive of true piety and genuine goodness. " If it be 
true piety to love God for his own sake, the over-solicitous 
regard to private good, expected from him, must of necessity 
prove a diminution of Piety. For whilst God is beloved only 
as the cause of private good, he is no otherwise beloved than 
as any other instrument or means of pleasure by any vicious 
creature. Now the more there is of this violent affection 
towards private good, the less room is there for the other sort 
towards Goodness itself, or any good and deserving object, 
worthy of love and admiration for its own sake ; such as God 
is universally acknowledged, or at least by the generality of 
civilized or refined worshippers." 2 

In this protest, admirable and much-needed, as, for the 
most part, it was, against the sordid motives almost ex- 
clusively insisted on in the current theology of Shaftesbury's 
time, one point is sometimes left out of view. " The law," 
says St. Paul, " was our schoolmaster to bring us unto 
Christ/'' And similarly, the hope of reward and the fear of 
punishment, though, in some cases, the only motives which 
are at first really efficacious, often, in course of time, so inure 
men to right-doing, that they come to love Virtue and God, 
the Exemplar and Rewarder of Virtue, for their own sakes. 
In the highest class of minds, these purer and nobler motives 
may be dominant from the first, and in the lowest class of 

2 Yet there is one sense in which the hope of future reward is itself an 
evidence of the love of virtue for its own sake. "In the case of religion, 
however, it must be considered that, if by the hope of reward be under- 
stood the love and desire of virtuous enjoyment, or of the very practice 
and exercise of virtue in another life, the expectation or hope of this kind 
is so far from being derogatory to virtue, that it is an evidence of our 
loving it the more sincerely and for its own sake. Nor can this principle 
be justly called selfish ; for, if the love of virtue be not mere self-interest 3 
the love and desire of life for virtue's sake cannot be esteemed so." 



SHAFTESBURY S ETHICAL THEORY. 87 

minds they may, throughout life, remain almost dormant, 
but there is a large intermediate class of men whose moral 
nature admits of gradual exaltation, and in whom the disci- 
pline which was necessary to them in childhood gradually 
gives place to the free and loving submission of manhood. 
Virtue is at first a hard rule and God a stern master, but, as 
reason develops and the habit of obedience becomes fixed, 
the truth is revealed in all its beauty and simplicity, and love 
becomes the fulfilling of the law. Then, hope and fear make 
way for love and reverence, the unselfish sense of duty and 
the spontaneous imitation of God. One set of motives thus 
gradually prepares the mind for another, and, when it has 
done its work, itself disappears. "After that faith is come, 
we are no longer under a schoolmaster. " 

These considerations, however, though not sufficiently 
insisted on, are by no means ignored by Shaftesbury. By 
means of the discipline of rewards and punishments he 
acknowledges that one affection "may come to be industriously 
nourished, and the contrary passion depressed. And thus 
Temperance, Modesty, Candour, Benignity, and other good 
affections, however despised at first, may come at last to be 
valued for their own sakes, the contrary species rejected, and 
the good and proper object beloved and prosecuted, when the 
reward or punishment is not so much as thought of." 3 

VI. There is another question, affecting the very existence 
of Morals as an independent Science, on which Shaftesbury 
diverged, and rightly diverged, from his master. Locke had 
maintained 4 that "the true ground of morality can only be 
the Will and Law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has 
in his hand rewards and punishments, and power enough to 
call to account the proudest offender." Similarly, he says 

3 Inquiry, Book I., Pc. 3, § 3. 
Esmy, Book I., Ch. 3, § 6. 



88 SHAFTESBURY. 



that "the Rule prescribed by God is the true and only 
measure of Virtue/'' though this rule is afterwards determined 
to be conformity with what tends to the Public Happiness. 
Shaftesbury, however, saw that to make moral distinctions 
depend solely on the arbitrary will of any being-, even though 
it were the Supreme Being himself, was in reality to abolish 
them altogether, or, in other words, to make them unmeaning. 
As is so clearly pointed out by Cudworth, whose Treatise 
concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, though written 
some time before the Characteristics) was not published till 
twenty years afterwards, the moral attributes of the Deity 
on this theory, entirely disappear. If what is right and 
wrong, good and evil, depends solely on the Will of God, 
how can we speak of God Himself as good ? Goodness, as 
one of the Divine attributes, must, on this hypothesis, simply 
mean the conformity of God to His own Will. " Whoever 
thinks there is a God," says Shaftesbury, " and pretends 
formally to believe that he is just and good, must believe 
that there is independently such a thing as Justice and In- 
justice, Truth and Falsehood, Right and Wrong, according to 
which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. 
If the mere Will, Decree, or Law of God be said absolutely 
to constitute Right or Wrong, then are these latter words of 
no significancy at all. For thus if each part of a contradiction 
were affirmed for truth by the supreme power, they would 
consequently become true But to say of any- 
thing that it is just or unjust, on such a foundation as this, 
is to say nothing, or to speak without a meaning."" 5 
" How/'' he says in another place, 6 " can Supreme Goodness 
be intelligible to those who know not what Goodness itself 
is ? Or how can Virtue be understood to deserve reward, 



6 Inquiry, Book I., Pt. 3, § 2. 
6 Moralists, Pt. II., Sect. 3. 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 89 

when as yet its merit and excellence is unknown. We begin 
surely at the wrong- end, when we would prove merit by 
favour, and Order by a Deity." 

VII. One of the most important questions which can be 
asked with regard to any system of Ethics is. How does it 
solve the problem of Freedom and Necessity ? Is the Will 
free to act as it chooses, or is it determined by motives ? Are 
our actions the mere resultants of our previous character 
together with the particular motives now operating, or is 
there any room for independence of volition, a Will free to 
make the weaker become the stronger motive, a cause itself 
uncaused ? This problem which in all ages has exercised so 
much of human ingenuity, and which many philosophers 
regard as yet unsolved, if not incapable of solution, Shaftes- 
bury studiously avoids. There is no passage in his works, so 
far as I can recollect, having any direct bearing upon the 
question. And this reticence is entirely in accordance with 
the practical bent of his mind and the conception which he 
had formed to himself of the objects of philosophy. The 
question of Liberty and Necessity is speculative rather than 
practical, — I might almost say, metaphysical rather than 
ethical, and, as such, it offers no interest to a writer whose 
aim is to purify human nature by developing a more refined 
moral sense, and to ameliorate the conditions of human life 
by enforcing the maxims of a more extended benevolence. 

To the principal questions of Ethics, then, Shaftesbury's 
answers are, in brief, that our moral ideas, the distinctions of 
virtue and vice, right and wrong, are to be found in the very 
make and constitution of our nature ; that morality is inde- 
pendent of theology, actions being denominated good or just, 
not by the arbitrary will of God, but in virtue of some quality 
existing in themselves ; that the ultimate test of a right 



90 SHAFTESBURY. 



action is its tendency to promote the general welfare ; that 
we have a peculiar organ, the moral sense, analogous to taste 
in art, by which we discriminate between characters and 
actions as good or bad; that the higher natures among 
mankind are impelled to right actiou, and deterred from 
wrong action, partly by the Moral Sense, partly by the love 
and reverence of a just and good God, while the lower natures 
are mainly influenced by the opinions of others, or by the 
hope of reward and the fear of punishment; that appetite 
and reason both concur in the determination of action ; lastly, 
that the question whether the Will does or does not possess 
any freedom of choice, irrespectively of character and motives, 
is one which it does not concern the moralist to solve. 

In this brief resume of the leading questions of ethics, the 
reader will at once be struck with the difficulty of reconciling 
the answers to two of the questions proposed, namely, the 
nature of the criterion and the nature of the approving act. 
If the test or criterion of a right action or a virtuous quality 
be its tendency to promote the general welfare, surely, it may 
be objected, a long process of ratiocination is often required, in 
order to trace consequences and compare various classes of results. 
This objection contains a certain amount, but a certain amount 
only, of truth. In the first place, the great majority of men 
seldom perform this process of tracing an action into its remote 
consequences. They have been taught or have come insensibly 
to regard certain actions with admiration and others with 
abhorrence, and, as soon as they witness an action either of the 
one kind or the other, the appropriate feeling is excited. Even 
here, though the emotional act, the exercise of the " Moral 
Sense,'* is the more prominent, there is an exercise of the 
Reason as well. Before the sentiment of approbation or dis- 
approbation is excited, the act must have been referred, 
however rapidly or unconsciously, to a class, or connected, by 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 91 

association, with other acts of a similar kind. Thus, if I 
detect a man in deceiving me, the sentiment of disapprobation 
seems to be at once excited, but between the steps of the 
discovery and the feeling" there really intervenes a reference of 
the particular act to the class of false dealing, or an associa- 
tion of it with other acts of the same kind which have excited 
my abhorrence before. In either case, the process involves 
comparison or reflection, that is to say, it is a rational one. 
Sometimes, even among unreflective men, who, of course, 
form the great majority of mankind, the rational element is 
far more prominent than in the cases I have hitherto described. 
Any man, who is at all capable of exercising his reason, must 
at times consider what are likely to be the particular con- 
sequences of his own actions or those of others, or what would 
be the consequences to society at large if such actions were 
of frequent occurrence, and, in such a case, the reasoning pro- 
is always a conscious, and often a lengthy one. TYhile 
this process is going on, the character of the act is as yet 
undecided, and, consequently, the sentiment, which will 
ultimately be evoked, is in abeyance. But if this be so 
amongst unreflective men, it is of far more frequent occurrence 
amongst the small class of reflective men. No circumstance 
is more characteristic of an educated and thoughtful man than 
that he is ready, from time to time, to review his moral 
judgments, and that his sentiments of approbation or dis- 
approbation, except in very clear cases, are only expressed 
after mature deliberation. He sees, or tries to see, all the 
sides of a question, and attempts to balance all the various 
considerations connected with it, and hence his judgments 
are, as a rule, far more sober and far more likely to be true to 
facts than those of ordinary men. In all cases, then, there is 
a rational process which precedes the emotion of moral appro- 
bation or disapprobation, though, in most cases, this process is 



92 SHAFTESBURY. 



almost instantaneous, and, perhaps, almost unconscious ; 
while, in some cases, as we have seen, and especially amongst 
educated men, the process is often a long- and complicated 
one. Now the expressions which. Shaftesbury employs, such 
as Moral Sense, Sense of Right and Wrong, a Right Taste, 
&c, as well as his whole treatment of the subject of moral 
approbation, undoubtedly tend to obscure the share of reason, 
while they tend to exaggerate the share of emotion, in our 
moral judgments. He does not, indeed, altogether ignore the 
rational element, but he passes it by with the merest recog- 
nition. Nor is this fault one of simply theoretical import, a 
mere defect in analysis. Systems like those of Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, and Butler, often exercise an unfortunate influence 
on men, in the way of inducing or confirming the habit of 
forming hasty judgments and acting on insufficient reflection. 
When. we are told that morality is a matter of taste, or that 
we have only to exercise a " Sense," or consult our Conscience, 
in order to know what is right, we are very apt to act or to 
judge on our first impulse, without any balancing of con- 
siderations or any allowance for circumstances. In nine cases 
out of ten, or possibly in ninety-nine out of a hundred, this 
course may be the right one, but in the tenth or the hundredth 
it may lead to most disastrous consequences, or to most 
inequitable judgments. The generality of men have much 
more need to be told not to act or judge without due con- 
sideration, than to be told to act up to their convictions or 
to judge according to their preconceived opinions. It is 
perfectly true that we ought to act up to our convictions, or 
" follow conscience/'' as the phrase is, and that we ought to 
judge in accordance with general rules, but it is equally true 
that we ought to be constantly engaged in reviewing, com- 
paring, and modifying our rules, and in educating and 
improving our consciences. " Let any plain, honest man," 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 93 

says Butler/ " before he engages in any course of action, ask 
himself, Is this I am going about right, or is it wrong ? Is 
it good, or is it evil ? I do not in the least doubt but that 
this question would be answered agreeably to truth and 
virtue, by almost any fair man in almost any circumstance." 
No doubt any " plain, honest man " would give an answer in 
accordance with the average moral sentiment, or perhaps 
slightly in advance of the average moral sentiment, of the 
time and country in which he lived. But did it never occur 
to the writer that there are " plain, honest men " in other 
countries besides England, and in stages of civilization very 
different from ours, and that there were "plain, honest men " 
one, two, and three thousand years ago, in the East as well as 
the West, and amongst pagans as well as amongst Jews and 
Christians? These "plain, honest men," could they be 
brought together, would give very different answers on many 
of the leading or more perplexed questions of conduct both 
from one another, and from the " plain, honest men " who 
lived in England in the early part of the eighteenth century. 
This divergence of the moral sentiment is alone sufficient to 
show that the decisions of the " moral sense " or " conscience," 
cannot be treated as absolute. A number of " consciences " 
whose decisions differ cannot all be in the right. That a man 
should act according to his conscience, that is to say, that he 
should not act contrary to his convictions, is a moral truism ; 
but it is no less his duty to take every precaution in his 
power that his conscience may guide him to a true decision. 
And this object he can only secure, first, by constantly 
reviewing and correcting his moral judgments in accordance 
with the best lights he can find, so as to adjust, as far as 
possible, his sense of right and wrong to the real qualities of 

? Sermon III. 



94 SHAFTESBURY. 



actions, and, secondly, by taking 1 pains, in any particular case 
of difficulty, to ascertain and weigh all the circumstances and 
considerations bearing on the point, before allowing his ethical 
emotions to be enlisted on either side. 

Shaftesbury's analysis of the act of moral approbation is, 
we have seen, defective, because it does not discriminate with 
sufficient precision between the rational and emotional elements 
in our moral judgments; and it is misleading, because it 
assigns a disproportionate share to the emotional element at 
the expense of the rational element. It might also be objected 
to his account of the Moral Sense that, though it admits that 
this sense is capable of cultivation and improvement, it does 
not state in what the process of education consists, nor make 
any attempt to trace the stages through which the original 
germ passes into the matured product. But investigations of 
this kind, to possess any value, require a knowledge of the 
subtler workings of association which was beyond Shaftes- 
bury's powers of psychological analysis. Locke had already 
enunciated the doctrines and some of the laws of association, 
but it was not till after the publication of the writings of 
Hartley and James Mill that it was recognized as the potent 
instrument which we now know it to be. 

The idea that our moral judgments are formed by a" sense," 
" taste," or " relish," naturally suggests an analogy between 
Art and Morality, Beauty and Virtue. This analogy, which 
is constantly insisted on by Shaftesbury, seems to me to be 
too refined to be of much service in ethical inquiry. Take a 
beautiful picture. In what does its beauty consist ? In the 
proportions of the forms and in a certain subtle harmony of 
colouring. Take a moral act. What is it that constitutes it 
moral? Its tendency, at least according to Shaftesbury's 
system, to promote the general welfare or the good of man- 
kind. Now where, at first sight, is the resemblance between 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 95 

the beautiful picture and the moral act ? It is true that with 
a little ingenuity we may find such a resemblance, which 
consists, I presume, in the act being- proportional to the needs 
and constitution of human society, as any particular form in 
the picture is proportional to the rest of the picture. But, 
however ingenious this point of view may be, do we really 
throw any light on the character of human action, or the 
distinction between vice and virtue, by having recourse to 
what I must venture to call this far-fetched analogy ? And 
so, again, with regard to a virtuous disposition. A disposition 
or character can only be known by its acts, and these acts 
must necessarily be isolated. But a picture, or statue, or a 
landscape may be seen at a glance. It is true that we may 
reflect on the nature of a character as manifested by its acts, 
and contemplating it, with a certain amount of mental effort, 
as a whole, speak with some justice of its being harmonious or 
well-balanced. But, though the analogy is certainly less 
remote here than in the case of virtuous acts, it may be 
questioned whether we really gain anything by this mode of 
speaking. The conception of " goodness " is surely more 
appropriate, whether we are contemplating acts or characters, 
than that of " beauty/'' and, therefore, why introduce a meta- 
phor when a direct expression would serve our purpose better ? 
And yet there are occasions when, in order to express our 
admiration of characters or actions, we seem to be led naturally 
to select such words as " grand," " beautiful," or " graceful." 
In all these cases I think it will be found that the characters 
or actions rise far above, or, at least, diverge considerably from 
the average standard of excellence, and that, consequently, 
the ordinary ethical expressions being inadequate to convey 
our meaning, we are compelled to have recourse to metaphor. 
But this is a well-known device of language which is by no 
means peculiar to morals. 



g6 SHAFTESBURY. 



Another distinctive feature of Shaftesbury's system remains 
to be noticed. I have already pointed out that, in the economy 
of human nature, he lays an undue stress on the benevolent 
affections. It would, indeed, be no unfair description of his 
ethical theory to say that, according" to him, the goodness of 
man consists in the possession and exercise of these affections, 
and virtue in what may be called conscious and approved 
benevolence. 8 Hence his system and that of Hutcheson 
have often been distinguished as the Benevolent Theory of 
Ethics. It must not be supposed that either the one author 
or the other denied the necessity of a due regard to one's own 
interests; for, if every man were absolutely careless about his 
own welfare, human affairs would, obviously, soon come to a 
standstill, not to say that, whatever care others might 
endeavour to take of him, the individual, if he took no care 
whatever of himself, must speedily perish. But Shaftesbury, 
as we have already seen, 9 looked on what are usually called 
the self-regarding virtues rather as conditions of virtue than 
as themselves virtues; and Hutcheson, as we shall see pre- 
sently, 1 going still further than Shaftesbury, maintained that 
actions which flow solely from self-love " seem perfectly in- 
different in a moral sense, and neither raise the love or hatred 
of the observer." Yet, if a man, in spite of difficulties and 
temptations, is cleanly, temperate, chaste, and frugal, and 
shows a due sense of his own independence and dignity, does 
he excite no admiration in us ? And, on the other hand, if 
he is brutal, grovelling, and incapable of exercising any self- 

8 See, for instance, Inquiry, Book I., Pt. 2, § 3, Pt. 3, § 1. A man is 
good, if his affections be adapted to promote the welfare of the species ; 
but he can only be called virtuous, if, on reflection, he approves such 
affections and the acts which flow from them, and disapproves the 
contrary 

9 See p. 67. l See p. 194. 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 97 

control, does he not move our disgust and hatred ? Take the 
quality of Temperance alone. Whatever be our theory of 
virtue, whether we regard it as a habit conducive to the 
public good, or as a self-realization of the individual, or as 
obedience to law, whether civil, divine, or natural ; in any 
case, does it not seem preposterous to say that Temperance is 
not a virtue, or Intemperance a vice? It is perfectly true 
that if a man had the self-regarding virtues, but were de- 
ficient in the benevolent virtues, and especially in the supreme 
virtue of justice, we should not, on the whole, call him a good 
or virtuous man. But neither, as I have already said, 2 could 
we properly call a man good or virtuous, taking his character 
as a whole, if he were distinctly lacking in the personal 
virtues, however kindly, liberal, and just he might be to 
others. The latter ease is, indeed, far less common than the 
former. For it is proverbial that, if a man does not care for 
himself, he is not likely to care much for other people ; 
whereas those who stop short at a regard for themselves are, 
unfortunately, only too numerous. And it may have been 
this comparative rarity of the extra-regarding or benevolent 
virtues (of which group I regard justice as not only a 
member, but as the principal member) which led Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson to assign to them so disproportionate a value. 
These virtues are, indeed, essential alike to the well-being of 
human society and to the moral perfection of the individual, 
and they are the crown and flower of all virtues, but still it 
is a mistake to ignore the fact that there is another group of 
virtues, equally essential, though it may be less rare, and less 
lovely. 

To those who are acquainted with the ancient writers on 
Ethics it will be plain that Shaftesbury is indebted to them 

2 See p. 76. 



98 SHAFTESBURY. 



for many of his most characteristic ideas. Thus, the analogy 
between Art and Morals, Beauty and Virtue, which is of 
such frequent occurrence in his writing's, is evidently derived 
from Plato. The idea that man is naturally a social animal, 
and that society has its origin in the family union, will 
remind every classical reader of Aristotle's Politics and the 
Third Book of Plato's Laws. Again, the idea of a due 
balance among the passions and affections, or that the various 
parts of man's nature should be so harmonized that no one 
should be developed in excess of the others, is derived from 
the Republic of Plato and the Ethics of Aristotle. To take 
one more instance, such a passage as the following, which 
embodies an idea of frequent recurrence throughout the 
Characteristics, could hardly have been written by any one 
who was not thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the stoical 
philosophy : — 

" Can you not call to mind what we resolved concerning 
Nature ? Can anything be more desirable than to follow 
her? Or is it not by this freedom from our passions and 
low interests, that we are reconciled to the goodly Order of 
the Universe ; that we harmonize with Nature ; and live in 
friendship both with God and Man ? " 3 

It would have been strange indeed, had the tastes of an 
author so devoted to the study of classical literature as 
Shaftesbury not been reflected in his ethical writings. But, 
perhaps, it would not be too much to say that there is no 
modern writer whose views on morals approximate so 

3 Moralists, Part III., Sect. 3. Other instances of Stoical doctrines 
adopted by Shaftesbury are that " Providence has placed our happiness 
and good in things we can bestow upon ourselves," that " Happiness is 
from within, not from without," and that " Opinion," that is the suppo- 
sition we form about things, " is all in all." 



SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL THEORY. 99 

closely to the classical way of thinking on these subjects as 
do his. 

Of previous English writers, those to whom he most 
frequently refers or alludes are Hobbes and Locke. To the 
distinctive tenets in moral and political philosophy of Hobbes, 
namely, that a ' ' state of mere nature " is a state of " war of 
every man against every man," that civil society is based on 
a contract, and that there is in mankind no such thing as 
disinterested affection, not originating in self-love, we have 
already seen that Shaftesbury declares himself in direct and 
emphatic opposition. 4 There can, in fact, be little doubt 

4 The following passage affords so acute a criticism of Hobbes' main 
theory, that I think it well to append it, both on account of its intrinsic 
value and also as furnishing a good example of Shaftesbury's argumen- 
tative power : — 

" 'Tis ridiculous to say, there is any obligation on man to act sociably, 
or honestly, in a formed Government, and not in that which is commonly 
called the State of Nature. For to speak in the fashionable language of 
our modern philosophy : ' Society being founded on a compact, the 
surrender made of every man's private unlimited right into the hands of 
the majority, or such as the majority should appoint, was of free choice 
and by a promise.' Now the Promise itself was made in the State of 
Nature. And that which could make a Promise obligatory in the State of 
Nature must make all other acts of humanity as much our real duty and 
natural part. Thus Faith, Justice, Honesty, and Virtue must have been 
as early as the State of Nature, or they could never have been at all. 
The Civil Union or Confederacy could never make Right or Wrong, if 
they subsisted not before. He who was free to any villainy before his 
contract will and ought to make as free with his contract, when he thinks 
fit. The Natural Knave has the same reason to be a Civil one, and may 
dispense with his politic capacity as oft as he sees occasion. 'Tis only his 
word stands in his way. — A man is obliged to keep his word. Why? 
Because he has given his word to keep it. — Is not this a notable account 
of the original of moral justice, and the rise of civil government and 
allegiance ! " Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, Part III., 
Sect. 1. LofC. 

H 2 



ioo SHAFTESBURY. 



that, like most of the other ethical writers of this time, he was 
mainly impelled to his task through the shock which had 
been given to the current moral sentiment by the paradoxes of 
Hobbes, and through the desire to arrest the progress of doc- 
trines at which society was then seriously alarmed. Shaftes- 
bury appears to have conceived it as his special mission to 
undertake this work, not as a " pedant " or a " schoolman," 
but as a " man of taste." 

It was probably in accordance with this conception that he 
refrained from using the language about the " laws of nature," 
which had hitherto been current in ethical treatises, and that 
he preferred to represent morality as a matter of " taste," 
" sentiment," or " affection," rather than as dictated simply 
by reason. These differences alone are sufficient to distinguish 
him from writers like Cumberland, Cudworth, and Clarke, 
though, in making benevolent acts and dispositions the 
special objects of moral approbation, he is, to a great extent, 
anticipated by Cumberland, whose influence on subsequent 
moralists has, perhaps, hardly been sufficiently recognized. 

Of Shaftesbury's own influence on other writers and of his 
relation to subsequent schools of ethics, I shall speak presently 
in a separate chapter. 

Before concluding this chapter, however, I must say a few 
words on the marked hostility with which Shaftesbury, in his 
character of a moralist, attacks the doctrines of Locke. I 
have already, in the last chapter, drawn attention to the 
vehement passage directed against Locke's philosophy in one 
of the letters to Michael Ainsworth. 5 There he speaks of 
Locke's ethical theory as " throwing all order and virtue out 
of the world, and making the very ideas of them unnatural." 
These words, of course, are aimed at Locke's denial of the 



See p. 45. 



SHAFTESBURY S ETHICAL THEORY. 101 

innate, or, as Shaftesbury would amend the word, con-natural 
origin of our moral ideas. In the Inquiry concerning Virtue, 
though Locke is not expressly named, there is an equally 
vehement protest against what may be called the cardinal 
doctrines of his ethical system, namely, that moral distinctions 
depend solely on the arbitrary will of God, and that they are 
mainly enforced by the supernatural sanctions of hope of 
future reward and fear of future punishment. Indeed, no 
two systems could well be more opposed on many points than 
are those of Shaftesbury and his tutor. According to Locke, 
" the true and only measure of virtue " is the Will of God, 
as revealed either in the Scriptures or by the Light of Nature. 
The only means of ascertaining that Will is the use of the 
reason, deducing rules of action either from the expressed 
commands of God in the Old and New Testaments, or, which 
he seems to contemplate as the commoner case, from con- 
siderations of public welfare, " God having, by an inseparable 
connexion, joined virtue and public happiness together." The 
main sanctions of this u will and law of a God, who sees men 
in the dark," are the rewards and punishments which He 
holds in His hand. " By the fault is the rod, and with the 
transgression a fire ready to punish it." Shaftesbury, on the 
other hand, maintained that, independently of any commands 
or prohibitions, whether of God or man, actions are intrinsi- 
cally right or wrong, just or unjust ; though, at the same time, 
he agreed with Locke in adopting as the test or criterion of a 
right action its tendency to promote the public interests or 
the general good of mankind. The character of an action, 
however, was to be ascertained, not so much by reasoning, as 
by a subtle and delicate sense, capable, indeed, of improvement 
by discipline, culture, and education, but the natural and 
inalienable heritage of every man from his birth. Lastly, 
the incentives to well-doing and the deterrents from evil-doing 



102 SHAFTESBURY. 



are to be sought not solely, or even mainly, in the opinion of 
mankind, or in the rewards and punishments of the magis- 
trate, or in the hopes and terrors of a future world, but in the 
answer of a good conscience, approving virtue and disap- 
proving vice, and in the love of a God, who, by His infinite 
wisdom and His all-embracing beneficence, is worthy of the 
love and admiration of His creatures. 



CHAPTER IV. 

Shaftesbury's theories on religion, beauty, and art. 

The articles of Shaftesbury's religious creed were few and 
simple, but these he entertained with a conviction amounting 
to enthusiasm. They may briefly be summed up as a belief 
in one God, whose most characteristic attribute is universal 
benevolence, in the moral government of the Universe, and 
in a future state of man, making up for the imperfections and 
repairing the inequalities of this present life. 

The existence of God is proved by the order and marks of 
design which appear in the Universe. " If there be divine 
excellence in things; if there be in Nature a supreme mind 
or Deity : we have then an object consummate, and compre- 
hensive of all which is good or excellent. And this object, 
of all others, must of necessity be the most amiable, the most 
engaging, and of highest satisfaction and enjoyment. Now 
that there is such a principal object as this in the World, the 
World alone (if I may say so) by its wise and perfect order 
must evince." 

Familiar as this argument has now become, Shaftesbury's 
presentation of it is sufficiently characteristic to merit a more 
detailed statement : — 

" All things in this world are united. For, as the branch 
is united with the tree, so is the tree as immediately with 

1 Moralists, Pt. II., Sect. 3. 



104 SHAFTESBURY. 

the earth, air, and water, which feed it. As much as the 
fertile mould is fitted to the tree, as much as the strong- and 
upright trunk of the oak or elm is fitted to the twining" 
branches of the vine or ivy : so much are the very leaves, the 
seeds, and fruits of these trees fitted to the various animals, 
these again to one another, and to the elements where they 
live, and to which they are, as appendices, in a manner fitted 
and joined, as either by wings for the air, fins for the water, 
feet for the earth, and by other correspondent inward parts of 
a more curious frame and texture. Thus, in contemplating" 
all on earth, we must of necessity view All in One, as holding 
to one common stock. Thus too is the system of the bigger 
world. See there the mutual dependency of things ! — the 
relation of one to another ; of the sun to this inhabited earth, 
and of the earth and other planets to the sun ! — the order, 
union, and coherence of the Whole ! And know that by this 
survey you will be obliged to own the Universal System and 
coherent scheme of things to be established on abundant 
proof, capable of convincing- any fair and just contemplator 
of the works of nature. For scarce would any one, till he 
had well surveyed this universal scene, believe an union thus 
evidently demonstrable by such numerous and powerful 
instances of mutual correspondency and relation, from the 
minutest ranks and orders of beings to the remotest spheres ! 

" Now, having recognized this uniform consistent fabric, 
and owned the Universal System, we must of consequence 
acknowledge a Universal Mind ; which no ingenious 
[ingenuous] man can be tempted to disown, except through 
the imagination of Disorder in the Universe, its seat. For 
can it be supposed of any one in the world that, being in 
some desert far from men, and hearing there a perfect 
symphony of music, or seeing an exact pile of regular archi- 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEA UTY, & ART. 105 

tecture arising gradually from the earth in all, its orders and 
proportions, he should be persuaded that, at the bottom, there 
was no design accompanying this, no secret spring of thought, 
no active mind ? Would he, because he saw no hand, deny 
the handywork, and suppose that each of these complete and 
perfect systems were framed, and thus united in just sym- 
metry and conspiring order, either by the accidental blowing 
of the winds or rolling of the sands ? " 2 

But it is not necessary to go out into the " bigger world " 
to find God. We may recognize Him in the microcosm of 
ourselves, either by direct intuition or by an inference from 
such intuition. " In vain we labour to understand that 
principle of Sense and Thought, which, seeming in us to 
depend so much on Motion, yet differs so much from it, 
and from Matter itself, as not to suffer us to conceive how 
Thought can more result from this, than this arise from 
Thought. But Thought we own pre-eminent, and confess the 
readiest of Beings ; the only existence of which we are made 
sure by being conscious. All else may be only dream and 
shadow. All which even Sense suggests may be deceitful. 
The Sense itself remains still ; Reason subsists ; and Thought 
maintains its eldership of being. Thus are we in a manner 
conscious of the original and eternally existent Thought, 
whence we derive our own. And thus the assurance we have 
of the existence of beings above our Sense, and of Thee (the 
great exemplar of Thy works), comes from Thee, the All- 
True and Perfect, who hast thus communicated Thyself more 
immediately to us, so as in some manner to inhabit within 
our souls ; Thou who art Original Soul, diffusive, vital in all, 
inspiriting the Whole." But the idea which we are thus 
competent to acquire by self-introspection, is amplified and 

2 Moralists, Pt. II., Sect. 4 



106 SHAFTESBURY. 

perfected by the contemplation of external nature. " All 
Nature's wonders serve to excite and perfect this idea of their 
Author. 'Tis here he suffers us to see and even to converse 
with Him, in a manner suitable to our frailty. How glorious 
is it to contemplate Him in this noblest of his works apparent 
to us, the system of the bigger world/' 3 

It has sometimes been supposed that Shaftesbury identified 
God with Nature. This, however, I think, was not the case. 
Witness the following passages : — 

" I only know that both theirs " (that is, the natures of 
trees) " and all other natures must for their duration depend 
alone on thatNature on which the world depends; and that every 
genius else must be subordinate to that One good Genius, 
whom I would willingly persuade you to think belonging to 
this world, according to our present way of speaking." 4 

"If it" (compounded matter) "can present us with so 
many innumerable instances of particular forms, who share 
this simple Principle by which they are really One, live, act, 
and have a Nature or Genius peculiar to themselves and 
provident for their own welfare; how shall we at the same 
time overlook this in the whole, and deny the Great and 
General One of the World ? How can we be so unnatural 
as to disown Divine Nature, our common Parent, and refuse 
to recognize the universal and sovereign Genius? " 5 

From these and other passages we may infer that Shaftes- 
bury conceived the relation of God to the World as that of 
the soul to the body. Nature is, as it were, the vesture of 
God, and God the soul of the Universe. The idea of an 
Anlma Mundi had been familiar to many of the ancients, 
whether, as with Plato, they regarded it as itself a created 



8 Moralists, Pt. III., Sect. 1. 

* Id. 6 Id. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEA UTY, & ART. 107 

being", or, as with the Stoics, they identified it with the 

Supreme Creator, or rather Fashioner, of the Universe, God 

Himself. Almost within our own times, this idea of a Soul 

of the World has been revived by Schelling. To most of my 

readers, Shaftesbury's thought will recall the well-known 

lines of Pope in which it is enshrined, and which it probably 

suggested : — 

" All are but parts of one stupendous whole, 
Whose body nature is, and God the soul." 6 

If there are difficulties in the way of conceiving an Uni- 
versal Mind, animating and governing nature, there are 
similar difficulties in the way of conceiving a Self or particular 
Mind, animating and governing our own bodies. " For be 
the difficulty ever so great, it stands the same, you may 
perceive, against your own Being, or against that which I am 
pretending to convince you of. You may raise what objec- 
tions you please on either hand ; and your dilemma may be 
of notable force against the manner of such a Supreme Being's 
existence. But, after you have done all, you will bring the 
same dilemma home to you, and be at a loss still about Your- 
Self. When you have argued ever so long upon these meta- 
physical points of Mode and Substance, and have philosophi- 
cally concluded from the difficulties of each hypothesis that 
there cannot be in Nature such a Universal-One as this, you 
must conclude, from the same reasons, that there cannot be 
any such particular- one as Your- Self. But that there is 
actually such a one as this latter, your own mind, 'tis hoped, 
may satisfy you. And of this Mind it is enough to say, 
" That it is something which acts upon a body, and has some- 
thing passive under it and subject to it : That it has not only 
body or mere matter for its subject, but in some respect even 

6 Pope's Essay on Man, Ep. 1., 267, 8 



108 SHAFTESBURY. 

itself too and what proceeds from it : That it superintends 
and manages its own imaginations, appearances, fancies ; cor- 
recting, working, and modelling these, as it finds good, and 
adorning and accomplishing, the Lest it can, this composite 
Order of Body and Understanding.-" Such a Mind and 
governing part, I know there is somewhere in the world. Let 
Pyrrho, by the help of such another, contradict me, if he 
pleases. We have our several understandings and thoughts, 
however we came by them. Each understands and thinks the 
best he can for his own purpose : He for Himself; I for 
another Self. And who I beseech you for the Whole? 

Is not this Nature still a Self? Or, tell me, I 

beseech you, How are You one? By what token? or by 
virtue of what? "By a Principle which joins certain parts, 
and which thinks and acts consonantly for the use and pur- 
pose of those parts." Say, therefore, what is your whole 
system a part of ? or is it, indeed, no part, but a whole, by it- 
self, absolute, independent, and unrelated to anything besides ? 
If it be indeed a part, and really related ; to what else, I 
beseech you, than to the Whole of Nature ? Is there then 
such a uniting principle in Nature ? If so, how are you then 
a Self, and Nature not so ? How have you something to 
understand and act for you, and Nature, who gave this under- 
standing, nothing at all to understand for her, advise her, 
or help her out (poor Being !) on any occasion, whatever 
necessity she may be in ? Has the World such ill-fortune in 
the main ? Are there so many particular understanding active 
principles everywhere? And is there nothing, at last, which 
thinks, acts, or understands for All ? Nothing which ad- 
ministers or looks after All ? " "' 

The Universal Mind is not only all-powerful and all-wise, 
but perfectly good. " There can be no malice but where 

I Moralists, Pt. III., Sect. 1. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEAUTY, & ART. 109 

interests are opposed. A Universal Being- can have no interest 
opposite ; and therefore can have no malice. If there be a 
general mind, it can have no particular interest; but the 
general good, or good of the whole, and its own private good 
must of necessity be one and the same. It can intend nothing 
besides, nor aim at anything beyond, nor be provoked to any- 
thing contrary. So that we have only to consider whether 
there be really such a thing as a Mind which has relation to 
the Whole or not. If there be really a mind, we may rest 
satisfied that it is the best-natured one in the world." 8 

From the perfect wisdom and goodness and the supreme 

power of the Deity it follows that, if Nature be regarded as a 

whole, everything, regarded with reference to that whole, must 

be for the best. As Shaftesbury's disciple afterwards wrote : 

" All nature is but art, unknown to thee ; 

All chance direction, which thou canst not see ; 

All discord, harmony not understood; 

All partial evil, universal good." 9 

Replying to a supposed objector, at the beginning of the 
Moralists, 1 Shaftesbury, in the person of Philocles, thus 
describes the confessions which he has wrung from him : — 

" That such a hazardous affair as this of Creation should have 
been undertaken by those who had not perfect foresight as well 
as command, you owned was neither wise nor just. But you 
stood to Foresight. You allowed the consequences to have 
been understood by the creating powers, when they undertook 
their work ; and you denied that it would have been better 
for them to have omitted it, though they knew what would 
be the event. 'Twas better still that the project should be 
executed, whatever might become of mankind, or how hard 

8 Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sect. 5. 

9 Pope's Essay on Man, Ep. I. 289-92. 
1 Pt. I, Sect. 2. 



1 1 o SB A FTESB UR Y. 

soever such a creation was like to fall on the generality of 
this miserable race. For "'twas impossible, you thought, that 
Heaven should have acted otherwise than for the best. So 
that even from this misery and 111 of Man, there was un- 
doubtedly some Good arising ; something which overbalanced 
all, and made full amends/'' 

In a later passage, 2 after describing the successive steps by 
which the mind rises from the contemplation of beauty in 
particular forms to the observation of universal order and the 
intuition of supreme beauty, he proceeds to u vindicate the 
works of God to man " in a still bolder strain : " Much is 
alleged, in answer, to show why Nature errs, and how she 
came thus impotent and erring from an unerring hand. But 
I deny she errs; and, when she seems most ignorant or 
perverse in her productions, I assert her even then as wise 
and provident as in her goodliest works. For -'tis not then 
that men complain of the world's order or abhor the face of 
things, when they see various interests mixed and interfering; 
natures subordinate, of different kinds, opposed one to another, 
and in their different operations submitted, the higher to the 
lower, 'Tis, on the contrary, from this order of inferior and 
superior things that we admire the world's beauty, founded 
thus on contrarieties ; whilst from such various and disagree- 
ing principles a universal concord is established 

Here then is that solution you require; and hence those 
seeming blemishes cast upon Nature. Nor is there ought in 
this beside what is natural and good. -Tis Good which is 
predominant; and every corruptible and mortal nature by its 
mortality and corruption yields only to some better, and all 
in common to that best and highest Nature, which is incor- 
ruptible and immortal/' 

Objections to this idea of the Universe being constructed 
s Pt. I., Sect. 3. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BE A UTY, & ART. in 

on a perfect scheme are met by Shaftesbury, as by so many 
other theologians and philosophers, with the appeal to our 
ignorance and the finite nature of our capacities, — to the 
principle that 

" 'lis but a part we see, and not the whole." 

"Now, in this mighty Union, if there be such relations of 
parts one to another as are not easily discovered, if on this 
account the end and use of things does not everywhere appear, 
there is no wonder : since 'tis no more indeed than what must 
happen of necessity. Nor could Supreme Wisdom have 
otherwise ordered it. For, in an infinity of things thus 
relative, a mind which sees not infinitely can see nothing 
fully. And, since each particular has relations to all in 
general, it can know no perfect or true relation of anything in 
a world not perfectly and fully known/'' 3 

In the case of man, the sufferings and imperfections of his 
present state are used as an argument in favour of a future 
life, where all apparent inequality and injustice will be redressed : 

" But, being once convinced of Order and a Providence as to 
things present, men may soon, perhaps, be satisfied even of a 
future state. For, if Virtue be to itself no small reward, 
and Vice in a great measure its own punishment, we have a 
solid ground to go upon. The plain foundations of a dis- 
tributive justice, and due order in this world, may lead us to 
conceive a further building. We apprehend a larger scheme, 
and easily resolve, ourselves why things were not completed in 
this state, but their accomplishment reserved rather to some 
further period. For had the good and virtuous of mankind 
been wholly prosperous in this life ; had goodness never met 
with opposition, nor merit ever lain under a cloud : where 
had been the trial, victory, or crown of virtue ? Where had 
the virtues had their theatre, or whence their names ? Where 
8 Moralists, Pt. II., Sect. 4. 



ii2 SHAFTESBURY. 

had been Temperance or Self-Denial ? Where Patience, 
Meekness, Magnanimity ? Whence have these their being ? 
What merit, except from hardship ? What Virtue without a 
conflict, and the encounter of such enemies as arise both 
within and from abroad?"* 

But it is not only from the prospect of future reparation 
that we may derive solace in our misfortunes. We may 
comfort ourselves also with the reflection that our particular 
lot, be it apparently good or evil, is a necessary incident in 
the well-ordering of that larger system, which we help to 
compose. After saying that, " according to the hypothesis of 
those who exclude a general mind, 'tis scarce possible, upon 
disastrous occasions, and under the circumstances of a 
calamitous and hard fortune, to prevent a natural kind of 
abhorrence and spleen, which will be entertained and kept 
alive by the imagination of so perverse an order of things," 
he proceeds : " But in another hypothesis (that of perfect 
Theism) it is understood ' That whatever the Order of the 
World produces is, in the main, both just and good/ There- 
fore, in the course of things in this world, whatever hardship 
of events may seem to force from any rational creature a hard 
censure of his private condition or lot, he may by reflection, 
nevertheless, come to have patience and to acquiesce in it. 
Nor is this all. He may go further still in this reconciliation, 
and from the same principle may make the lot itself an object 
of his good affection, whilst he strives to maintain this 
generous fealty, and stands so well disposed towards the laws 
and government of his higher country." 5 

4 Moralists, Pt. II., Sect. 3. 

6 This passage affords another instance of the similarity of much of 
Shaftesbury's teaching to that of the Stoics. Von Gizycki refers to 
Seneca, De Vita Beata, Ch. xv., from which I extract the following 
sentences: "Quomodo hie potest deo parere et quicquid evenit bono 
animo excipere nee de fato queri, casuum suorum benignus interpres, si 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEA UTY, & ART. 113 

Such is Shaftesbury's scheme of theology. Like most 
other optimists, he fails, at least on the face of his system, 6 
to meet the great difficulty which is usually felt by meu who 
are tolerably familiar with the ills of life and the destructive 
forces of nature, when theories of this roseate hue are pro- 
pounded to them. Why, if the designer and governor of the 
Universe be all-powerful and all- wise as well as all -good, 
could he not have secured' the beauty, the perfection, and the 
happiness of the whole, without so much deformity, imper- 
fection, and misery in the parts ? A suffering man may well 
be pardoned, if, even with a firm assurance of future repara- 
tion, he questions the accuracy of the dictum that " every- 
thing is for the best in the best of all possible worlds." Why, 
he may say, should I not be happy here as well as hereafter, 
why should not an omnipotent Providence attain its ends by 
means less painful and less hurtful to its creatures? And, 
though the necessity of a contrast between good and evil, 
pleasure and pain, like the lights and shades in painting, or 
the harmonies and dissonances in music, which Shaftesbury 
adduces as parallels, may, in some measure, meet the difficulty, 
it can hardly be said altogether to remove it. Some of the 
ancient philosophers imagined that the designs of a beneficent 
creator were constantly being frustrated, though with vary- 
ing success, by the resistance of an inert matter, the source 
of all evil both in man and nature. The Manichees, following 
the ancient Persians, maintained the original and independent 
existence of two principles, one of Good or Light, the other 

ad voluptatum dolorumque punctiunculas concutiturp Quic- 

quid ex universi constitutione patiendum est magno suscipiatur animo. 
Ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia nee perturbari iis quae 
vitare non est nostrte potestatis. In regno nati sumus. Deo parere 
libertas est." 

6 For a qualification of his system, which Shaftesbury possibly ad- 
mitted, see pp. 115, 116. 



U4 SHAFTESBURY. 

of Evil or Darkness. Christian theology recognizes an evil 
principle, though a subordinate and created one, and, in the 
last resort, refers all evil, including sin and death, to the dis- 
obedience of voluntary agents, who, by obedience to the 
Supreme "Will, might have preserved to themselves and their 
posterity their primeval condition of unsullied happiness. So 
perplexed was J. S. Mill by this ever-recurring problem of 
the existence of evil, that he thinks the attribute of perfect 
Goodness in the Deity can only be saved at the expense of 
his Omnipotence. " The only admissible moral theory of 
Creation," he says, " is that the Principle of Good cannot at 
once and altogether subdue the powers of evil, either physical 
or moral ; could not place mankind in a world free from the 
necessity of an incessant struggle with the maleficent powers, 
or make them always victorious in that struggle, but could 
and did make them capable of carrying on the fight with 
vigour and with progressively increasing success. " 7 What- 
ever may be the solution of these difficulties, and they are 
difficulties which will probably always continue to exercise 
the minds of reflecting men, the optimistic theory seems to 
me at least more reasonable than the now fashionable theory 
of pessimism. It is easier to believe, so it appears to me, 
that, if we could see the whole scheme of nature, we should 
recognize that all things are for the best, than that we are 
living in a world, which, if it were only a little worse than 
it is, would cease to exist. Both Optimism and Pessimism, 
when nakedly stated, seem to practical men to wear an air of 
paradox, but surely Pessimism is far the more paradoxical of 
the two. 

It is ingeniously remarked by Mill that, in the Theodicee, 
Leibnitz does not maintain that this is the best of all imagi- 
nable, but only of all possible worlds. The Deity, therefore, 
Essays on Religion, pp. 38, 39. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BE A UTY, & ART. 115 

is regarded as limited by possibilities, certain combinations of 
events only being possible, and certain events in those com- 
binations excluding or implying the presence of others. Thus, 
for instance, freedom of choice in man implies liability to 
error and sin. He cannot be endowed with the privilege, 
without also being exposed to the danger. The Optimism oi 
Leibnitz is, therefore, a limited and qualified Optimism. 
Shaftesbury's Optimism appears, at first sight, to be more 
thoroughgoing, but it may be questioned whether he did not 
regard the operations of God as limited by what he conceived 
as the co-existent and co-eternal principle of matter. At least, 
in the Moralists, 8 the following curious and striking passage 
is put into the mouth of Philocles, and Theocles, by his 
silence, appears to acquiesce in the views there suggested : — 
" I expected to have heard from you, m customary form, 
of a First Cause, a First Being, and a Beginning of Motion : 
how clear the idea was of an immaterial substance : and 
how plainly it appeared that, at some time or other, Matter 
must have been created. 9 But as to all this you are silent. 
As for what is said of ' a material unthinking substance being 
never able to have produced an immaterial thinking one/ I 
readily grant it ; but on the condition that this great maxim of 
' Nothing being ever made from Nothing ' may hold as well 
on my side as my adversary's. And then, I suppose, that, 
whilst the world endures, he will be at a loss how to assign a 
beginning to Matter, or how to suggest a possibility of 
annihilating it. The spiritual men may, as long as they 
please, represent to us, in the most eloquent manner, "that 
Matter, considered in a thousand different shapes, joined and 
disjoined, varied and modified to eternity, can never, of itself, 

8 Pt. II., Sect. 4. 

9 Shaftesbury is here probably alluding to Locke's demonstration of the 
Existence of a God, contained in the Essay, Bk. IV., Ch. 10. 

i a 



L 



n6 SHAFTESBURY. 

afford one single thought, never occasion or give rise to any- 
thing like sense or knowledge." Their argument will hold 
good against a Democritus, an Epicurus, or any of the elder 
or later Atomists. But it will be turned on them by an 
examining Academist. And, when the two substances are 
fairly set asunder, and considered apart as different kinds, 
'twill be as strong sense, and as good argument, to say as 
well of the immaterial kind : ( That do with it as you please, 
modify it a thousand ways, purify it, exalt it, sublime it, 
torture it ever so much, or rack it, as they say, with thinking ; 
you will never be able to produce or force the contrary sub- 
stance out of it.' The poor dregs of sorry matter can no 
more be made out of the simple pure substance of immaterial 
thought, than the high spirits of thought or reason can be 
extracted from the gross substance of heavy matter. So let 
the Dogmatists make of this argument what they can." 

If this passage expresses Shaftesbury's own opinions, he 
probably, like Plato, regarded matter as the cause of evil or 
imperfection, the blind, unintelligent force, which even 
Supreme Wisdom must take into account in its designs for 
the good of the entire system of the Universe. Hence, the 
necessity for subtle combinations, in which the part must 
often be sacrificed to the whole, and the Universal Good can 
only be compassed at the expense of individual suffering, 
occasional deformities, and particular blemishes. On this 
view of Shaftesbury's theory, the world is not, to use Mill's 
phrase, the best imaginable world, but the best world that 
existing circumstances admit of; the supreme goodness and 
wisdom of the Deity being displayed, not in the framing of 
an ideal scheme, but in the adaptation of given means to the 
best attainable end. 

No description of Shaftesbury's theological position would 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BE A UTY, & ART. 117 

be complete, unless it noticed his attitude towards Revealed 
Religion and the doctrines and clergy of the Established 
Church. As to Revelation, notwithstanding the tone of mock 
deference with which, in common with so many other 
sceptical writers of the eighteenth century, he professes his 
entire submission to <e the Opinions by Law established/'' it 
is tolerably plain that he does not regard the Church or the 
Bible as having communicated to mankind any moral or 
spiritual truths which were not attainable by the natural 
exercise of the human reason. He believed steadfastly, and 
even enthusiastically, in all those doctrines which Divines 
assign to the province of Natural Religion, — in One God, in 
the moral government of the Universe, in a future state of 
rewards and punishments, — but the distinctive doctrines of 
Christianity were alien alike to his optimistic modes of 
thought and to the intensely classical spirit which he had 
imbibed from his assiduous study of ancient authors. He 
professes, indeed, that " through a profound respect and 
religious veneration he has forborne so much as to name any 
of the sacred and solemn mysteries of Revelation," 1 but his 
reticence, which is not always strictly maintained, is of the 
kind which betokens unbelief. His hostility or indifference 
to those theological dogmas which he did not regard as rest- 
ing on the evidence of natural reason is specially apparent in 
the first and last Treatises. The passage on the Jews in the 
Letter concerning Enthusiasm is alone sufficient to show how 
completely he had broken with the idea of specially revealed 
religions. A good instance of the covert manner in which 
he conducted his assaults against what he conceived to be the 
weak or immoral points in the prevalent religious creed of his 
day is furnished by the following passage, which is taken 
from the same letter : " We must not only be in ordinary 

1 Miscellaneous Reflections, Misc. V., Ch. 3. 



n8 SHAFTESBURY. 

good humour, but in the best of humours, and in the sweetest, 
kindest disposition of our lives, to understand well what true 
goodness is, and what those attributes imply which we 
ascribe with such applause and honour to the Deity. We 
shall then be able to see best, whether those forms of justice, 
those degrees of punishment, that temper of resentment, and 
those measures of offence and indignation, which we vulgarly 
suppose in God, are suitable to those original ideas of Good- 
ness, which the same Divine Being, dy Nature under him, 
has implanted in us, and which we must necessarily presup- 
pose, in order to give him praise or honour of any kind/'' 2 

In opposition to the almost unanimous assumption of pro- 
fessed theologians, Shaftesbury maintained that entire free- 
dom of speculation, and, in consequence, of opinion, extend- 
ing even to the question of His own existence, cannot be 
displeasing to a Being, one of whose attributes is perfect 
benevolence. " It is impossible that any besides an ill- 
natured man can wish against the Being of a God ; for this 
is wishing against the public, and even against one's private 
good too, if rightly understood. But, if a man has not any 
such ill-will to stifle his belief, he must have surely an un- 
happy opinion of God, and believe him not so good by far as 
he knows himself to be, if he imagines that an impartial use 
of his reason, in any matter of speculation whatsoever, can 
make him run any risk hereafter ; and that a mean denial of 
iiis reason, and an affectation of belief in any point too hard 
for his understanding, can entitle him to any favour in another 
world. This is being sycophants in religion, mere parasites 

of devotion. 'Tis the most beggarly refuge 

imaginable, which is so mightily cried up, and stands as a 
great maxim with many able men : " That they should strive 
to have faith, and believe to the utmost ; because if, after all 3 

s Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sect. 4. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEAUTY, & ART. 119 

there be nothing in the matter, there will be no harm in 
being- thus deceived, but if there be anything, it will be fatal 
for them not to have believed to the full,", But they are so 
far mistaken that, whilst they have this thought, 'tis certain 
they can never believe either to their own satisfaction and hap- 
piness in this world, or with any advantage of recommendation 
to another. For, besides that our reason, which knows the 
cheat, will never rest satisfied on such a bottom, but turn us 
often adrift and toss us in a sea of doubt and perplexity, we 
cannot but actually grow worse in our religion, and entertain 
a worse opinion still of a Supreme Deity, whilst our belief is 
founded on so injurious a thought of Him/' 3 

But, though every man who has the leisure and oppor- 
tunity should be free to form his own opinions on religion 
as on all other subjects, there should be an authorized eccle- 
siastical body to supply a common doctrine and worship for 
the people at large. " As a notable author of our nation 4 
expresses it, 'tis necessary a people should have a public 

3 Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sect. 4. 

* Shaftesbury cites James Harrington, author of the Oceana. The 
particular passage he alludes to is to be found in The Art of Laiogiving: 
Bk. III., ch 2. The chapter begins with the following sentences 
" There is nothing more certain or demonstrable to common sense than 
that the far greater part of mankind, in matters of religion, give them- 
selves up to the public leading. Now a National Religion, rightly 
established, or not coercive, is not any public driving, but only the public 
leading. If the Public in this case may not lead such as desire to be led 
by the Public, and yet a party may lead such as desire to be led by a 
party, where woulJ be the Liberty of Conscience as to the State ? " In the 
" Preliminarys " to the Oceana, he says : " As a Government pretending 
to Liberty, and yet suppressing Liberty of Conscience, must be a contra- 
diction ; so a man that, pleading for the liberty of private conscience, 
refuses liberty to the national conscience must be absurd. A Common- 
wealth is nothing else but the national conscience. And, if the conviction 
of a man's private conscience produces his private religion, the conviction 
of the national conscience must produce a national religion." 



120 SHAFTESBURY. 

leading in religion. For to deny the magistrate a worship, 
or take away a National Church, is as mere enthusiasm as 
the notion which sets up persecution. For why should there 
not he public walks as well as private gardens ? Why not 
public libraries as well as private education and home- 
tutors?" 5 Moreover, though no one should be compelled, 
against his will, to conform to the prescribed worship of the 
Church established by law, Shaftesbury evidently thinks that 
it is the better course on the part of the philosopher, if not 
of all good citizens, to do so. "Every one knows that by 
Heresy is understood a stubbornness in the will, not a defect 
merely in the understanding. On this account 'tis impos- 
sible that an honest and good-humoured man should be a 
schismatic or heretic, and affect to separate from his national 
worship on slight reason, or without severe provocation.'" 6 
A.s we have seen in the First Chapter, 7 he was himself 
regular in his attendance at Church and habitually received 
the Holy Communion. In pursuing this course of conduct, 
I do not think that he was simply acting for the sake of 
setting an example to his tenants and dependents, much less 
that he was playing the hypocrite. He was, as I have said 
elsewhere, a man of a deeply religious temperament, and, 
though his own religious feelings were satisfied by the doc- 
trines of Natural Religion and he had evidently no belief 
in the miraculous aspects of Christianity, he probably thought 
that a system of practices and dogmas, appealing directly to 
the senses and imagination, was necessary to the spiritual sus- 
tenance of the great mass of mankind, while to the philosopher 
these same dogmas and practices, philosophically interpreted, 
might have a moral and even a religious value. At least, 

8 Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sect. 2. 
6 Miscellaneous Reflections, Misc. 2, Ch. 3 
1 See p. 38. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEA UTY, & ART. 121 

this is what I would hazard as the most probable explanation 
of Shaftesbury's somewhat enigmatical frame of mind. 

The great blot on Shaftesbury's treatment of religious 
questions is the tone of banter which he so often assumes. 
Sometimes this banter approaches grimace, and not infre- 
quently reminds us of Voltaire. Thug, speaking of Revela- 
tion, he says : " If I mistake not our author's meaning, he 
professes to believe, as far as is possible for any one who him- 
self had never experienced any divine communication, whether 
by dream, vision, apparition, or other supernatural operation ; 
nor was- ever present as eye-witness of any sign, prodigy, or 
miracle whatsoever." 8 Of course, what he means is that 
nothing short of personal experience affords sufficient evidence 
of a supernatural occurrence. But why not make this asser- 
tion outright, instead of insinuating it under the cover of an 
ironical remark ? When, speaking of himself in the same 
passage, he goes on to say that " for what is recorded of ages 
heretofore, the author seems to resign his judgment, with 
entire condescension, to his superiors/' and that " on all occa- 
sions he submits most willingly, and with full confidence and 
trust, to the opinions by law established/' his irony appears 
to be carried to the verge of mendacity. That he did not 
believe in what is ordinarily, though it may be inaccurately, 
called the supernatural as distinguished from the natural 
government of God, is plain to any one who can read between 
the lines. But, as if to leave no doubt on the subject, in the 
Moralists, Shaftesbury puts in the mouth of one of his 
characters, who is defending modern miracles, the following 
argument, to which no reply is attempted : " The attestation 
of men dead and gone, in behalf of miracles past and at an 
end, can never surely be of equal force with miracles present. 
If there were no miracles now-a-days, the world would be 

8 Miscellaneous Eeflections, Misc. 2, Ch. 2. 



122 SHAFTESBURY. 

apt to think there never were any. The present must answer 
for the credibility of the past." 9 But that he regards the 

9 The Moralists, Part II., Sect. 5. Shaftesbury is undoubtedly right 
in maintaining, in this section, that miracles afford no logical proof of the 
existence of God, understanding by God one Supreme Being, all-powei fill, 
all-wise, and all good. We must already believe in the existence of God, 
before we can determine whether any alleged miracle proceeds from Him 
or not. Mr. Mill has stated this argument extremely well in his Logic, 
Bk. III., Ch. 25, extending it so as to apply to the evidence, derived 
from miracles, for the reality of supernatural agencies generally. He 
maintains that, " if we do not already believe in supernatural agencies, no 
miracle can prove to us their existence." The reality of the supernatural 
agency must have been previously accepted on other grounds. The 
miracle can only reveal to us its will. Though Shaftesbury's argument 
has not so wide an application, it is stated with remarkable force. 
" What though innumerable miracles from every part assailed the sense, 
and gave the trembling soul no respite ? What though the sky should 
suddenly open, and all kinds of prodigies appear, voices be heard, or 
characters read ? What would this evince more than 'That there were 
certain Powers could do all this ' ? But ' what Powers ; whether one or 
more ; whether superior or subaltern ; mortal or immortal ; wise or 
foolish ; just or unjust ; good or bad ' : this would still remain a mystery ; 
as would the true intention, the infallibility or certainty of whatever these 
Powers asserted. Their word could not be taken in their own case. 
They might silence men indeed, but not convince them : since Power can 
never serve as proof for Goodness ; and Goodness is the only pledge of 
Truth. By Goodness alone Trust is created. By Goodness superior 

powers may win belief. To whom, therefore, the laws of 

this Universe and its government appear just and uniform: to him they 
speak the government of one Just One ; to him they reveal and witness a 
God ; and, laying in him the foundation of this first faith, they fit him 
for a subsequent one." Moralists, Pt. II., Sect. 5. This order of proof 
agrees with that adopted by the early Christian Apologists, who did not 
adduce miracles, as such, but miracles evincing beneficence, to p.ove the 
divine intervention ; for evil spirits also were regarded as capable of 
working wonders, and hence the moral character of a miracle was a most 
important element in determining the source from which it issued. But 
these considerations imply that the belief in a God must already exist, 
before we can infer that any particular miracle proceeds from Him. 



JHEORIES ON RELIGION, BEAUTY, & ART. 123 

belief in modern miracles as sheer fanaticism, lie nowhere 
conceals. 

Shaftesbury was perfectly sincere in expressing* himself in 
favour of the maintenance of a Church Establishment; nor 
would he probably have cared to bring- about any serious 
alterations in the articles and formularies of the English 
Church as settled at the Reformation. The moderate and 
tolerant party amongst the Anglican Clergy, the Broad 
Church party, as we should now call them, seem to have fairly 
satisfied his ideal of religious teachers. The religion which 
they taught was not indeed the sublimated or attenuated 
religion which corresponded with his own convictions, but it 
had the advantage of laying hold of the feelings of the 
masses, while it lent support to the civil order and did not 
unduly interfere with liberty of speculation. In early life, he 
edited Dr. Whichcote's Sermons ; of Bishop Burnet, who was 
the Bishop of his own diocese, he always speaks with esteem 
and even admiration ; and, in one of his letters to Michael 
Ains worth, 1 he praises the bishops, and "dignified church- 
men " generally, of his own time, as " the most worthily and 
justly dignified of any in any age." But to the high church- 
men — the preachers of passive obedience, the claimants of 
sacerdotal powers, and the advocates of a policy of relentless 
persecution towards dissenters — he seems to have been 
actuated by a feeling of the deepest animosity. With them, 
their mode of life, their course of action, and their ways of 
thinking, he neither had, nor could pretend to have, any 
sympathy. In the letter from which I have just quoted, 
speaking of the bishops and dignified clergy, he says : " They 
are for toleration, inviolable toleration (as our Queen nobly and 
Christianly said it, in her speech a year or two since) ; and 
this is itself intolerable with our high gentlemen, who 

1 Letters to a Young Man at the University, Letter I. 



124 SHAFTESBURY. 

despise the gentleness of their lord and master, and the sweet 
mild government of our Queen, preferring rather that 
abominable blasphemous representation of church power, 
attended with the worst of temporal governments, as we see 
it in perfection of each kind in France.'''' In a subsequent 
letter (Letter IX), he warns his protege that "all the pre- 
eminence, wealth, or pension,'" which he may receive, or ex- 
pect to receive, by help of the clerical character, "is from 
the public, whence both the authority and the profit is 
derived, and on which it legally depends ; all other pretensions 
of priests being Jewish and Heathenish, and in our state 
seditious, disloyal, and factious.'''' In another letter to 
Ains worth, dated Reigate, 11th May, 1711, part of which is 
wrongly incorporated in Letter X. of the printed collection, 2 
he complains that " this is the worst time for insolence, riot, 
pride, and presumption of clergymen, that I ever knew, or 
have read of; though I have searched far into the characters 
of high churchmen from the first centuries, in which they 
grew to be dignified with crowns and purple, to the late 
times of our reformation and to our present age.''' The 
Characteristics abound in passages attacking, either obliquely 
or directly, the intolerance and sacerdotal pretensions of the 
high-church section of the English clergy. In the Miscel- 
laneous Reflections, there is an elaborate passage 3 in which 
he traces the growth of dogma and the spirit of persecution 
in the Christian Church, till at last it culminated in the 
establishment of the Romish hierarchy. In the spirit and 
almost in the very words of modern controversy he takes 
occasion to remark how much more imposing, and even 
tolerable, are the claims of the Romish Church than those of 
its imitators in other communions: "In reality, the exercise 

» See p. 46. 3 Misc. 2, Ch. 2. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEA UTY, & ART. 125 

of power, however arbitrary or despotic, seems less intolerable 
under such a spiritual sovereignty, so extensive, ancient, and 
of such a long 1 succession, than under the petty tyrannies and 
mimical polities of some new pretenders. The former may 
even persecute with a tolerable grace. The latter, who would 
willingly derive their authority from the former, and graft on 
their successive right, must necessarily make a very awkward 
figure. And whilst they strive to give themselves the same 
air of independency on the civil magistrate, whilst they affect 
the same authority in government, the same grandeur, 
magnificence, and pomp in worship, they raise the highest 
ridicule in the eyes of those who have real discernment and 
can distinguish originals from copies : 

' imitatores, servum pecus ! ' " 



There remains one other subject connected with Shaftes- 
bury's literary activity, to the exposition of which, however, 
it is not necessary that I should devote much space. This is 
his theory of beauty and art. We have seen that, even in 
his treatment of morals, the idea of moral beauty, the Greek 
conception of a harmony or proportion in characters or 
actions, is always uppermost in his mind. Goodness, Beauty, 
and Truth, indeed, he regards as all one. " What is beauti- 
ful is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious 
and proportionable is true ; and what is at once both beautiful 
and true is, of consequence, agreeable and good." 4 Truth is 
a word appropriate to propositions, goodness to actions and 
characters, and beauty to external objects, whether of nature 
or art, and it is much more convenient that these words 
should be confined within their proper provinces than that 

4 Miscellaneous Reflections, Misc. 3, Ch. 2. 



126 SHAFTESBURY. 

they should be used interchangeably. As, however, •! have 
already discussed this question in reference to the words 
Goodness and Beauty, I need not dwell on it any further. 
The same tendency or desire to assimilate the conceptions of 
morals to those of art is shown in the frequent comparison 
of the moralist or philosopher with the virtuoso, a word then 
in common use to designate what we should now call an 
amateur. 

This analogy, or, as it might almost be styled, identifica- 
tion, pervades Shaftesbury's entire system, and his theory of 
Ethics, consequently, easily admits of being translated into a 
theory of aesthetics. Beauty and Morality are conceived of 
as inherent properties, the one of external objects, the other 
of actions and characters. Moreover, they are both appre- 
hended under the same conditions, and after the same manner. 
Lastly, Morality is only Beauty in one of its higher stages. 
It may be worth while briefly to explain and illustrate these 
several points. 

To begin with the first. Beauty is a quality of objects, as 
Morality is a quality of characters, dispositions, and actions. 
" The case is the same in the mental or moral subjects, as in 
the ordinary bodies or common subjects of sense. The shapes, 
motions, colours, and proportions of these latter being * 
presented to our eye, there necessarily arises a beauty or 
deformity, according to the different measure, arrangement, 
and disposition of their several parts. So in behaviour and 
actions, when presented to our understanding, there must be 
found, of necessity, an apparent difference, according to the 
regularity or irregularity of the subjects/'' 5 In the Moralists, 6 
he tries to state the question with regard to the beauty of 
external objects in the simplest possible terms, by confining 

5 Inquiry concerning Virtue, Book I., Pt. 2, Sect. 3. 
8 Pt. III., Sect. 2. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEAUTY, & ART. 127 

himself, to the case of figures. " 'Tis enough/' says Theocles, 
" if we consider the simplest of figures ; as either a round 
ball, a cube, or die. Why is even an infant pleased with the 
first view of these proportions ? Why is the sphere or globe, 
the cylinder and obelisk preferred; and the irregular figures, 
in respect of these, rejected and despised?" "I am ieaJy/' 
replies Philocles, <( to own there is in certain figures a natural 
beauty, which the eye finds as soon as the object is presented 
to it." The ultimate foundation of beauty, then, as of 
morality, is found in the principles of harmony and propor- 
tion, whether of the parts in relation to each other, or of 
the whole in relation to other wholes. In the case of 
morality, it may be urged, the idea of harmony and propor- 
tion is better replaced by that of Goodness, or tendency to 
promote the general welfare. And, as applied to Beauty, the 
analysis is, undoubtedly, very imperfect. It omits to take 
into consideration the large extent to which our ideas of 
beauty depend on association with other ideas and emotions, 
and how much of our own thoughts and moods and feelings 
we have usually imported into a landscape or a face or a work 
of art, before our sesthetic judgments on it are definitely 
formed. 

Shaftesbury does not, like Hutcheson, distinguish between a 
sense of Beauty and a Moral Sense. These are both, with him, 
one and the same sense, applied to different objects. We have a 
sense of harmony and proportion, which, as it is con-natural, 
may be called an instinct. As applied to external objects, it 
is the sense of beauty j as applied to human actions, characters, 
and dispositions, it is the moral sense; and, lastly, when 
applied to the contemplation of the universal frame of things, 
and the moral government of the world, it becomes a religious 
sense, by which we apprehend the Supreme Beauty. In its 
origin, this sense is an instinct, but it admits, in all its appli- 



128 SHAFTESBURY. 

cations, of indefinite cultivation and improvement, and this 
is the work which ought to form the main occupation of our 
lives. 

The three orders of Beauty are set forth in a passage in 
the Moralists/ which is so characteristic of Shaftesbury's 
point of view, that, notwithstanding the length of the 
extract, I think it well to lay the greater part of it before 
the reader. 

" Do you not see then, replied Theocles, that you have 
established three degrees or orders of Beauty ? As 

how? 

" "Why first, the dead forms, as you properly have called 
them, which bear a fashion, and are formed, whether by man 
or nature; but have no forming power, no action, or intelli- 
gence. Bight. 

" Next, and as the second kind, the Forms which form ; that 
is, which have intelligence, action, and operation. Bight 

still. 

" Here therefore is double beauty. For here is both the 
Form (the effect of Mind) and Mind itself. The first kind 
[is] low and despicable in respect of this other ; from whence 
the dead form receives its lustre and force of beauty. For 
what is a mere body, though a human one, and ever so 
exactly fashioned, if inward form be wanting, and the mind be 
monstrous or imperfect, as in an idiot or savage ? This 

too I can apprehend, said I ; but where is the third 
order ? 

" Have patience, replied he, and see first whether you have 
discovered the whole force of this second Beauty ? H >w 
else should you understand the force of love, or have the 
power of enjoyment? Tell me, I beseech you, when first 
you named these the Forming Forms, did you think of no 

7 Moralists, Part III., Sect. 2. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEAUTY, & ART. 129 

other productions of theirs besides the dead kinds, such as 
the palaces, the coins, the brazen or the marble figures of 
men ? Or did you think of something' nearer life? 

" I could easily, said I, have added that these forms of ours 
had a virtue of producing other living forms, like themselves. 
But this virtue of theirs I thought was from another form 
above them, and could not properly be called their virtue or 
art ; if in reality there was a superior art, or something 
artist-like, which guided their hand, and made tools of them 
in this specious work. 

" Happily thought, said he ! You have prevented a censure 
which I hardly imagined you could escape. And here you 
have unawares discovered that third order of Beauty, which 
forms not only such as we call mere forms, but even the 
Forms which form. For we ourselves are notable architects. 
in matter, and can show lifeless bodies brought into form, 
and fashioned by our own hands : but that which fashions 
even minds themselves contains in itself all the beauties 
fashioned by those minds ; and is consequently the principle, 
source, and fountain of all Beauty. It seems so. 

" Therefore, whatever beauty appears in our second order of 
forms, or whatever is derived or produced from thence, all 
this is eminently, principally, and originally in this last order 
of Supreme and Sovereign Beauty. True. 

" Thus Architecture, Music, and all which is of human 
invention, resolves itself into this last order. Bight, 

said I : and thus all the enthusiasms of other kinds resolve 
themselves into ours.'" 

However open to criticism these statements may be, it 
must at least be acknowledged that the conception of an 
ascending scale of beauty, rising from the simplest objects 
of nature, through man, his works and actions, up to the 
universal frame of things and its Creator, and of a special 

K 



1 30 SHAFTESBUR Y. 

organ in man, capable, by development and cultivation, of 
apprehending- these successive stages, is one of peculiar 
grandeur and sublimity, as worthy of a poet as of a philo- 
sopher. The reader, who is acquainted with the works of 
Plato, will not fail to recognize the thoroughly Platonic spirit 
which animates Shaftesbury's speculations on these and 
kindred topics. But the disciple, though the master's mantle 
is upon him, never fails to retain a marked individuality of 
his own. 

In addition to the many observations on art and beauty 
which lie scattered up and down his religious and ethical 
treatises, Shaftesbury wrote two small pieces having express 
reference to the Fine Arts. These are the " Notion of the 
historical draught or tablature of the Judgment of Hercules " 
and the "Letter concerning Design," both of which have 
ceen already noticed in the second chapter. The first piece 
offers suggestions for a painting of the Judgment of Hercules, 
and contains some very just remarks on the requisites of 
historical painting in general. Thus, he lays down the rules 
that in painting of this kind there must be unity of design, 
that is to say, the tablature must be " a single piece, compre- 
hended in one view, and formed according to one single in- 
telligence, meaning, or design/" " constituting a real whole 
by a natural and necessary relation of its parts, the same as 
of the members in a natural body/' that there must be 
unity of time and action, which he calls the rule of con- 
sistency, that is to say, that " such passages or events " only 
are to be set in view, " as have actually subsisted, or, accord- 
ing to nature, might well subsist or happen together, in one 
and the same instant;" that the subsidiary parts of the 
picture, such as the landscape or architecture, should not divert 
the eye from the action, which is the principal design ; that 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BEAUTY, & ART. 131 

" nothing 1 of the emblematical or enigmatic kind be visibly 
and directly intermixed/' as tending to interfere with the 
natural simplicity and grace of the piece. These and similar 
rules have for their object the maintenance of verisimilitude 
and congruity, and are intended, it must be recollected, for 
application to historical or mythological pieces, such as exer- 
cised the skill of the later Italian painters, rather than to 
devotional pieces, such as expressed the faith, or love, or awe 
of the earlier artists. The treatise concludes with some 
remarks inculcating the complete subordination of the colour- 
ing to the drawing and composition in a picture, to which, 
probably, few art-critics in our own time would subscribe. 
"The pleasure" arising from colours "is plainly foreign 
and separate; as having no concern or share in the proper 
delight or entertainment which naturally arises from the 
subject aud workmanship itself. For the subject, in respect 
of pleasure as well as science, is absolutely completed, when 
the design is executed, and the proposed imitation once ac- 
complished. And thus it always is the best, when the colours 
are most subdued and made subservient." This criticism only 
too well accords with the sombre colouring and consequent 
heaviness of effect which unfavourably distinguish so much 
of the later Italian art. 

That Shaftesbury did not realize the extent to which 
Italian art had declined in the hands of the later painters is 
shown by his mentioning the name of Carlo Maratti, at the 
end of his Letter concerning Design, as one of the painters 
by whom he would have wished the picture of the Judgment 
of Hercules to be executed. 

I have already noticed 8 some ot the more characteristic 
contents of the Letter concerning Design, namely the pre- 
diction that a national school of art would soon arise in 

8 See pp. 60, 61. 
K 2 



132 SHAFTESBURY. 

England, the depreciation of Gothic architecture, and the 
attack on Sir Christopher Wren. I may add that the term 
Gothic is invariably used by Shaftesbury as a term of 
reproach, and that he always assumes, as a proposition not 
likely to be disputed, that Gothic art is contrary to all sound 
principles of taste. Thus, in one of the passages in the 
Characteristics 9 where he is drawing a parallel between Art 
and Virtue, and maintaining that both are founded in nature, 
he says : " For Harmony is Harmony by nature, let men 
judge ever so ridiculously of music. So is Symmetry and 
Proportion founded still in nature, let men's fancy prove ever 
so barbarous, or their fashions ever so Gothic in their archi- 
tecture, sculpture, or whatever other designing art." That 
these narrow canons of criticism, as applied to sculpture and 
architecture, were all but universal in Shaftesbury's time and 
for about a centuiy afterwards, and that they were followed 
by a reaction almost as complete, as exclusive, and as un- 
reasoning, which has lasted into our own days, I need hardly 
remark. There is one other point in the Letter concerning 
Design which I ought not to pass over in silence. This is 
the contention that a flourishing condition of the arts depends 
not so much on the patronage of courts and private persons 
as on the taste and genius of the people at large, and that a 
people that has learnt to exercise its judgment freely on 
political matters is best qualified to pronounce an opinion on 
questions of art. " 'Tis not the nature of a court (such as 
courts generally are) to improve, but rather corrupt a taste. 
And what is in the beginning set wrong by their example, is 
hardly ever afterwards recoverable m the genius of a nation." 
" Without a public voice, knowingly guided and directed, 
there is nothing which can raise a true ambition in the artist; 
nothing which can exalt the genius of the workman, or make 

9 Advice to an Author, Pt. III., Sect. 3. 



THEORIES ON RELIGION, BE A UTY,& ART. 133 

him emulous of after-fame, and of the approbation of his 
country and of posterity Everything co- 
operates, in a free state, towards the improvement of art and 
science. And for the designing" arts in particular, such as 
architecture, painting, and statuary, they are in a manner 
linked together. The taste of one kind brings necessarily 
that of the others along with it. When the free spirit of a 
nation turns itself this way, judgments are formed; critics 
arise ; the public eye and ear improve ; a right taste prevails, 
and in a manner forces its way. Nothing is so improving, 
nothing so natural, so congenial to the liberal arts, as that 
reigning liberty and high spirit of a people, which, from the 
habit of judging in the highest matters for themselves, makes 
them freely judge of other subjects, and enter thoroughly into 
the characters as well of men and manners, as of the products 
or works of men in art and science" The progress of the 
arts is affected by many other causes, such as climate and 
physical geography, wealth, leisure, the peculiar temperament 
of a people, the aesthetic or unaesthetic character of its 
religious beliefs, but I cannot doubt that Shaftesbury is right 
in connecting it, as a general rule, with freedom of thought 
and of political institutions. The habit of unrestrained dis- 
cussion on one class of subjects begets a similar habit of dis- 
cussion on others, and hence one indispensable condition of 
attaining any high excellence in art is satisfied, namely, free 
criticism. The mental activity too, which is displayed in 
politics and speculation, has a tendency to multiply itself and 
flow over into other channels ; and, thus, a flourishing state 
of art and literature usually, though not invariably, accom- 
panies a wide-spread interest in philosophy and politics. If 
we turn from these a priori considerations to an examination 
of facts, we shall find that our anticipations are verified in 
at least the two most notable instances of the outburst of 



134 SHAFTESBURY. 



artistic genius which the world has known— the age of Pericles 
at Athens and the era of the Renaissance in the Italian 
Republics. To discuss the cases of real or seeming exceptions, 
where art has flourished or appeared to flourish in periods of 
speculative and political torpor, or where in periods of specu- 
lative and political activity art has not, or, at least, appears 
not to have flourished, would compel me to digress far too 
widely from the subject immediately before me. It may be 
enough to recall what I have already said, that the causes of 
which Shaftesbury is speaking, though very powerful, are 
only some amongst the many causes which may promote the 
development of art, and hence that the effect may be produced 
in a certain measure even though they are absent, and that, 
when they are present, they may be counteracted, in whole 
or in part; by adverse influences of other kinds. It may be 
added that, on a superficial view of a period of history, we 
are often apt to suppose quiescence when, on a closer view, we 
should find that there are many and important activities at 
work. Specially is this the case with regard to the period of 
modern history which we call the Middle Ages, or at least 
the later part of it. The magnificent churches, which were 
then spread over the face of Europe, were indeed reared in 
ages of faith, but not, by any means, in ages of political or 
even intellectual stagnation. 

Shaftesbury's enthusiastic and passionate love of the 
beauties of nature is constantly exemplified throughout his 
works, but it appears, as might be expected, most prominently 
in the prose hymn to Nature and God, which is put into 
the mouth of Theocles in the Moralists. There is, it must 
be owned, a certain stiffness and affectation of style about 
this production, but I entertain no doubt that it expresses 
the genuine sentiments of its author. 



135 



CHAPTER V. 

RECEPTION AND INFLUENCE OP SHAFTESBURY'S WRITINGS. 

In attempting 1 to give an account of the reception of 
Shaftesbury's writings, I am at once met with the difficulty, 
that, whereas it would be desirable to treat the reception of 
his views on ethics separately from that of his views on 
religion, it is impossible to do so, without having recourse to 
an inconvenient amount of repetition. For the positions that 
moral distinctions have an independent basis, not being founded 
merely on the positive commands of God, and that we ought 
to follow virtue for its own sake, because of its inherent 
beauty, and not from the hope of future reward or the fear 
of future punishment, are at once ethical and theological. 
Hence, there being so much common ground, I shall not 
attempt any division according to subjects, but shall consider 
each criticism or notice of his writings as a whole, and, in 
trying to arrange these criticisms and notices shall, for the 
most part, follow the chronological order. 

The Letter concerning Enthusiasm was rapidly followed by 
three replies. These were entitled : " Remarks upon a Letter 
by a Lord concerning Enthusiasm, not written in raillery but 
good humour;" "Barflemy Fair, or an Enquiry after Wit, 
by Mr. Wotton ;" * and " Reflections upon a Letter concerning 

1 This was probably Dr. William Wot! on, a voluminous author, who, in 
early life, was celebrated as a youthful prodigy. He was entered, in 1676, 
at Catherine Hall, Cambridge, by the Master, Dr. John Eachard, as " Gu- 
lielmus Wottonus infra decern annosnec Hammondo nee Grotio secundus." 



136 SHAFTESBURY. 



Enthusiasm." The first and last were published anonymously, 
but the last is attributed to Dr. Edward Fowler, Bishop of 
Gloucester. It could now be of no service to any one to 
disinter these pamphlets. They undoubtedly make good two 
points against Shaftesbury : first, that, in ridiculing" the 
" enthusiasm " of the French Prophets, he was glancing 
obliquely at supernatural pretensions in general, and thinking 
at least as much of the English clergy as of the Cevinol 
peasants; second, that his rule that Ridicule is the best test 
of Truth is often a most unsafe guide. These brochures 
betray much acerbity, and it is a sad proof of the unfairness 
of theological controversy, when we find a divine usually so 
moderate as Dr. Edward Fowler charging Shaftesbury with 
blasphemy, because he attacks what he conceives to be certain 
unworthy conceptions of God. The argument as to what 
representations are and what are not worthy of the Divine 
Nature must, surely, be open to every theological disputant, 
or else there is no superstition, however gross, whose position 
would not be impregnable. 

The Letter concerning Enthusiasm was quickly translated 
into French, and in 1709 was reviewed by Le Clerc in the 
Bibliotheque Choisie. The reviewer says that it must be read 
with attention, in order to avoid giving it a sense and an aim 
which it has not. He does not know the author, but, who- 
ever he may be, he is a man of wit and intelligence (Itomme 
d'esprit), who is thoroughly master of his subject, and who 
writes in English with much delicacy and vivacity. The 
remaining treatises were reviewed as they appeared, the esti- 
mate formed of them being invariably a favourable one. 2 To 
the principal treatise, the Inquiry Concerning Virtue, Le 
Clerc bears testimony that it is as solid in its matter, as regular 

2 See Bibliotheque Choisie, Tomes 19, 21, 23. These reviews were 
translated into English, and published in a small tract in 1712. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 137 

in its method, and as well written as any piece on Morals 
that he has read. The author's general aim in these treatises, 
he sums up, is, so far as I can comprehend, to establish 
Liberty and Virtue, the two things the most precious and the 
most useful that men can possess; his design deserves at 
least, in this respect, to be applauded by all those who equally 
hate Slavery and Vice, the two things most worthy of hatred, 
of which one has ever heard speak amongst men. 

Shaftesbury sent a copy of the Characteristics to Leibnitz, 
who, in a letter to Grimarest, dated June 4th, 1712, expressed 
himself as highly delighted with them. 3 Leibnitz had. 
already seen and criticized the Letter concerning Enthusiasm, 
not being acquainted with its authorship. His praise of it 
is qualified, and he evidently regards Shaftesbury's principle 
of raillery as capable of dangerous applications. But, when 
the complete works were before him, he changed his tone. 
From a Lucian, he said, the author had become a Plato. 4 By 
way of acknowledgment for the copy of the Characteristics, 
Leibnitz returned a paper of remarks, which reached Shaftes- 
bury at Naples in 1712, and is said to have given him great 
satisfaction. 5 This " Judgment,'" though it took exception 
to Shaftesbury's advocacy of the unsparing use of ridicule and 
to his contempt for metaphysical speculations, was, on the 
whole, highly favourable. I have already quoted its encomium 

3 " Mylord Shaftesbury, Anglois, fils du Comte de Shaftesbury, autre- 
fois grand Chancelier d'Angleterre, a publie des ouvrages sur la Philo- 
sophie et la Morale, ou il y a bien des choses qui me contentent 
extreinement. II m'a envoye ses ouvrages," etc. Leibnitii Opera, Ed, 
Dutens, Torn v., p. 67. 

4 Leibnitz to M. .Remond. Ed. Dutens, Tom v., p. 20. Eecueil de 
Des Maizeaux, Tome ii., p. 191. 

5 Preface by Des Maizeaux to the Eecueil, p. lxxv. The remarks 
themselves occur in the Eecueil, Tome ii., pp. 267-86. They are also 
contained in the fifth volume of Dutens' Edition of the works oi 
Leibnitz. 



138 SHAFTESBURY. 

on the Moralists. The Inquiry concerning' Virtue it pro- 
nounces to be thoroughly systematic, aud to contain well-estab- 
lished sentiments on Virtue and Happiness. " It seems to me," 
says Leibnitz, " that I could very easily reconcile them with 
my own language and opinions; for, as I have explained in 
the Preface to my Code, Justice is, at bottom, nothing but 
love in unison with wisdom." 6 

The Characteristics, for a book of that time, had a rapid 
circulation. In little more than twenty years, it passed through 
five editions. At first, the interest which it excited was 
mainly theological, but it was soon recognized that it had 
started important theories, which must henceforth be taken 
account of, in the science of Ethics. Bernard de Mandeville 
was the first moralist of any eminence who attacked Shaftes 
buiy's system. Mandeville, who is described by Sir James 
Mackintosh, not without justification, as " the buffoon and 
sophister of the ale-house," was the eighteenth-century re- 
presentative of Hobbes — much coarser, much less able, and 
vastly inferior as a writer, but still holding, generally, the 
same views as to the baseness and selfishness of human nature. 
In one of the Essays which are appended to the second edition 
of the Fable of the Bees (1723), entitled " A Search into the 
Nature of Society," Mandeville directly joins issue with 
Shaftesbury. " The generality of Moralists and Philosophers 
have hitherto agreed that there could be no virtue without 
self-denial; but a late author, who is now much read by 
men of sense, is of a contrary opinion, and imagines that 
men, without any trouble or violence upon themselves, may be 
naturally virtuous. He seems to require and expects good- 

* " La Justice dans le fond n'est autre chose qu'une charite conforme a 
la sagesse." In the Preface to the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus, 
Leibnitz defines Justice as " Caritas sapientis, hoc est sequens sapientia? 
dictata." 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 139 

ness in his species, as we do a sweet taste in grapes and China 
oranges, of which, if any of them are sour, we boldly pro- 
nounce that they are not come to that perfection their nature 
is capable of. This noble writer fancies that, as man is made 
for society, so he ought to be born with a kind affection to 
the whole, of which he is a part, and a propensity to seek the 
welfare of it. Jn pursuance of this supposition, he calls every 
action performed with regard to the public good, virtuous ; 
and all selfishness, wholly excluding such a regard, vice. In 
respect to our species, he looks upon virtue and vice as perma- 
nent realities that must ever be the same in all countries and 
all ages, and imagines that a man of sound understanding, by 
following the rules of good sense, may not only find out 
that Pulc/irum et Honestum both in morality and the works 
of art and nature, but likewise govern himself by his reason 
with as much ease and readiness as a good rider manages a 
well-taught horse by the bridle." 

Allowing for a slight tone of exaggeration, this is not an 
unskilful representation of Shaftesbury's system. Mande- 
ville adds, with undoubted accuracy : " Two systems cannot be 
more opposite than his Lordship's and mine.'" If Shaftes- 
bury takes too roseate a view of human nature, it would be im- 
possible to portray it in darker tints than those laid on by 
Mandeville. But this author does not confine himself to feel- 
ings which are directly and obviously selfish, having for their 
object the mere gratification of material and selfish wants. 
He also largely employs, in the construction of his system, 
what may be called, according as we view them from 
different sides, the indirectly selfish, or semi-social feelings of 
Pride and Vanity. It is through these mainly that our 
desires are enlarged, and that society has attained its present 
vast proportions. What he altogether refuses to admit, as 
explanatory of any of the phenomena of human life, is any 



140 SHAFTESB UR Y. 

original feeling" of sympathy, kindliness, or sociability. 
" Man loves company, as lie does everything" else, for his own 
sake.'''' " The sociableness of man arises only from these two 
things — the multiplicity of his desires, and the continual 
opposition he meets with in his endeavours to gratify them." 
" No societies could have sprung from the amiable virtues and 
loving qualities of man, but, on the contrary, all of them 
must have had their origin from his wants, his imperfections, 
and the variety of his appetites/'' " It would be utterly 
impossible, either to raise any multitudes into a populous, 
rich, and flourishing nation, or, when so raised, to keep and 
maintain them in that condition, without the assistance of 
what we call evil, both natural and moral." 7 Nor have the 
so-called virtues of the individual any higher or purer origin 
than the constitution of society. "The moral Virtues are 
the political offspring which Flattery begat upon Pride.'" 
And, in a spirit which we should now stigmatize as thoroughly 
unhistorical, we are told that these two were brought together 
by " the skilful management of wary politicians/ 5 in order 
that " the ambitious might reap the more benefit from, and 
govern vast numbers of" their subjects "with the greater 
ease and security." 8 Of course, it is by a systematic and 
habitual hypocrisy that we conceal from one another the origin 
and true nature of our feelings, at once masking the senti- 
ments which we really entertain, and pretending to others 
which have no foundation in fact. " In all civil societies, 
men are taught insensibly to be hypocrites from their cradle; 
nobody dares to own that he gets by public calamities, or even 
by the loss of private persons. The sexton would be stoned, 
should he wish openly for the death of the parishioners, though 
everybody knew that he had nothing else to live upon." 9 

7 A Search into the Nature of Society. 

8 Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue. 
A Search into the Nature of Society. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 141 

Though, as I have already pointed out in preceding- 
chapters, Shaftesbury's account of human nature, as well as 
his analysis of moral virtue, requires several qualifications, 
in order to render it conformable with facts, I think that 
his exaggerations are far less remote from the truth than 
those of Mandeville. The feelings which attract and bind 
men to others seem to me, with Shaftesbury, to be as primary 
and as powerful as those which centre wholly in themselves. 
But, even granting that the social propensities, which now 
appear to us to be instinctive, admit of being traced back to 
the most indisputably selfish source, we are still far removed 
from the conclusions to which Mandeville would bring us. 
As Mr. Leslie Stephen remarks, 1 the fallacy which he commits 
is akin to that which occurs, when men argue that, if we are 
descended from apes, we must be apes still. " Mandeville 
assumes that, because our virtues took their rise in selfish or 
brutal forms, they are still brutality and selfishness in 
masquerade." The theory that the higher elements in human 
nature are successively formed out of the lower, but so trans- 
formed by the change that they put on an entirely new 
character, was afterwards started by Hartley. According to 
him, our moral progress begins in mere self-seeking, but ends 
in the pursuit of virtue for virtue's sake and in the dis- 
interested love of God and man. 

Mandeville's "Search into the Nature of Society" contains, 
after the controversial manner of that time, a personal attack 
upon Shaftesbury. "A man that has been brought up in 
ease and affluence, if he is of a quiet indolent nature, learns 
to shun everything that is troublesome, and chooses to curb 
his passions, more because of the inconveniences that arise 
from the eager pursuit after pleasure than any dislike he has 
to sensual enjoyments.'" It is possible that such a person 

1 History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Ch. 9. 



142 SHAFTESBURY, 

may "have a better opinion of his inward state than it really 
deserves, and believe himself virtuous, because his passions lie 
dormant." Shaftesbury should have illustrated his principles 
of benevolence and patriotism, not by living in retirement 
and inactivity, but by serving his country in the field or by 
attempting to retrieve its ruined finances. 

In 1728, Mandeville published a second part of the Fable 
of the Bees in the form of Dialogues. In these, Horatio is 
supposed to be a disciple of Shaftesbury, while Cleomenes 
represents the opinions of Mandeville. Shaftesbury's own 
weapon of banter is turned against him, and much fun is 
made out of the supposition of persons in low employments 
and humble positions in life being actuated sobly by a regard 
to the public weal. " The advantage that is justly expected 
from his writings can never be universally felt, before that 
public spirit, which he recommended, comes down to the 
meanest tradesmen, whom you would endeavour to exclude 
from the generous sentiments and noble principles that are 
already so visible in many." Throughout this book, Mande- 
ville ungenerously attempts to bring odium on Shaftesbury 
by representing him as the antagonist of revealed religion. 
His " design was to establish heathen virtue on the ruins of 
Christianity/' while Mandeville insinuates that, by insisting 
on the universal corruption of human nature and demon- 
strating the impossibility of virtue, he had himself earned 
the right to be regarded as a defender of the faith. How far 
he was ingenuous in putting forth this claim, may be deter- 
mined by any one who will take the trouble to look through 
a work, which he published in 1723, entitled Free Thoughts on 
Religion, the Church, and National Happiness. 

The treatises contained in MandevihVs first part of the 
Fable of the Bees were answered in 1724 by Dr. Richard 
Fiddes, a clergyman of the Church of England, and chaplain 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 143 

to Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford. The title of Dr. Fiddes' 
work is A General Treatise of Morality formed upon the Prin- 
ciples of Natural Reason only. In the Preface, he defends 
Shaftesbury against the attacks of Mandeville, and praises 
him for having asserted, in the strongest terms, the immutable 
distinction of Moral Good and Evil, as well as for having, in 
his Inquiry concerning Virtue, " employed some very pertinent 
and beautiful illustrations in proof of it."" Fiddes guards 
himself against being supposed to approve of Shaftesbury's 
employment of Ridicule, but thinks it " more surprising that 
a young nobleman should have published so many tracts, so 
generally read by men of sense, than that there should be 
so few errors found in them/'' His own ethical theory, while 
it places the moral faculty in the reason and not a sense, 
adopts Shaftesbury's idea of an analogy between Beauty and 
Virtue, and makes the rule of action to consist in the imitation 
of that all-perfect Being, who observes Order in all His works, 
proposing to Himself the most worthy ends and attaining 
them by the most regular and simple means. 

Hutcheson's relation to Shaftesbury may at present be 
passed over, as his theories will form the special subject of 
the latter part of this volume. When his two first Essays 
were published in 1725, it was stated on the title-page that 
"the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are explained 
and defended against the Author of the Fable of the Bees." In 
the Preface, Hutcheson (who, it must be recollected, was an 
influential Presbyterian Minister, as well as a Professor of 
Philosophy), while regretting the tone which Shaftesbury had 
assumed towards Christianity, says " it is a very needless 
attempt" to recommend his writings; for "they will be 
esteemed, while any reflection remains among men/' There 
are indeed those who " search into his writings," simply for 
the sake of finding "insinuations against Christianity, that 



144 SHAFTESBURY. 

they may be the less restrained from their debaucheries/' but 
how would "his indignation have been moved'' against these 
men, whose "low minds are incapable of relishing those noble 
sentiments of Virtue and Honour, which he has placed in so 
lovely a light." 

Of Balguy's Letter to a Deist, published in 1726, T shall 
speak subsequently. 2 

In 1729, there appeared a new edition of Butler's Sermons, 
with a Preface. This Preface contains a criticism of Shaftes- 
bury's theory of Virtue. Butler does himself credit by con- 
fining himself entirely to philosophical issues. He acknow- 
ledges that Shaftesbury "has shown, beyond all contradiction, 
that virtue is naturally the interest or happiness, and vice the 
misery of such a creature as man, placed in the circumstances in 
which we are in this world." Further, " he thought it a plain 
matter of fact, as it undoubtedly is, which none could deny 
but from mere affectation," " that mankind, upon reflection, 
feels an approbation of what is good and disapprobation of 
the contrary." So far as he goes, then, Shaftesbury entirely 
falls in with Butler's conception of a sound moral theory. 
But there is one material point in which he is deficient. "The 
not taking into consideration the authority, which is implied 
in the idea of reflex approbation or disapprobation, seems a 
material deficiency or omission in Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry 
concerning Virtue." Before examining this charge, it will 
be necessary to state briefly what Butler himself understood 
by the authority which attaches to the idea of moral appro- 
bation. According to the scheme of human nature which he 
usually, though not invariably, follows, man possesses, in 
addition to the several particular appetites, passions, and 
affections, and to what may be called the general principles of 
benevolence and self-love, a certain directing or sovereign 

2 Seep. 159. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 145 

principle of Conscience or Reflection, which is " in kind and 
in nature supreme over all others, and which bears its own 
authority of being- so." Not only is it, as a matter of fact, 
supreme, but its supremacy is attested in all its operations. 
"You cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without 
taking* in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a 
constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself; 
and to preside and govern, from the very economy and con- 
stitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has 
right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would 
absolutely govern the world. >n That this principle (which 
Butler apparently regards as having been, once for all, im- 
planted in us by God exactly in its present condition, and as 
being an equally trustworthy guide in all men) does invariably 
direct our conduct, is not asserted ; otherwise, according to 
Butler's theory, we should always act rightly. What is 
meant, then, must be simply that, having once, on reflection 
(a process, it may be observed, which he does not sufficiently 
analyze), determined an act to be right or wrong, we cannot 
divest ourselves of the idea that we ought to perform or have 
performed it, to refrain or have refrained from it, as the case 
may be. However powerful the other parts of our nature, 
and however much, as a matter of fact, one or more of them 
may predominate, there is no one of them which can ever 
silence the still small voice of approbation or reprobation 
which applauds or condemns our acts as morally good or evil. 
" Interest and passion" may "come in ; and be too strong for 
reflection and conscience," but still reflection and conscience 
are always present with us to bear witness against them. 
Now it may at once be acknowledged that Shaftesbury seems 
to admit that a man may altogether lose the moral sense, 4 

3 Sermon II. 

4 See Inquiry concerning Virtue, Bk. I., Pt. 3, Sects. 1, 2. 

L 



146 SHAFTESBURY. 

though such a case would, of course, be extremely exceptional, 
whereas Butler seems to maintain that the conscience can 
never be wholly silenced. Moreover, he insists much less 
emphatically than Butler on the absolute character of the 
moral faculty, regarding- it, apparently, as capable of constant 
improvement or deterioration, thereby undoubtedly expressing 
himself in far closer conformity with facts. But, taking the 
case of a man whose moral constitution is in a normal con- 
dition, can we fairly say that the " Moral Sense " of Shaftes- 
bury is less authoritative than the "Conscience" of Butler? 
Both have for their appropriate object the discrimination 
between right and wrong. Both not only issue directions 
with regard to future actions, but pronounce a judgment on 
actions already performed. And in the view of Shaftesbury, 
as well as of Butler, and this is the point to which I particu- 
larly wist, to direct attention, no amount of pleasure is suffi- 
cient to compensate for the pains arising from an outraged 
Conscience. " To want Conscience, or natural sense of the 
odiousness of crime and injustice, is to be most of all miser- 
able in life ; but, where Conscience or Sense of this sort remains, 
there whatever is committed against it must of necessity, by 
means of Reflection, be . continually shameful, grievous, and 
offensive. " 5 In the "Conclusion" with which Shaftesbury 
sums up the Inquiry concerning Virtue, he states, as the 
results of his examination, that " To be wicked or vicious is 
to be miserable and unhappy;" "That every vicious action 
must be self-injurious and ill;" "That the state which is 
consequent to this defection of nature is of all others the most 
horrid, oppressive, and miserable ;" finally, " That Virtue is 
the Good and Vice the 111 of every-one." Now, if all this 
be the case, and if any normally constituted man be fully 
conscious that it is so, it is difficult to see how the " Moral 
5 Inquiry, Bk. II., Pt. 2, § 1. 



1NFL UENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 147 

Sense" could well carry with it more "authority and obliga- 
tion" than it does. All obligation and authority must ulti- 
mately repose upon some sanction, but could the sanctions of 
a virtuous life be stated in more emphatic language, or in 
language more likely to influence mankind, than that in 
which Shaftesbury states them ? 

It is part of Butler's charge against Shaftesbury's system 
that he acknowledges that an "ill judgment on the happiness 
of Virtue" is "without remedy." 6 The words quoted are not 
well chosen. What Shaftesbury means is that, if a man were 
entirely uninfluenced by the love or fear of God (he is speaking 
of an Atheist), and, moreover, experienced no pleasure from 
the conciousness of well-doing or remorse from the conscious- 
ness of evil-doing, any case, in which he thought it to his 
interest to act viciously, would be without remedy. But this 
is no more than to say that a man, who is entirely deaf to all 
religious and moral sanctions, will be guided solely by a view 
to his own selfish and material interests — surely, an obvious 
truism, supposing that the conditions can be satisfied. We 
have only to substitute the term " conscience " for the term 
" moral sense," and ask what arguments we can address to a 
man in whom conscience and all religious emotion is stifled, 
and Butler is plainly in the same difficulty as Shaftesbury. 
The fact is that moral considerations appeal only to men 
whose moral constitution is in a fairly normal condition. A 
man, who is lost, as we say, to a sense of right and wrong 
(happily not a very common case), can only be kept straight 
by the prospect of reward or punishment, present or future. 
Society, the laws, religious hopes and terrors of the coarser 
kind, can alone supply the remedy which conscience and the 
higher religious sanctions have ceased to afford. 

I think it probable that Butler would have refused to admit 
6 Inquiry, Bk. I., Pt. 3, § 3. 

L a 



1 48 SHA FTESB UR Y. 

the possibility of the case I have put — a man in whom the 
conscience has entirely ceased to assert itself. And here, 
perhaps, we have the main difference between his conception 
of the moral faculty and that of Shaftesbury — that, whereas, 
according- to Shaftesbury, the " moral sense " may exist 
in different men in the most varying- degrees, and may 
conceivably be extinguished altogether ; according to Butler, 
the " conscience " is pretty nearly uniform in all men, 
and can never be wholly lost. But, even on the admission 
that there are a few rare and exceptional cases in which the 
conscience exists in only a very low degree (and to deny the 
occurrence of such cases is surely to ignore obvious facts 
of human nature), it appears to me that the difficulty, for 
which Shaftesbury can find no remedy, is one which Butler's 
system is equally unable to meet. 

The next criticism of Shaftesbury which merits notice is 
that of Bishop Berkeley, contained in the third Dialogue of 
Aleip/iron, or the Minute Philosopher, which appeared in 
1732. I agree with Mr. Leslie Stephen 7 in thinking that 
" Berkeley's Minute Philosopher is the least admirable perform- 
ance of that admirable writer.'" His remarks on Shaftesbury 
seem to me to be mainly conceived in the narrow temper of 
theological polemic rather than in that broad and candid 
spirit which befits one philosopher examining the system of 
another. To insinuate that Shaftesbury was a man " without 
one grain of religion," and to represent him as so little in 
earnest about virtue as only, " after a nice inquiry and balanc- 
ing on both sides/' to conclude that " we ought to prefer 
virtue to vice," are sheer calumnies, which the violence of 
theological partisanship can alone excuse. And even that can 
hardly excuse the personal attack on Shaftesbury, under the 
name of Cratylus, in which the refined and gentle Berkeley 
7 English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Ch. 9. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 149 

verges on coarseness. But fairness to an opponent in a 
controversy, we must recollect, was, at that time, regarded 
rather as a weakness than as a virtue. Amongst the specific 
points in Shaftesbury's ethical theory which Berkeley criticizes 
are the vagueness of his idea of moral beauty, his conception 
of a moral sense, different in kind from the other principles of 
our nature, the attempt to construct a moral system indepen- 
dently of religion, and, above all, the slight stress laid upon 
the consideration of future rewards and punishments, as a 
sanction of morality. On this last point there can be no 
doubt that Berkeley misrepresents Shaftesbury's position. 
Any one who knew the Characteristics only through the 
AlcipJiron would suppose that Shaftesbury not only en- 
tirely repudiated the sanctions afforded by the expectation 
of a future life, but even denied its possibility. 8 And yet, as 
we have seen in previous chapters, he looks forward to a 
future life as repairing the imperfections and inequalities of 

8 Crito says to Alciphron, who represents a disciple of Shaftesbury : 
" The love therefore that you bear to moral beauty, and your passion for 
abstracted truth, will not suffer you to think with patience of those 
fraudulent impositions upon mankind — Providence, the Immortality of the 
Soul, and a future retribution of rewards and punishments." That 
Shaftesbury himself maintained the first of these doctrines enthusi- 
astically, if at least by Providence Berkeley means the same thing as the 
Moral Government of the Universe, is shown abundantly by the quota- 
tions which I have given in ch. iv. The passages quoted on pp. 84-5 of ch. 
iii., and on pp. 111-12 of ch. iv., are, I think, quite sufficient to prove that he 
believed in a future life, compensating for the apparent injustice to which 
the virtuous man is often exposed, in the present condition of things. Such 
a state, of course, implies future rewards, but the absence of reward, or 
even a gradation of rewards, implies, in a certain sense, punishment. 
Moreover, the idea that vice is attended by misery here (and, if here, 
why not hereafter ?) is in accordance with the whole genius of Shaftesbury's 
philosophy. Again, when he refers to the sanction of future rewards and 
punishments, much as he may disparage it, when compared with the 
higher sanctions of the moral sense and the love of God, he speaks in the 



150 SHAFTESBURY. 

our present condition, 9 and admits the sanctions of future 
rewards and punishments, not indeed as the highest sanctions, 
which they certainly are not, but as being 1 on the same level with 
those of society and human law. 1 The most effective thing 
which Berkeley says against Shaftesbury is that his principles 
are inadequate to influence the mass of mankind. " Whatever 
may be the effect of pure theory upon certain select spirits, of 
a peculiar make, or in some other parts of the world, T do 
verily think that, in this country of ours, reason, religion, 
and law are all together little enough to subdue the outward 
to the inner man ; and that it must argue a wrong head and 
weak judgment to suppose that without them men will be 
enamoured of the golden mean." " In no case is it to be 
hoped that to kuXov will be the leading idea of the many, who 
have quick senses, strong passions, and gross intellects." 
Berkeley's own ethical theory, as Professor Fraser says, was a 
kind of Theological Utilitarianism. The source of moral 
obligation is the Divine Will, the end of moral action is the 
general well-being of all men, and the main motive to 
practise morality is a regard to our own eternal interests. 
Though less coarsely stated, Berkeley's system is, in fact, 
fundamentally the same as that of Locke. 2 

tone of a man who regards it as a real, and not merely an imaginary, 
sanction. On the immortality of the soul, as distinct from its future 
existence, I cannot recall any passage containing an explicit statement. 
But the following words, contained in the Fourth Letter to a Young Man 
at the University, seem to imply the belief: "And even heaven itself 
can be no other than the addition of grace to grace, virtue to virtue, and 
knowledge to knowledge ; by which we may still more and more compre- 
hend the chief Virtue, and highest excellence, the giver and dispenser of All." 
9 See ch. iv., pp. 111-12. 

1 See ch. iii., pp. 83-7, where I have discussed at length Shaftesbury's 
views on the several sanctions of morality. 

2 See particularly the Sermon on Passive Obedience, printed in Fraser 's 
edition of Berkeley's Works, Vol. iii., pp, 103 — 139. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 151 

Berkeley's attack on Shaftesbury provoked a curious re- 
joinder, in which the author affects to believe that the Minute 
Philosojoher is a forgery. This pamphlet is dated 1734, and 

bears the title : A Vindication of the Reverend D 

B y from the scandalous imputation of being author of a 

late book entitled Alcijohron or the Minute Pliilosojoher. It 
brings forward very effectively various passages from the 
Characteristics in reply to Berkeley's criticisms, and then pro- 
ceeds to carry on the war against the orthodox divines, by 
charging Butler with having repeated Shaftesbury's theories, 
without acknowledgment, in the first edition of his Sermons, 
and grossly misrepresented them in the Preface to his second 
edition. That Butler's criticism of Shaftesbury for not 
having taken into consideration the authority of conscience 
rests on insufficient grounds, I have already stated my opinion. 
But, though there is much resemblance between the moral 
systems of Butler and Shaftesbury, there is hardly room for a 
charge of plagiarism. Had Butler's system been unfolded in 
a formal treatise, it would certainly have been strange if 
Shaftesbury's name had been passed over in silence; but he 
was hardly bound to mention it either in the text or the 
scanty notes of a short collection of Sermons, whose primary 
object was probably religious edification, and the future repu- 
tation of which he can scarcely himself have foreseen. 

In the years 1733, 1734, a wide circulation was given to 
Shaftesbuiy's theories on Natural Religion, and specially to 
his scheme of optimism, by the publication of Pope's Essay 
on Man. Several lines, especially of the First Epistle, are 
simply statements from the Moralists done into verse. "Whether, 
however, these were taken immediately by Pope from 
Shaftesbury, or whether they came to him through the papers 
which Bolingbroke 3 had prepared for his use, we have no 

3 On Bolingbroke's connexion with the Essay on Man, see Elwin's 



152 SHAFTESBURY. 

data for determining-. All we can say is that, so far as Pope 
himself was concerned, his optimism must have been derived 
from an English source. Of Leibnitz, scraps of whose philo- 
sophy had, however, filtered into the Essay through Bolingbroke, 
he professed himself, some years later, as entirely ignorant. 4 

Voltaire frequently mentions Shaftesbury. In the Lettres 
sur les Anglais or Lettres P/iilosop/iiques, 5 published in 1734, 
he insists on the identity of Shaftesbury's religious and 
philosophical system with that of the Essay on Man. After 
highly lauding Pope's poem, he proceeds to say that the main 
argument of it is to be found entire in the Characteristics. 
" And I do not know why," he adds, " Mr. Pope should have 
ascribed the merit of it exclusively to Lord Bolingbroke, 
without saying a word of the celebrated Shaftesbury, the 
pupil of Locke." 6 In later life, as is well known, Voltaire 
adopted a different attitude towards optimism, if not towards 
theism itself. The maxim " Whatever is, is best" presented 
itself to him as not only untrue, but ridiculous. And this 
change of mind is exemplified in his language about 

Introduction to that poem, Pope's Works, Vol. ii. Bolingbroke's own 
sentiments on Philosophy and Natural Religion are to be found in the 
Essays and Fragments, printed in his collected works. 

4 See a letter to Warburton, quoted by Mr. Eivvin, Pope's Works, 
Vol. ii., p. 293. " It cannot be unpleasant to you to know that I never 
in my life read a line of Leibnitz." 

5 Letter xxii. Op. Dictionnaire Philosophique, Art. " Bien," and 
tbe Preface to the Poem on the Earthquake of Lisbon. Pope mentions 
the Inquiry concerning Virtue as well as the Moralists, as having supplied 
material for the Essay on Man. 

6 L'Essai sur V Homme de Pope me parait le plus beau poeme didac- 
tique, le plus utile, le plus sublime qu'on ait jamais fait dans aucune 
langue. II est vrai que le fond s'en trouve tout entier dans les Caracter- 
istiques du lord Shaftesbury; et je ne sais pourquoi M. Pope en fait 
uniquement honneur a, M de Bolingbroke, sans dire un mot du celebre 
Shaftesbury, eleve de Locke. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 153 

Shaftesbury. Contrasting" the lives of optimists with their 
theories, he says of Shaftesbury that, though he made 
optimism the mode, he was himself a most miserable man. 7 
This statement, if not entirely without foundation, is at least 
a gross exaggeration. Voltaire, like many other writers who 
have obtained a reputation for brilliancy, when he found an 
epigram neatly expressing- a preconceived idea, did not always 
pause to inquire whether it was an accurate representation 
of facts, 

Warburton, in his Dedication of the Divine Legation to the 
Free-Thinkers (1738), has a rambling attack upon Shaftesbury, 
in which he accuses him of cruel and unworthy treatment of 
Locke, " the honour of this age and the instructor of the 
future." It was Locke's love of Christianity, he says, " that 
seems principally to have exposed him to his pupil's bitterest 
insults." The maxim that " Ridicule is the test of Truth ' 
is justly handled with severity. The " moral sense " is treated 
with contumely. At the same time, it is acknowledged that 
Shaftesbury "had many excellent qualities, both as a man 
and a writer." Warburton' s tribute to his personal character 
has been already quoted. 8 " In his writings," he adds, " he 
hath shown how largely he had imbibed the deep sense, and 
how naturally he could copy the gracious manner of Plato." 

The continued interest felt in Shaftesbury's writings is 
shown by the appearance, in 1751, of an elaborate monograph 
entitled Essays on the Characteristics, by John Brown, M.A. 
Brown, who was afterwards appointed Vicar of Newcastle- 
upon-Tyne, is best known for his Estimate of the Manners 
and Principles of the Times, of which seven editions were 
printed in little more than a year. He was himself a liberal 
divine of very varied culture, and entertained strong sympa- 

7 Ilfaut prendre un Parti, a brochure published in 1772. 

8 See p. 40. 



154 SHAFTESBURY. 

tines with the cause of liberty, both civil and ecclesiastical. 
It is said that he was moved to write on the Characteristics 
by Warburton, and that the idea of a special refutation of 
Shaftesbury had been suggested to Warburton by Pope, who 
told him that " to his knowledge the Characteristics had done 
more harm to Revealed Religion in England than all the 
works of infidelity put together/' 9 Brown is, for the most 
part, a courteous antagonist. The opening sentence of his 
work bears testimony to the wide-spread popularity of 
Shaftesbury as an author. " It has been the fate of Lord 
Shaftesbury's Characteristics, beyond that of most other books, 
to be idolized by one party, and detested by another. "While 
the first regard it as a work of perfect excellence, as contain- 
ing everything that can render mankind wise and happy ; the 
latter are disposed to rank it amongst the most pernicious of 
writings, and brand it as one continued heap of fustian, 
scurrility, and falsehood." Brown himself does not agree 
with either of these extrerne estimates. " The noble writer 
hath mingled beauties and blots, faults and excellencies, with 
a liberal and unsparing hand." One excellency of the 
Characteristics specially appeals to his admiration, namely, 
" that generous spirit of freedom which shines throughout the 
whole." " The noble author everywhere asserts the natural 
privilege of man, which hath been so often denied him, of 
seeing with his own eyes and judging by his own reason/'' 
On the two first Essays, as well as on parts of the Miscellanous 
Reflections, he is naturally very severe, but, as regards the 
Soliloquy, " bating only a few accidental passages," he has, 
" little more to do than to approve and admire.'" In the 
main part of his task, the examination of the Inquiry concern- 
ing Virtue, Brown shows considerable acuteness, and a much 

9 Chalmers' Biographical Dictionary, Art. "Brown (Joku). 5 ' 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 155 

clearer conception, than most writers of his time, of the real 
meaning of ethical problems. He is himself what we should 
now call an Utilitarian, insisting' on the necessity of a definite 
criterion of actions, and placing- that criterion in their 
tendency to promote or impair the general weal. Virtue, he 
maintains, "is no other than the conformity of our affections 
with the public good/' or " the voluntary production of the 
greatest happiness. " We have already seen 1 that Shaftesbury 
substantially adopts the same criterion of actions as Brown, 
though the fact that he does so is obscured by the metaphori- 
cal language which he employs in describing Virtue and 
Vice, as well as by the immediate character which he ascribes 
to the decisions of the Moral Sense. The theory of an 
immediate moral faculty and the adoption of a test, often 
requiring much, time and pains in its application, are, un- 
doubtedly, to a certain extent, inconsistent, 2 but I should 
myself rather find fault with his account of the " Moral Sense " 
than accuse him of having failed to discover any definite 
criterion of right and wrong. Brown's strictures, however, 
on the vague and metaphorical character of his language, and 
on the want of system in his speculations, are, it must be 
confessed, far from being without justification. On the 
ultimate origin of the distinction of Right and Wrong Brown 
says nothing, though I imagine he would have placed it in 
the Will of God. As respects the sanctions of virtuous 
conduct, he is not completely at issue with Shaftesbury, wide 
as their differences are. He grants that there are a few 
exceptional cases in which the purely moral sanction may be 
sufficient to ensure right action. " In minds of a gentle and 
generous disposition, where the sensual appetites are weak, 

1 See ch. in., pp. 72-6. 

2 The extent to which they are inconsistent has already been discussed 
in ch. iii., pp. 90-94. 



1 56 SUA FTESB UR Y. 

the imagination refined, and the benevolent affections natu- 
rally predominant ; these very affections, and the moral sense 
arising- from them, will in all the common occurrences of life 
secure the practice of virtue/' The higher religious sanction, — 
the example of a Perfect Being, and the love and adoration 
inspired by Him, — which occupies so prominent a position in 
Shaftesbury's system, Brown regards as " not calculated for 
use/' and "only existing in a mind taken up in vision." God, 
except possibly to a few, who are capable of the most exalted 
degrees of virtue, is simply the dispenser of rewards and 
punishments, which supplement the terrors of human law. 
The mass of mankind, in a large proportion of their actions, 
can only be deterred from vice by " the lively and active 
belief of an all-seeing and all-powerful God, who will hereafter 
make them happy or miserable, according' as they designedly 
promote or violate the happiness of their fellow-creatures. " 
This proposition is possibly true, but, when the writer goes 
on to say " And this is the Essence of Religion," one feels 
that, however orthodox he may be in his opinions, his religious 
feeling is on a lower level than that of the author of the Moralists. 
Brown's ethical theories, in respect both to the criterion and the 
sanctions of morality, are very similar to those of Paley, whose 
work on Moral and Political Philosophy was published in 
1785. He would hardly, however, have gone to the length 
of defining Virtue as " the doing good to mankind, in 
obedience to the Will of God, and for the sake of everlasting 
happiness," 3 a definition which implies that no act, not expressly 
done for the purpose of avoiding future punishment or secur- 
ing future reward, can properly be called virtuous. There 
was a growing tendency among the divines of the eighteenth 
century, inspired probably by the fear of Deism, to suppose 
that any moral system which appealed, in the last resort, to 

3 Paley's Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Book I., cit. 7. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 157 

other sanctions than those of human law, the opinions of 
society, or future rewards and punishments, must necessarily 
be irreligious. 

Brown's last Essay (On Revealed Religion and Christianity) 
contains some very hard hitting", and not unfrequently, I 
think, exaggerates Shaftesbury's hostility to Revealed Religion 
and the Doctrines of the Church. A special .example of un- 
fairness is, perhaps, to be found in the section (Sec. V) where 
he tries to show that Shaftesbury did not believe in the sanc- 
tion of future punishment, and attempted designedly to 
weaken its force, thereby " unhinging society to the utmost 
of his power/' Shaftesbury's position on this subject was, of 
course, difficult to understand by men, like Berkeley and 
Brown, whose whole habit of thinking on ethical questions 
lay in the direction of theological utilitarianism, but still the 
extent to which they misunderstood him argues much want 
of care, I should not like to say want of candour, on their 
part. The seventy of the rest of the Essay would probably 
have been tempered, had Brown, in addition to his strong 
reasoning powers, possessed any sense of humour. Shaftes- 
bury's banter is mercilessly analyzed, and every sentence 
discussed is treated as if it formed part of a grave legal docu- 
ment. Moreover, no allowance is made for the varying moods 
of a man who seems to have been, by constitution, peculiarly 
fitful. In the interpretation of a wilter of this kind, much 
greater stress ought always to be laid on the passages in 
which he is plainly in a serious vein, than on those in which 
he is indulging a turn for ridicule or badinage. At the same 
time, I do not deny that the stern reproofs dealt out to 
Shaftesbury by Brown and some of his other antagonists, for 
the unseemly manner in which he often handles sacred 
subjects, were, in many cases, richly deserved. These 
authors seem, however, frequently to have suspected de- 



158 SHAFTESBURY. 

sign, where Shaftesbury was only following' the bent of his 
temper. 

Brown's book immediately provoked three replies. Two of 
these, A Vindication of Lord Shaftesbury on the Subject of Ridi- 
cule, and A Vindication of Lord Shaftesbury on the Subjects of 
Morality and Religion, were written by a Mr. Charles Bulkley, 
a dissenting minister. The authorship of the third, a smartly- 
written pamphlet, entitled Animadversions on Mr. Brown's 
Three Essays on the Characteristics, is, I believe, unknown. 

Leland's View of the Principal Beistical Writers, which 
was published in 1754, contains a criticism of Shaftesbury. 
It gives the author " a real concern, that, among the writers 
who have appeared against revealed religion," he is " obliged 
to take notice of the noble author of the Characteristics," and 
he states that " some are not willing to allow that he is to be 
reckoned in the number/' He proceeds, nevertheless, to 
repeat in a briefer form and in a milder tone the charges of 
endeavouring to undermine Christianity and of disparaging 
the supernatural sanctions of conduct which had recently been 
levelled against the Characteristics by Brown. He recognizes, 
however, Shaftesbury's ''refined sentiments on the beauty and 
excellence of virtue," and acknowledges that he "hath often 
spoken honourably of a wise and good providence, which 
ministers and governs the whole in the best manner ; and 
hath strongly asserted, in opposition to Mr. Hobbes, the 
natural differences between good and evil ; and that man was 
originally formed for society and the exercise of mutual kind- 
ness and benevolence ; and not only so, but for religion and 
piety too." In a supplement to his work, Leland included 
another letter on Shaftesbury, defending his first, but fully 
recognizing the exalted views of natural religion, and of the 
intimate connexion between the religious and moral feelings, 
which are to be found scattered up and down the Characteristics. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 159 

Of all the replies which were elicited by Shaftesbury's 
statements on the sanctions of a future life, the most tem- 
perate and effective is that of John Balguy, the friend of 
Hoadly and disciple of Clarke, who, in 17 £6, published a 
pamphlet entitled J Letter to a Deist concerning the Beauty 
and Excellency of Moral Virtue, and the support and improve- 
ment which it receives from the Christian Revelation. While 
admitting that the perfection of moral goodness consists in 
the love of Virtue for Virtue's sake, or, as he afterwards 
expressed it in a postscript, "in being influenced solely by a 
regard to rectitude and right reason, and the intrinsic fitness 
and amiableness of such actions as are conformable thereto/'' 
he maintains that the hope of reward and fear of punishment, 
especially in a future life, are indispensable as auxiliary 
motives to the great majority of mankind. "In short, the 
question is not, which motives are the purest and most 
sublime; but which are most useful, and most effectual, to 
prevail with degenerate man and accomplish his reform ation." 
At the same time, he acknowledges that, cceteris paribus, the 
more disinterestedly any agent acts, the more virtuous he is. 

Balguy's tract on The Foundation of Moral Goodness, contain- 
ing an examination of Hutcheson's ethical system, will be 
considered more conveniently in a subsequent chapter. The 
systems of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are there attacked, 
not from the side of Theological Utilitarianism, but from that 
of what has been called the Rational School of Moralists. 

Shaftesbury had several imitators, whose works have now 
sunk into oblivion, and, besides the authors already named, 
there were, of course, many others, in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, who directly or incidentally criticized his 
opinions. The instances, however, which I have already 
given, are quite sufficient to show the character of the recep- 
tion accorded to his works in his own country, and, if we take 



160 SHAFTESBURY. 

in Balguy's criticism of Hutcheson, the nature of the objec 
tions urged against them. 

Of the judgments of Le Clerc, Leibnitz, and Voltaire, 
I have spoken in earlier portions of this chapter. The 
influence of Shaftesbury on the earlier phases of Diderot's 
ethical and theological opinions is notorious. 4 In 1745 
Diderot adapted or reproduced the "Inquiry concerning 
Virtue " in what was afterwards known as his " Essai sur le 
Merite et la Vertu." Though announced as a translation from 
Shaftesbury, this work represents the spirit rather than the 
words of the Inquiry. The author tells us that he seldom had 
recourse to the original during the compositiom of his book, 
but yet all its distinctive features are faithfully retained. 
Specially is this the case with the intimate connexion which 
Shaftesbury establishes between Virtue and Natural Religion, 
a connexion emphasised even still more by Diderot than by 
his English prototype. In the Biseours Preliminaire, Diderot 
dwells specially on the religious character of Shaftesbury's 
philosophy, and protests warmly against confounding him 
with the Asgills, the Tindals, and the Tolands, ' ' bad Protes- 
tants and miserable writers." 

In 1769, a Erench translation of the whole of Shaftesbury's 
works, including the letters, was published at Geneva. 

I must now say something of the popularity accorded to 
Shaftesbury's writings in Germany, during the latter part of 
the eighteenth and the earlier part of the nineteenth century. 
Translations of separate treatises into German began to be 

4 See Morley's Diderot, Vol i., pp. 41 — 48. Mr. Morley has some 
interesting remarks on the historical circumstances which directed 
Diderot's attention to Shaftesbury. He draws a parallel between the 
extravagances of the French Prophets in England at the beginning of the 
century, which occasioned Shaftesbury's Letter concerning Enthusiasm, 
and the subsequent outburst of fanaticism amongst the Jansenists in 
Paris. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 161 

made in 1738, and in 1776 — 1779 there appeared a complete 
German translation of the Characteristics? Hermann Hettner 6 
says that, not only Leibnitz, Voltaire, and Diderot, but Lessing, 
Mendelssohn, Wieland, and Herder drew the most stimulating 
nutriment from Shaftesbury. " His charms," he adds, "are 
ever fresh. A new-born Hellenism, a divine cultus of Beauty 
presented itself before his inspired soul/* Herder is specially 
eulogistic. In the Aclrastea, 7 he pronounces the Moralists to 
be a composition, in form well-nigh worthy of Grecian 
antiquity, and in its contents almost superior to it. It is per- 
haps the most beautiful Metaphysic which has ever been 
imagined. To any young man, who has a power of compre- 
hending the noble and the beautiful, it must be a peculiarly 
rich source of inspiration. Without it, even with the assist- 
ance of Bolingbroke's papers, the best verses in Pope's Essay 
on Man would hardly have been written, and Thomson's Muse 
had the impassioned Theocles for its guide. In France, it was 
under the impulse communicated by Bacon and Shaftesbury 
that Diderot pursued his peculiar path. " This Virtuoso of 
Humanity," he says in another place, 8 "exercised a signal 
influence on the best heads of the eighteenth century, on men 
who honestly devoted themselves to the culture of the true, 
the beautiful, and the good." The interest felt by German 
literary men in Shaftesbury, which had pretty nearly died out 
in the middle of this century, has been recently revived by the 
publication of two excellent monographs, one dealing with 
him mainly from the theological side by Dr. Gideon Spicker, 
Freiburg i. B., 1872, the other dealing with him mainly from 
the philosophical side by Dr. Georg von Gizycki, Leipzig, 

5 Von Gizycki, Die PkilosopMe Shaftesbury's. Vorrede. 

6 Literaturgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, Erster Theil. 

7 Adrastea, I., 14, 1801. Shaftesburi, Geist und Frohsinn. 

8 JBriefe zu Beforderung der Humaniiat, 1794. Brief 23. 

M 



1 62 SHAFTESBURY. 

1876. Both these works, and perhaps I may say specially the 
latter, present the German reader with a faithful and graphic 
portraiture of the English essayist and philosopher. 9 

By fur the most important influence, if we look to perma- 
nent results, which Shaftesbury exercised on the development 
of subsequent speculation was in his character of a moralist. 
Religious scepticism, at the beginning of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, was in the air, and, at that period, it naturally took the 
form of Deism, that is to say, the rejection of a positive 
revelation combined with the belief in a personal God, a 
Providence, and, in some cases, a future state of rewards and 
punishments. Shaftesbury, if I may be allowed the expres- 
sion, was a Deist of the right, and was fully as much occupied 
in presenting the positive as the negative parts of his 
doctrine. Moreover, the latter were rather insinuated than 
openly avowed. These circumstances, combined with the 
fact that he was an English peer, belonging to a family 
distinguished even in the English Peerage, doubtless procured 
for him readers, who would have scorned to pay any attention 
to the works of the coarser and more vulgar Deists. But, 
though Shaftesbury may have swelled the volume, he did not 
alter the direction, of the sceptical tendencies of the time. 
In one respect only can he be said to have exerted moi'e 
than a passing influence on religious thought, and that is 
by the scheme of Optimism which he propounded simul- 
taneously with Leibnitz, and which, mainly through the 
verses of Pope, coloured much of the religious sentiment of 
the eighteenth century. 

9 A recent monograph, "Einfluss der englischen Philosophen seit 
Baeon auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18 Jahrhunderts," by G. Zart, 
Berlin, 1881, gives much detailed information on the relation of Shaftes- 
bury and Hutcheson to the history of German Philosophy in the 
eighteenth century. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 163 

Shaftesbury's influence on the subsequent history of Moral 
Philosophy was exercised at least as much indirectly through 
Hutcheson as directly through his own writing's. Hence I 
must distribute what I have to say on this head between the 
present chapter and the chapter with which I shall conclude 
this volume. It appears to me that, in reference to subsequent 
speculation, the points which it is most important to notice in 
Shaftesbury's ethical theory are four — namely, his adoption of 
a tendency to promote the general welfare as the criterion of 
action, his conception of Virtue as consisting mainly in the 
exercise of the benevolent affections, the reference of moral 
distinctions to grounds independent of theology, and the 
theory of a moral sense, pronouncing immediately on the 
character of actions. 

The first of these doctrines lies more on the surface in 
Cumberland than it does even in Shaftesbury, and it seems to 
be implied in the ethical speculations of Bacon. 1 In Hutcheson 
it becomes, as we shall see, sufficiently prominent to be ex- 
pressed in a formula ; with Hume it is the main doctrine of 
ethics; and in Bentham, under the name of the Greatest Hap- 
piness principle, it excludes almost entirely all the other 
questions of Moral Philosophy. 

That Virtue consists mainly in the exercise of the Benevo- 
lent Affections is a proposition which is implicitly recognized 
by many of the earlier of the modern writers on ethics. 
Passages to this effect might easily be discovered in Bacon, 
Grotius, Puffendorf, Cumberland, and what are called the 
Cambridge Platonists; and Leibnitz, as we have seen, 2 
declared his own system to be, on this point, in harmony with 
that of Shaftesbury. It seems indeed to follow naturally 
from the Christian teaching that "love is the fulfilling of the 

1 See my " Bacon/' in this series, pp. 169 — 174. 
* See p. 138. 



164 SHAFTESBURY. 

law/' and Hobbes' attempt to build up a system of morality 
resting* solely on the selfish feelings was, when first started, 
almost universally regarded as a paradox. The peculiarity of 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson is not so much that they empha- 
sized the importance of the benevolent affections as that their 
teaching" seem to throw into the shade the self-regarding and 
prudential virtues, which are so essential to the happiness 
of the individual and the material well-being of society. By 
Hume and Adam Smith the balance was restored, and, while 
the supreme excellence of the sympathetic feelings was fully 
recognized, the various forms of self-regard and self-respect 
were shown, when properly directed and kept within proper 
bounds, to merit the approbation of mankind at large. 3 Not- 
withstanding their exaggerations, however, Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson may be considered as having permanently affected 
for good the course of moral speculation in England by 
diverting it from the sordid channels in which it was begin- 
ning to run, and by insisting, if even too strongly, on the 
fact that it is in the generous, sympathetic, and benevolent 
side of human nature that we must seek for the source of the 
most useful as well as the noblest virtues. 

One of the main objections taken to Shaftesbury's ethical 
system by the critics of his own and the next generation was 
that he traced the origin of moral distinctions to the make and 

3 Compare, for instance, the two following passages in Hume's Inquiry 
concerning the Principles of Morals. "The epithets sociable, good- 
natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, or 
their equivalents, are known in all languages, and universally express the 
highest merit which human nature is capable of attaining." — Section II., 
Part 1. " Temperance, sobriet}^ patience, constancy, perseverance, fore- 
thought, considerateness, secrecy, order, insinuation, address, presence of 
mind, quickness of conception, facility of expression : these, and a 
thousand more of the same kind, no man will ever deny to be excellencies 
and perfections " — Section VI., Part 1. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 165 

constitution of human nature rather than to the arbitrary will 
of God. What was then thought a defect would now be almost 
universally regarded as an excellency. Indeed, if rig-tit and 
wrong are simply constituted by the arbitrary fiat of the 
Supreme Being, it is difficult to see why morals should be 
treated as an independent science, and not merely as a subor- 
dinate branch of theology. And yet the view against which 
Shaftesbury protests had recently received the sanction of 
Locke, and was probably at this time the one generally 
accepted in Protestant countries, 4 not only amongst the vulgar 
but even in cultivated and reflective circles. Grotius and 
Hobbes, Cudworth and Clarke, had already assumed a bolder 
ground, and endeavoured to constitute Ethics as a separate 
science, though the work of Cudworth on Eternal and Immu- 
table Morality, in which the popular view is so conclusively 
refuted, had not yet been published. Butler lent the great 
weight of his authority to the same side, 5 and, though the 
opposite opinion long maintained its ground, especially among 
what may be called the theological utilitarians, it, in its turn, 
has now come to be looked upon as exceptional, if not unten- 
able. "When it is said that Shaftesbury treated Morals inde- 
pendently of Theology, it must be remembered, however, that 
he fully recognized the reality of theological sanctions, and 
especially of the higher theological sanction, which consists in 
the love and veneration of a Being who is Himself ideally 
good. But the character of the sanctions by which morality is 
imposed and the ultimate grounds of moral distinctions are, as 
I have already shown, distinct questions. 

4 That this is not the doctrine of the Catholic Church is argued with 
great force by Mr. W. G. Ward, in his "Nature and Grace," Book I. 
Ch. 1, Sects. 3, 4. 

5 See a note in Butler's Analogy, Part I., Ch. 6. The same view is 
implied throughout the Sermons. 



1 66 SHAFTESBURY. 



In the expression " Moral Sense/' Shaftesbury contributed 
a new phrase to the English language. Though used 
sparingly by him, it was employed by Hutcheson almost 
invariably, whenever he had occasion to speak of the moral 
faculty, and thus it gradually found its way into ordinary 
writings and conversation. 6 Coalescing with what had long 
been taught by divines on the absolute and semi-mystical 
attributes of conscience, 7 the metaphor implied in this term 
unfortunately tended to obscure the fact that our moral judg- 
ments often require to be preceded by long and careful pro- 
cesses of ratiocination. Thus the idea gained ground, and 
seemed to receive a philosophical sanction, that a man can at 
once and without reflection determine on the right course of 
action for himself, or pronounce a valid opinion on the moral 
character of the acts of himself or others. Hume, 8 by his 
more careful analysis of the process of moral approbation, did 
much to dissipate this error among those who made a special 
study of ethical questions, but it still held its place, and to 
some extent, notwithstanding the rude assaults of Paley and 
Bentham, even now holds its place, in vulgar opinion. The 
language of Butler, however, on this subject is still more 
unguarded than that of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and, 
being also the most widely-read writer of the three, I think 
it is to him more than to any other philosophical moralist 
that we must ascribe the encouragement which men have 
received from their ethical guides to form hasty decisions and 

6 Adam Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), says that 
" the word moral sense cannot yet be considered as making part of the 
English tongue. 

' For an excellent protest against the exaggerated and mischievous 
language often used on this subject, see two Sermons by Dr. South, on 
"The Nature and Measures of Conscience." 

8 See Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Section I., and 
Appendix I. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 167 

express hasty judgments on matters of moral conduct. How 
far Butler's account of " Conscience " is simply an attempt to 
throw into philosophical language the traditional teaching of 
theologians, and how far it was suggested by Shaftesbury's 
theory of the " Moral Sense/' is not easy to determine. That 
both influences are represented in his Sermons - , there can be little 
doubt. In concluding this chapter, I need only remind the 
reader that the position of Shaftesbury, and of what has been 
called the " Moral-Sense school/' on this point, has been 
already ascertained and criticized in my third chapter. It 
is not necessary that I should here pursue the subject any 
further, especially as it will come before us again in the 
account of Hutcheson. 



HUTCHESON 



CHAPTER I. 

LIFE AND WORKS. 

Francis Htjtcheson was born on the 8th of August, 1694. 
His father, John Hutcheson, was Presbyterian Minister of 
Armagh, and lived at Bally rea, near that city. His grand- 
father, Alexander Hutcheson, was also a Presbyterian Minister, 
his charge being Saintfield in the county of Down. At 
Drumalig, a township in the parish of Saintfield, his grand- 
father's residence, Francis Hutcheson was probably born. 1 
The grandfather had come over from Scotland, being, as 
Dr. Leechman tells us, "of an ancient and respectable family 
in the shire of Ayr in that kingdom/'' Thus the family of 
Hutchesons, like so many other families in the North of 
Ireland, was of Scottish descent. 

Francis, who seems to have been distinguished, as a child, 
for the sweetness of his disposition and his capacity for learn- 
ing, was a great favourite with his grandfather. It is said 

1 I am indebted for information as to the place of Hutcheson's birth, 
as well as for some particulars regarding his family and early history, to 
the Eev. George Hill, late Librarian of Queen's College, Belfast, who has 
kindly sent me various extracts from the Belfast Monthly Magazine of 
August, 1813. 



170 HUTCHESON. 



that, at a later period, when his grandfather wished to alter a 
prior settlement of his property in the young" man's favour, he 
peremptorily refused, though many arguments were used by his 
relations to prevail with him to accept the advantage. He and 
his brother Hans lived mostly with their father in Baltyrea till 
the year 1702, when they were sent to reside permanently with 
their grandfather, for the benefit of their education. Accord- 
ing to the Belfast Magazine, the best classical school in the 
neighbourhood was one kept by a Mr. Hamilton in the old 
Meeting-house of Saintfield. Here the two brothers remained, 
till Francis, at least, was moved to an Academy (where 
situated Dr. Leechman, who is here our informant, does not 
tell us) to begin his course of Philosophy. He was "there 
taught the ordinary Scholastic Philosophy which was in vogue 
in those days, and applied himself to it with uncommon 
assiduity and diligence." In the year 1710, at the age of 
sixteen, he entered the university of Glasgow, where he spent 
the next six years of his life, at first in the study of philo- 
sophy, classics, and general literature, and afterwards in the 
study of theology. It was while here that he read Dr. Samuel 
Clarke's book on the Being and Attributes of God, which had 
been first published a few years before. The a priori argu- 
ments employed in this work did not give him entire satis- 
faction, and, about the time he was leaving the University, 
he wrote a letter to Dr. Clarke, urging his objections and 
desiring further explanations. Whether he received any 
answer, we are told, does not appear from his papers; and 
from this fact we may almost certainly infer that he did not. 
Dr. Clarke, who had then the highest reputation of any man 
in England as a metaphysical theologian, was probably paying 
the penalty of eminence by being exposed to an inconvenient 
number of queries and objections from various philosophical 
and theological students. Bishop Butler, who was at that 



LIFE AND WORKS. 171 

time a student at a dissenting academy at Tewkesbury, he had 
goodnaturedly answered in the years 1713 and 1714, and 
the correspondence was published in 1716, under the title of 
Several letters to Dr. Clarke from a gentleman in Gloucester- 
shire, with the Doctor's answers thereunto. A few years before, 
in 1710, he had been less courteous to Berkeley, and declined 
altogether to enter into any correspondence with him on his 
new theory of Matter. 2 Hutcheson always remained doubtful, 
his biographer tells us, of the expediency of presenting to the 
bulk of mankind metaphysical arguments for the purpose of 
demonstrating the existence, unity, and perfections of. the 
Deity, nor was he himself convinced of their soundness. 
Accordingly, in his own work on metaphysics, when he comes 
to the question of the existence of a God, we find him, like 
Shaftesbury, resting the proof almost entirely on the indica- 
tions of a Deity afforded by the constitution of the Universe. 
On quitting the university, Hutcheson returned to the 
north of Ireland, received a licence to preach, and was just on 
the point of settling down as the minister of a small presby- 
terian congregation, when it was suggested to him by some 
gentlemen living in the neighbourhood of Dublin to start a 
private academy in that city. In this occupation he seems 
to have been eminently successful. At Dublin his literary 
accomplishments soon made him generally known, and he 
appears to have rapidly formed the acquaintance of the more 
notable persons, lay and ecclesiastical, who then resided in the 
metropolis of Ireland. Among these are specially to be noted 
Lord Molesworth, already known to the reader as the friend 

2 See Praser's Berkeley in Blackwood's Series of Philosophical 
Classics, Pt. I., ch. 5. The correspondence between Berkeley and Sir John 
Percival, from which I have derived the information given in the text, 
has been recently brought to light by Professor Fraser, and is an im- 
portant contribution to Berkeley's biography. 



172 HUTCHESON. 

and correspondent of Shaftesbury, who assisted him with 
advice and criticism in his aesthetic and philosophical inquiries, 
and Archbishop King, author of the well-known work Be 
Origin? Mali, who, to his great honour, steadily resisted all 
attempts to prosecute Hutcheson in the archbishop's court for 
keeping a school without having* previously subscribed to the 
ecclesiastical canons and obtained the episcopal licence. 
When the two first Essays were published, Lord Carteret, after- 
wards Lord Granville, was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. He 
was so struck with their merits that he took pains to find out 
the author, and afterwards invariably treated him with 
the most distinguishing marks of familiarity and esteem. 
Another friend was Dr. Synge, afterwards Bishop of Elphin, 
who assisted him to revise his papers. Hutcheson's relations 
with the clergy of the Established Church, especially with the 
archbishops of Armagh and Dublin, Boulter and King, seem 
to have been of the most cordial description; and "the incli- 
nation of his friends to serve him, the schemes proposed to 
him for obtaining promotion/' &c, of which his biographer 
speaks, probably refer to some offers of preferment, on con- 
dition of his accepting episcopal ordination. These offers, 
however, of whatever nature they might be, were unavailing; 
" neither the love of riches nor of the elegance and grandeur 
of human life prevailed so far in his breast as to make him 
offer the least violence to his inward sentiments.'" 

While residing in Dublin, Hutcheson published anony- 
mously the four essays by which he still remains best known, 
namely, the Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, 
Besign, and the Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, in 
1725, and the Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions 
and Affections, and Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, in 1728. 
The original title of the former work (which reached a second 
edition in the next year) was — An Inquiry into the Original 



LIFE AND WORKS. 173 

of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in two Treatises, in which 
the Principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are explained 
and defended against the Author of the Fable of the Bees ; and 
the Ideas of Moral Good and Evil are established, according to 
the Sentiments of the Ancient Moralists, with an attempt to 
introduce a Mathematical Calculation on subjects of Morality. 
The alterations and additions made in the second edition of 
these Essays were published in a separate form in 1726. To 
the period of his Dublin residence are also to be referred the 
" Thoughts on Laughter " (a criticism of Hobbes) and the 
" Observations on the Fable of the Bees/' being in all six 
letters contributed to Hibernicus' Letters, a periodical which 
appeared in Dublin, 1725-27 (2d ed., 1734). At the end of 
the same period occurred the controversy in the columns of 
the London Journal with Mr. Gilbert Burnet (probably the 
second son of Dr. Gilbert Burnet, bishop of Salisbury), on 
the '* True Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness." All 
these letters were collected in one volume, and published by 
Foulis, Glasgow, 1772. 

Of the admirable little treatise on Laughter, as I shall 
have no opportunity of recurring to it, I shall here offer a 
brief account. Hobbes had maintained that Laughter, like 
all other emotions, has its roots in selfishness. " Sudden 
glory is the passion which maketh those grimaces called 
Laughter ; and it is caused either by some sudden act of 
their own, that pleaseth them, or by the apprehension of some 
deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they sud- 
denly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to those 
that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves ; who 
are forced to keep themselves in their own favour by observing 
the imperfections of other men." 3 " If," says Hutcheson, 

3 Leviathan, Pt. I. ch. 6. Of Human Nature, ch. 9. " The passion 
of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden 



174 HUTCHESON. 

u Mr. Hobbes' opinion be just/' then, first, " there can be no 
laughter on any occasion where we notice no comparison of 
ourselves to others, or of our present state to a worse state, or 
where we do not observe some superiority of ourselves above 
some other thing ; and, again, it must follow that every 
sudden appearance of superiority over another must excite 
laughter, when we attend to it." He then proceeds, by a 
number of examples, to show that both these consequences, 
and, therefore, the supposition on which they are based, are 
false. Thus, in the case of parody and burlesque allusion, 
which so frequently occasion laughter, there is often the 
highest feeling of veneration for the words or acts parodied 
or alluded to. Humorous applications of texts of Scripture 
are often quite as much enjoyed by orthodox and pious people 
as by unbelievers. As regards the second consequence, if it 
be true, "- it must be a very merry state in which a fine gen- 
tleman is, when well dressed, in his coach, he passes our 
streets, where he will see so many ragged beggars, and 
porters and chairmen sweating at their labour, on every side 
of him. It is a great pity that we had not an infirmary or 
lazar-house to retire to in cloudy weather, to get an afternoon 
of laughter at these inferior objects." Hobbes might have 
replied to this latter argument by saying that the sense of 
the ludicrous is, in this instance, overpowered by what is at 
the moment a much stronger feeling, the feeling of pity. 
There can be no question, however, that Hutcheson is right 
in his main contention, and that the reflection on our own 
superiority, whether to others or to our past selves, is by no 
means an invariable, or even a very frequent, accompaniment 
of laughter. 

conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the in- 
firmity of others or with our own formerly ; for men laugh at the follies 
of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, except 
they bring with them any present dishonour." 



LIFE AND WORKS. 175 

Hutcheson's own theory is that laughter arises on the 
observation of contrast. " That then which seems generally 
the cause of laughter is the bringing together of images 
which have contrary additional ideas, as well as some re- 
semblance in the principal idea ; this contrast between ideas 
of grandeur, dignity, sanctity, perfection, and ideas of mean- 
ness, baseness, profanity, seems to be the very spirit of bur- 
lesque, and the greatest part of our raillery and jest are 
founded upon it. We find ourselves also moved to laughter 
by an overstraining of wit, by bringing resemblances from 
subjects of a quite different kind from the subject to which 
they are compared. When we see, instead of the easiness 
and natural resemblance which constitutes true wit, a forced 
straining of a likeness, our laughter is apt to arise ; as also, 
when the only resemblance is not in the idea but in the 
sound of the words. And this is the matter of laughter in 
the pun." 

Setting aside purely physical causes of laughter, such as 
tickling and hysteria, and also the spontaneous laughter, 
which is one of the outlets of over-excited emotion, as, for 
instance, of sudden joy or of exuberant animal spirits, it may 
be maintained that the perception of contrast, in some form 
or other, is an invariable condition of laughter. As Mr. Bain 4 
has pointed out, there are, however, many kinds of contrast 
or incongruity which do not excite laughter; such, for in- 
stance, as a decrepit man under a heavy burden, an instrument 
out of tune, a corpse at a banquet, a falsehood, parental cruelty, 
filial ingratitude. What, then, are the kinds of incongruity 
which provoke laughter ? I should be inclined to arrange 
them under two heads : the ludicrous, properly so called, and 
the mere frustration of expectation or, in other words, the 
occurrence of the unexpected. Mr. Bain maintains that 

Bain on The Emotions and the Will. The Emotions, eh. 14. 



176 HUTCHESON. 



" the occasion of the Ludicrous is the degradation of some 
person or interest possessing" dignity, in circumstances that 
excite no other strong emotion." And Mr. Herbert Spencer, 
in his very interesting article on the Physiology of Laughter 
(Macmill an's Magazine, March 1860 j reprinted in Essays, 
vol. i.)> says, " Laughter naturally results only when con- 
sciousness is unawares transferred from great things to small — 
only when there is what we may call a descending incongruity." 
While admitting these as adequate accounts of the sentiment 
which, we strictly designate as a sense of the ludicrous, it 
seems to me that the contrast involved in mere surprise, or, as 
I have called it, the frustration of expectation or the occurrence 
of the unexpected, is often an occasion of laughter. Thus we 
often laugh, when an unexpected turn is given to a word or 
sentence, even though it suffers no degradation in the change. 
And sometimes, when a player is suddenly and expectedly 
beaten in a game of chance, or even when there is an extra- 
ordinary run of luck, the bystanders will burst into uproarious 
merriment, directed not so much at the discomfiture of the 
loser as at the strangeness of the event. Again, we all know 
how children laugh at the game of " hide and seek," and how 
even grown-up people will laugh, when they discover that 
they have been "playing," as the phrase goes, "at cross- 
purposes." Of course, the surprise must never be such as 
to evoke disagreeable feelings, but it appears to me that, 
when this is not the case, the mere surprise occasioned by a 
striking contrast, without any descent from great things to 
small, is, in many temperaments, quite sufficient to elicit 
laughter. 

The use of Ridicule is stated by Hutcheson with great 
felicity. " When any object, either good or evil, is aggra- 
vated and increased by the violence of our passions, or an 
enthusiastic admiration, or fear, the application of ridicule is 



LIFE AND WORKS. 177 

the readiest way to bring 1 down our high imaginations to a 
conformity with the real moment or importance of the affair. 
Ridicule gives our minds, as it were, a bend to the contrary 
side ; so that, upon reflection, they may be more capable of 
settling in a just conformity with nature." 

The main motive of the letters on Laughter is to show the 
insufficiency of Hobbes' ethical theory to account for the 
obvious facts of human nature. 

In 1729 Huteheson was elected, without any solicitation, 
we are told, on his part, as the successor of his old master, 
Gerschom Carmichael, to the chair of moral philosophy in 
the University of Glasgow. It is curious that up to this 
time both his essays and letters had all been published anony- 
mously, though their authorship appears to have been perfectly 
well known. In 1730 he entered on the duties of his office, 
delivering an inaugm*al lecture (afterwards published), Be 
Naturali Hominnm Socialitate. The prospect of being de- 
livered from the miscellaneous-drudgery of school work, and 
of securing increased leisure for the pursuit of his favourite 
studies, occasions an . almost boisterous outburst of joy : — 
" laboriosissimis, mihi, atque molestissimis negotiis implicito, 
exigua admodum erant ad bonas literas rut mentem colendam 
otia; non levi igitur Isetitia commovebar cum almam matrem 
Academiam me, suum olim alumnum, in libertatem asseruisse 
audiveram/" And yet the works on which Hutcheson's 
reputation was to rest had already been published. 

The rest of Hutcheson's life was mainly spent in the 
assiduous performance of the duties of his professorship, 
including, of course, the preparation of lectures for his 
classes. Five days a week he lectured on Natural Religion, 
Morals, Jurisprudence, and Government. Three days a week 
he lectured on the Greek and Latin Moralists. On Sunday 
evenings he lectured on the evidences and distinctive tenets 

N 



178 HUTCHESON. 



of Christianity, "taking his views of its doctrines," we are 
told, " from the original records of the New Testament, and 
not from the party-tenets or scholastic systems of modern 
ages." This was the most crowded of his lectures, being 
attended by students indifferently from every faculty. His 
reputation as a teacher attracted many young meu, belonging 
to dissenting families, from England and Ireland, and he 
appears to have enjoyed a well-deserved popularity among 
both his pupils and his colleagues. One of his pupils, it may 
be mentioned, was Adam Smith, who subsequently occupied 
the same chair. As a lecturer, Hutcheson had a persuasive 
manner, and drew from a fund of natural eloquence, which, 
together with his stores of knowledge, rendered him one of 
the most masterly and engaging teachers of his generation. 5 
Though the subjects of his lectures were, in the main, the 
same every season, students would often attend them for four, 
five, or six years together. Then he had that indispensable 
qualification of a successful teacher, that intercourse with 
young men was a delight rather than a trouble to him. In 
conversation, he displayed great skill, and discovered such a 
readiness of thought, clearness of expression, and extent of 
knowledge, on almost every subject that could be started, as 

5 Dugald Stewart, in his Account of the Life and Writings of Adam 
Smith, says that Hutcheson's talents, as a public speaker, must have 
been of a far higher order than those which he displayed as a writer; 
" all his pupils whom I have happened to meet with (some of them, 
certainly, very competent judges) having agreed exactly with each other 
in their accounts of the extraordinary impression whi<:h they made on the 
minds of his hearers." After expressing his decided preference for the 
Essays over the posthumous work, Stewart adds : " His great and 
deserved fame, however, rests now chiefly on the traditionary history of 
his academical lectures, which appear to have contributed very powerfully 
to diffuse, in Scotland, that taste for analytical discussion, and that spirit 
-of liberal inquiry, to which the world is indebted for some of the most 
valuable productions of the eighteenth century." 



LIFE AND WORKS. 179 

gave delight to all who heard him. " A remarkable vivacity 
of thought and expression, a perpetual flow of cheerfulness 
and good-will, and a visible air of inward happiness, made 
him the life and genius of society, and spread an enlivening 
influence everywhere around him. He was gay and pleasant, 
full of mirth and raillery, familiar and communicative to the 
last degree, and utterly free from all stateliness or affectation." 
To the poorer students he was always open-handed, assisting 
them with money or opening his lectures to them without fees. 
Though somewhat quick-tempered, he was remarkable for his 
warm feelings and generous impulses. " He was all bene- 
volence and affection," says Dr. Leechman ; " none who saw 
him could doubt of it; his air and countenance bespoke it. 
It was to such a degree his pi - evailing temper that it gave a 
tincture to his writings, which were perhaps as much dictated 
by his heart as his head ; and if there was any need of an 
apology for the stress that in his scheme seems to be laid 
upon the friendly and public affections, the prevalence of 
them in his own temper would at least form an amiable one." 
Hutcheson's studies appear to have ranged over a wide 
field. They included, besides the subjects peculiar to his 
chair, the Latin and Greek Classics, Hebrew, Theology, 
Natural Philosophy and Mathematics, Civil and Ecclesiastical 
History, the history of the arts and sciences. The study of 
Greek, which had fallen into great neglect, was revived in 
Glasgow mainly through his influence. In those days, when 
the accumulation of books on any one subject was compara- 
tively small, and simpler social habits left to studious men 
more leisure than they are now usually fortunate enough to 
obtain, this union of excellence in a variety of subjects was 
by no means rare. The cases of Descartes, Leibnitz, and 
Newton will at once occur to the reader as striking illus- 
trations of this fact. 

N 2 



1 80 HUTCHESON. 

The disinterestedness which Hutcheson displayed in all 
that concerned his own fortunes is shown by his declining- an 
offer of the Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh. 
Not only was this a more lucrative appointment than the one 
which he held, but he would have had the advantages which 
attend residence in a capital and the opportunity of entering 
a much more distinguished circle of acquaintances than was 
open to him in Glasgow. He was content, however, with his 
position and surroundings, and remained where he was, in the 
quiet discharge of his duties, till his death in 1746. When 
he died, Hutcheson was in his fifty-third year. He had 
hitherto, with the exception of occasional attacks of gout, 
enjoyed excellent health, but was carried off prematurely by 
a fever. Soon after his settlement in Dublin, he married a 
Miss Wilson, daughter of a gentleman of fortune and position. 
He left one son, Dr. Francis Hutcheson, who followed the 
medical profession. " If any one/' says his biographer, 
" should wish to know anything about Dr. Hutcheson's 
external form, it may be said it was an image of his mind. 
A stature above middle size, a gesture and manner negligent 
and easy, but decent and manly, gave a dignity to his appear- 
ance. His complexion was fair and sanguine, and his features 
regular. His countenance and look bespoke sense, spirit, 
kindness, and joy of heart. His whole person and manner 
raised a strong prejudice in his favour at first sight." Not- 
withstanding, however, all these advantages of person, dis- 
position, address, and acquirements, he was not without his 
detractors. Theological party-spirit, at that time, ran high 
in Scotland, and the known liberality of his religious views, 
and his zeal for civil and religious freedom, caused him to be 
looked upon with a certain amount of suspicion and disfavour. 
It is implied by his biographer that he made no attempt to 
disarm hostility, either by any reserve in communicating his 



LIFE AND WORKS. 181 

opinions or by studying- moderation in the expression of 
them; in other words, that he had the courage of his con- 
victions. 

In addition to the works already named, the following- were 
published during Hutcheson's lifetime : — a pamphlet entitled 
Const 'derations on Patronages, addressed to the Gentlemen of 
Scotland, 1735 ; Philosophies Moralis Institutio Compeudiaria, 
Lthices et Jurisprudentia Naturalis Mementa contiuens, Lib. 
III., Glasgow, Foulis, 1742 ; Metaphysics Synopsis Ontologiam 
et Pneumatologiam complectens, Glasgow, Foulis, 1742. The 
last work was published anonymously. The pamphlet on 
Patronages is directed against the patronages vested in the 
Crown and private patrons, as restored by the Act of 1711, 
and advocates the restitution of ecclesiastical appointments to 
the heritors and elders, on the ground that they represent the 
feelings and opinions of the more influential parishioners. 

After his death, his son, Francis Hutcheson, M.D., pub- 
lished in two volumes, quarto, what is much the longest, 
though by no means the most interesting, of his works, A 
System of Moral Philosophy, in Three Books, London, 1755. 
To this is prefixed a life of the author, by Dr. William 
Leechman, professor of divinity in the university of 
Glasgow. The only remaining- work that we are able to 
assign to Hutcheson is a small treatise on Logic, which, 
according to his biographer, was " not designed for the public 
eye," but which was published by Foulis at Glasgow in 
1764. This compendium, together with the Compendium of 
Metaphysics, was republished at Strasburg in 1772. 

Of all these writings, however, those alone on which 
Hutcheson's philosophical reputation rests are the four essays, 
and perhaps the letters, all published during his residence in 
Dublin. To the more distinctive features of his philosophical 
system, so far as they may be gathered from these and his 



1 82 HUTCHESON. 

other works, I shall proceed to draw attention in the two 
next chapters. 

The original editions of Hutcheson's various works have 
been already mentioned. Several additions and alterations 
were made in the second edition (1726) of the Inquiry into 
the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. This, as 
well as most of his other works, passed through various 
editions. Of the System of Moral Philosophy, however, 
published after Hutcheson's death, there is, I believe, one 
edition only. Notices of Hutcheson occur in most histories, 
both of philosophy generally and of moral philosophy in 
particular, as, for instance, in part vii. of Adam Smith's 
Theory of Moral Sentiments ; Mackintosh's Progress of Ethical 
Philosophy ; Cousin, Cours d'Histoire de la Philosophie Morale 
du XVIlIieme Siecle j Whe well's lectures on the History of 
Moral Philosophy in England; Bain's Menial and Moral 
Science ; Dr. Noah Porter's Appendix to the English trans- 
lation of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy ; Mr. Leslie 
Stephen's History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 
&c. Of Dr. Leechman's Biography of Hutcheson I have 
already spoken. Professor Veitch gives an interesting 
account of his professorial work in Glasgow, Mind, Vol. ii. 
pp. 209— 211. 



183 



CHAPTER II. 

hutcheson's ethical theory. 

In the publication of the first two essays, Hutcheson acted 
quite rightly in connecting' his name on the title-page with 
that of Shaftesbury. There are no two names, perhaps, in 
the history of English moral philosophy, which stand in a 
closer connexion. The analogy drawn between beauty and 
virtue, the functions assigned to the moral sense, the position 
that the benevolent feelings form an original and irreducible 
part of our nature, and the unhesitating adoption of the 
principle that the test of virtuous action is its tendency to 
promote the general welfare, or; good of the whole, are at 
once obvious and fundamental points of agreement between 
the two authors. 

According to Hutcheson, man has a variety of senses, 
internal as well as external, reflex as well as direct, the general 
definition of a sense being " any determination of our minds 
to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have per- 
ceptions of pleasure and pain." x He does not attempt to 
give an exhaustive enumeration of these "senses," but, in 
various parts of his works, he specifies, besides the five external 
senses commonly recognized (which, he rightly hints, might 
be added to) 2 — (1) consciousness, by which each man has a 

1 Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, Sect. 1. 

2 Hutcheson here anticipates a great improvement in the classifications 
of psychology. To the " Five Senses," commonly so called, recent psy- 



184 HUTCHESON. 



perception of himself and of all that is going- on in his own 
mind f (2) the sense of beauty ; (3) a public sense, or sensus 
communis, " a determination to be pleased with the happiness 
of others and to be uneasy at their misery •/' (4) the moral 
sense, or " moral sense of beauty in actions and affections, by 
which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or others ;" 
(5) a sense of honour, or praise and blame, " which makes the 
approbation or gratitude of others the necessary occasion of 
pleasure, and their dislike, condemnation, or resentment of 
injuries done by us the occasion of that uneasy sensation 
called shame \" (6) a sense of the ridiculous. It is plain, as 
the author confesses, that there may be " other perceptions, 
distinct from all these classes," and, in fact, there seems to be 
no limit to the number of ' f senses " in which a psychological 
division of this kind might result. Thus, he makes veracity 
the object of a special sense. " In this important matter, we 
have very manifest indications of what God requires of us, in 

chologists add various other physical or corporeal senses, by the action of 
which a great part of our conscious life is built up. By Mr. Lewes 
(Problems of Life and Mind, Yol. i., p. 132) these are called the 
" S3'stemic Senses, because distributed through the system at large, 
instead of being localized in eye, ear, tongue, &c," and are classified as 
the Nutritive, Respiratory, Generative, and Muscular Senses. As 
examples of the first, he gives the feelings accompanying secretion, 
excretion, hunger, thirst, &c. " The feelings of suffocation, oppression, 
lightness, &c, belong to the second. The sexual and maternal feelings 
belong to the third ; while those of the fourth enter as elements into all 
the others." The recognition of this last class, the Muscular Feelings, 
whose characteristic is the consciousness of energy promoted or impaired, 
at once introduces a wide difference between the old psychologj' and the 
new, and vastly adds to the material at our disposal for the construction 
of a rational account of the development of our cognitive and sentient 
nature. 

3 " Sensus quidam internus, aut conscientia, cujus ope nota sunt ea 
omnia, quae in mente geruntur ; hac animi vi se novit quisque, suique 
sensum habet," Metaph. Syn., pars i. cap. 2. This " sense " is regarded 
as a direct internal sense. 



HUTCHESON'S ETHICAL THEORY. 185 

the very structure of our nature ; an immediate sense seems to 
recommend that use of speech which the common interest re- 
quires. In our tender years we are naturally prone to discover 
candidly all we know. We have a natural aversion to all false- 
hood and dissimulation, until we experience some inconveniency 
from this opennesss of heart, which we at first approve." 4 

Of these " senses " that which plays the most important 
part in Hutcheson's ethical system is the " moral sense." 
It is this which pronounces immediately on the character 
of actions and affections, approving of those which are 
virtuous, and disapproving- of those which are vicious. 
" This moral sense from its very nature appears to be designed 
for regulating" and controlling all our powers. This dignity 
and commanding nature we are immediately conscious of, as 
we are conscious of the power itself. Nor can such matters 
of immediate feeling be otherways proved but by appeals to 
our hearts." 5 " His principal design," he says in the preface 
to the two first treatises, "is to show that human nature was 
not left quite indifferent in the affair of virtue, to form to 
itself observations concerning the advantage or disadvantage 
of actions, and accordingly to regulate its conduct. The 
weakness of our reason, and the avocations arising from the 
infirmity and necessities of our nature are so great that very 
few men could ever have formed those long deductions of 
reason, which show some actions to be in the whole advan- 
tageous to the agent, and their contraries pernicious. The 
Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous 
conduct than our moralists seem to imagine, by almost as 
quick and powerful instructions as we have for the preservation 

4 Pkilosophice Moralis Institutio Compendiaria. Lib. II., cap. 10, 

§1- 

b Si/stem of Moral Philosophy, Book I., ch. 4. These are almost the 

exact words employed by Butler, when speaking of conscience. See 

Preface to the Sermons, and Sermons II., III. 



1 86 HUTCHESON. 



of our bodies. He has made virtue a lovely form, to excite 
our pursuit of it, and has given us strong 1 affections to be the 
springs of each virtuous action." Passing over the appeal to 
final causes involved in this and similar passages, as well as 
the assumption that the " moral sense" has had no growth or 
history, but was "implanted " in man exactly in the condition 
in which it is now to be found among the more civilized races, 
an assumption common to the systems of both Hutcheson and 
Butler, it may be remarked that the employment of the term 
" sense " to designate the approving or disapproving faculty 
has a tendency to obscure the real nature of the process which 
goes on in an act of moral approbation or disapprobation. For, 
as is so clearly established by Hume, 6 this act really consists 
of two parts : — one an act of deliberation, more or less pro- 
longed, resulting in an intellectual judgment; the other a 
reflex feeling, probably instantaneous, of either satisfaction or 
repugnance — of satisfaction at actions of a certain class which 
we denominate as good or virtuous, of dissatisfaction or 
repugnance at actions of another class which we denominate 
as bad or vicious. By the intellectual part of this process we 
refer the action or habit to a certain class, and invest it with 
certain characteristics ; but no sooner is the intellectual 
process completed than there is excited in us a feeling similar 
to that which myriads of actions and habits of the same class, 
or deemed to be of the same class, have excited in us on former 
occasions. Now, supposing the latter part of this process to 
be instantaneous, uniform, and exempt from error, the former 
certainly is not. All mankind may, apart from their selfish 
interests, approve of that which is virtuous or makes for the 
general good, but surely they entertain the most widely 
divergent opinions, and, if left to their own judgment, would 

6 See the passages referred to on pp. 225-7. Cp. Brown's Lectures on 
the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lecture lxxxii 



HUTCHESON'S ETHICAL THEORY. 187 

frequently arrive at directly opposite conclusions as to the 
nature of the particular actions and habits which fall under 
this class. This distinction is undoubtedly recognized by 
Hutcheson, as it could hardly fail to be, in his analysis of 
the mental process preceding- moral action, nor does he in- 
variably ignore it, even when treating of the moral appro- 
bation or disapprobation which is subsequent on action. 
Witness the following passages : — " Men have reason given 
them, to judge of the tendencies of their actions, that they 
may not stupidly follow the first appearance of public good ; 
but it is still some appearance of good whieli they pursue." 7 
" All exciting reasons presuppose instincts and affections; 
and the justifying presuppose a moral sense." 8 " When we 
say one is obliged to an action, we either mean — (1) that the 
action is necessaiy to obtain happiness to the agent, or to 
avoid misery ; or (2) that every spectator, or he himself upon 
reflection, must approve his action, and disapprove his omitting 
it, if he considers fully all its circumstances. The former 
meaning of the word obligation presupposes selfish affections, 
and the senses of private happiness; the latter meaning 
includes the moral sense/'' 9 Notwithstanding these passages, 
however, it remains true that Hutcheson, both by the phrases 
which he employs to designate the moral faculty, and by the 
language in which he ordinarily describes the process of moral 
approbation, has done much to favour that loose and popular 
view of morality which, ignoring the difficulties that often 
attend our moral decisions, and the necessity of deliberation 
and reflection, encourages hasty resolves and impulsive judg- 
ments. The term " moral sense " (which, it will be remem- 
bered, had already been employed by Shaftesbury), if in- 

7 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 4. 

8 Illustrations on the Moral Sense, Sect. 1. 
• Ibid. 



HUTCHESON. 



variably coupled with the term "moral judgment," would be 
open to little objection ; but, taken alone, as designating the 
complex process of moral approbation, it is liable to lead not 
only to serious misapprehension, but to grave practical errors. 
For, if each man's decisions are solely the result of an imme- 
diate intuition of the moral sense, why be at any pains to 
test, correct, or review them ? Or why educate a faculty 
whose decisions are infallible? The expression has, in fact, 
the fault of most metaphorical terms ; it leads to an exaggera- 
tion of the truth which it is intended to suggest. 

But, though Hutcheson usually describes the moral faculty 
as acting instinctively and immediately, he does not, like 
Butler, confound the moral faculty with the moral standard. 
The test or criterion of right action is with Hutcheson, as 
with Shaftesbury, its tendency to promote the general welfare 
of mankind. " That we may see how Love or Benevolence is the 
foundation of all apprehended excellence in social virtues, let 
us only observe that, amidst the diversity of sentiments on 
this head among various sects, this is still allowed to be the 
way of deciding the controversy about any disputed practice, 
namely, to inquire whether this conduct, or the contrary, will 
most effectually promote the public good. The morality is 
immediately adjusted, when the natural tendency, or influence 
of the action upon the universal natural good of mankind, is 
agreed upon. That which produces more good than evil in 
the Whole is acknowledged good ; and what does not, is 
counted evil. In this case, we no other way regard the good 
of the actor, or that of those who are thus inquiring, than as 
they make a part of the great system. In our late debates 
about Passive Obedience and the right of Resistance in 
defence of privileges, the point disputed among men of sense 
was, whether universal submission would probably be attended 



HUTCHESONS ETHICAL THEORY. 189 

with greater natural evils than temporary insurrections, when 
privileges are invaded ; and not, whether what tended in the 
whole to the public natural good, was also moi*ally good/' 
" In comparing the moral qualities of actions, in order to 
regulate our election among various actions proposed, or to 
find which of them has the greatest moral excellency, we are 
led by our moral sense of virtue to judge thus — that, in equal 
degrees of happiness expected to proceed from the action, the 
virtue is in proportion to the number of persons to whom the 
happiness shall extend (and here the dignity or moral import- 
ance of persons may compensate numbers), and, in equal 
numbers, the virtue is as the quantity of the happiness or 
natural good; or that the virtue is in a compound ratio of 
the quantity of good and number of enjoy ers. In the same 
manner, the moral evil, or vice, is as the degree of misery and 
number of sufferers ; so that that action is best which pro- 
cures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, and 
that worst which, in like manner, occasions misery." x What 
was subsequently called the utilitarian standard is here un- 
hesitatingly adopted by Hutcheson ; and it is curious to 
notice that he actually employs the very phrase which became 
so celebrated in the mouth of Bentham, though afterwards 
reduced by that writer to the more simple expression e ' greatest 
happiness." 

The controversy with Mr, Gilbert Burnet " concerning the 
true foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness " proceeds 
throughout on the assumption of the truth of what would now 
be called the Utilitarian or Greatest Happiness Theory. 
The only question between the disputants is whether the 
ultimate principle of action is given by a sentiment, as is 
maintained by Hutcheson, or by an intuition of the reason, as 

1 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 3. 



190 HUTCHESON. 

is held by his opponent. Hutcheson's theory is well summed 
up in the following- passage : — 

,v Ask a being who has selfish affections, why he pursues 
wealth ? He will assign this truth as his exciting reason, 
' that wealth furnishes pleasures or happiness/ Ask again, 
why he desires his own happiness or pleasure ? I cannot 
divine what proposition he would assign as the reason moving 
him to it. This is indeed a true proposition, f There is a 
quality in his nature moving him to pursue happiness/ but 
it is this quality or instinct in his nature which moves him, 
and not this proposition. Just so this is a truth, ' that a 
certain medicine cures an ague;' but it is not a proposition 
which cures the ague, nor is it any reflection or knowledge of 
our own natnre which excites us to pursue happiness. If 

this being have also public affections; what are the exciting 
reasons for observing faith, or hazarding his life in war? He 
will assign this truth as a reason, ' Such conduct tends to the 
good of mankind/ Go a step further, why does he pursue 
the good of mankind ? If his affections be really disinterested, 
without any selfish view, he has no exciting reason ; the 
public good is an ultimate end to this series of desires/' 2 

We must be careful, however, to distinguish between mere 
Natural Good and that which is properly denominated Moral 
Good, which, besides bringing us advantage, also elicits our 
moral approbation. " That the perceptions of Moral Good 
and Evil are perfectly different from those of Natural Good, 
or Advantage, every one must convince himself, by reflecting 
upon the different manner in which he finds himself affected 
when these objects occur to him. Had we no sense of good 
distinct from the advantage or interest arising from the ex- 
ternal senses and the perceptions of beauty and harmony ; 
our admiration and love toward a fruitful field, or commodious 
2 Letters concerning the Foundation of Virtue, Letter VI. 



HUTCHESON'S ETHICAL THEORY. 191 

habitation, would be much the same with what we have 
toward a generous friend, or any noble character. For both 
are, or may be, advantageous to us. And we should no more 
admire au}^ action, or love any person, in a distant country or 
age, whose influence could not extend to us, than we love the 
mountains of Peru, while we are unconcerned in the Spanish 
Trade. We should have the same sentiments and affections 
toward inanimate beings, which we have toward rational 
agents ; which yet every one knows to be false. Upon com- 
parison, we say, ' Why should we admire or love with esteem 
inanimate beings ? They have no intention of Good to us. 
Their nature makes them fit for our uses, which they neither 
know nor study to serve. But it is not so with rational 
agents. They study our interest, and delight in our hap- 
piness, and are benevolent toward us.' We are all then 
conscious of the difference between that Love and Esteem, or 
perception of Moral Excellence, which Benevolence excites 
toward the person in whom we observe it, and that opinion 
of natural goodness, which only raises desire of possession 
toward the good object. " s An action, then, to be morally 
good, must not only be attended with good consequences, but 
also originate in good affections. But the question still 
remains, What are good affections, and Why do they approve 
themselves to us as such ? Surely, the answer is, that those 
affections are good which promote the general welfare, and 
that they approve themselves to us, because, by observation 
and on reflection, we discover that they do so. Thus, if any 
affection, of which we generally approve, is found, when 
pursued to an inordinate degree, or applied to particular 
objects, to be attended with evil results, as is the case, for 
instance, with indiscriminate charity, misplaced love, ex- 
cessive resentment, or a blind and injudicious fondness for 
8 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 1. 



192 HUTCHESON. 



children, its exercise henceforth becomes to all rational and 
reflective persons no longer an occasion of praise, but of 
blame. And yet again it may be asked, if a tendency to 
promote the general welfare is the only measure even of good 
affections,- why are we animated with such different feelings 
towards a fertile field or a commodious habitation and a 
generous friend ? Is it not that we sympathize with the one, 
and not with the other ; that we regard our friend as a 
voluntary agent, actuated by motives similar to those by 
which we are^ ourselves actuated, and evidencing dispositions 
similar to those of which we are conscious in ourselves, when 
our motives and dispositions are such as most approve them- 
selves to us ? But this difference in the rational or irrational, 
the voluntary or involuntary, character of the objects which 
we approve is perfectly compatible with an identical test of 
excellence. A field or a habitation may be excellent in its 
kind, whatever be the character of its possessor. An act can 
only be morally good, if it be the act of a rational agent, and 
if the agent, in performing the act, be animated by a virtuous 
disposition; but then the only intelligible test of a virtuous 
disposition is its tendency to promote the public good. The 
ultimate criterion is the same, however circuitous may be the 
mode of its application, and however different may be the 
nature of the objects to which it is applied. These con- 
siderations, I think, will be found to remove any apparent 
discrepancies in the language which Hutcheson employs, 
when speaking of the standard by which our acts are to be 
measured. That standard, I do not doubt, he conceived of as 
an external standard, — namely, the tendency of an act, or 
rather of the disposition from which it springs, to promote 
happiness and to alleviate misery, to the greatest extent pos- 
sible under existing circumstances. At the same time, it 
must be acknowledged that the adoption of an external 



HUTCHESON'S ETHICAL THEORY. 193 

standard, requiring 1 so much care and reflection in its appli- 
cation, ought to have led him to see that the moral faculty, 
by which the standard was to be applied, is by no means so 
simple and instinctive as he imagined it to be, and that, 
consequently, these two parts of his system are in reality 
inconsistent. 

It must not, however, be supposed that Hutcheson in- 
variably ignored the necessity of educating the Moral Sense. 
Had he pursued to its consequences, and. more frequently 
attended to, the thought expressed in such a passage as the 
following, in which the moral faculty and the moral standard 
are brought into juxtaposition, his system would doubtless 
have been saved from most of the difficulties and incon- 
sistencies in which it is now involved. " In governing our 
moral sense, and desires of virtue, nothing is more necessary 
than to study the nature and tendency of human actions ; 
and to extend our views to the whole species, or to all 
sensitive natures, as far as they can be affected by our conduct. 
Our moral sense thus regulated, and constantly followed in 
our actions, may be the most constant source of the most 
stable pleasui-e.'" 4 

As connected with Hutcheson's adoption of what we should 
now call the utilitarian standard, it may be noticed that he 
proposes a kind of moral algebra, for the purpose of " com- 
puting the morality of actions." This calculus occurs in the 
" Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil/' sect. 3. It 
does nothing more than state in symbolical language a few 
obvious deductions from his general principles. 

Closely connected with the adoption of the General Good 
as the criterion of morality is what has been called the " bene- 
volent theory " of morals. Hobbes had maintained that all 

4 The Nature and Conduct of the Passions, Sect. 6. 

O 



194 HUTCHESON. 



our actions, however disguised under apparent sympathy, have 
their roots in self-love. Huteheson, following or rather ex- 
aggerating the doctrine already laid down by Shaftesbury/ 
not only maintains that benevolence is the sole and direct 
source of many of our actions, but, by a not unnatural recoil 
from the repellent tenets of Hobbes, that it is the only 
source of those actions of which, on reflection, we approve 
as virtuous. " If we examine all the actions which are 
accounted amiable anywhere, and inquire into the grounds 
upon which they are approved, we shall find that, in the 
opinion of the person who approves them, they always appear 
as benevolent, or flowing from love of others and a study of 
their happiness, whether the approver be one of the persons 
beloved or profited or not) so that all those kind affections 
which incline us to make others happy, and all actions sup- 
posed to flow from such affections, appear morally good, if, 
while they are benevolent toward some persons, they be not 
pernicious to others. Nor shall we find anything amiable 
in any action whatsoever, where there is no benevolence 
imagined; nor in any disposition, or capacity, which is not 
supposed applicable to and designed for benevolent pur- 
poses." 6 Consistently with this position, actions which flow 
from self-love only are pronounced to be morally indifferent : 
" The actions which flow solely from self-love, and yet evi- 
dence no want of benevolence, having no hurtful effects upon 
others, seem perfectly indifferent in a moral sense, and neither 
raise the love or hatred of the observer." 7 But surely, by 
the common consent of civilized men, prudence, temperance, 
cleanliness, industry, self-respect, and, in general, the "per- 

6 For Shaftesbury's statement of the " benevolent theory," which is 
more qualified than that of Hutcheson, see pp. 65 — 7, and pp. 72 — 6. 
6 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 3. 
? Ibid. 



HUTCHESONS ETHICAL THEORY. 195 

sonal virtues/' as they are called, are regarded, and rightly- 
regarded, as fitting objects of moral approbation. This con- 
sideration could hardly escape any author, however wedded to 
his own system, and Hutcheson attempts to extricate himself 
from the difficulty by laying down the position that a man 
may justly regard himself as a part of the rational system, 
and may thus " be, in part, an object of his own benevo- 
lence," 8 — a curious abuse of terms, which really concedes the 
question at issue. Moreover, he acknowledges that, though 
self-love does not merit approbation, neither, except in its 
extreme forms, does it merit condemnation. "We do not 
positively condemn those as evil who will not sacrifice their 
private interest to the advancement of the positive good of 
others, unless the private interest be very small and the 
public good very great.'"' 9 The satisfaction of the dictates 
of self-love, too, is one of the very conditions of the pre- 
servation of society. "Our reason can indeed discover certain 
bounds, within which we may not only act from self-love 
consistently with the good of the whole, but every mortal's 
acting thus within these bounds for his own good is absolutely 
necessary for the good of the whole; and the want of such 
self-love would be universally pernicious." 1 " Self-love is really 
as necessary to the good of the whole as benevolence, — as 
that attraction which causes the cohesion of the parts is as 
necessary to the regular state of the whole as gravitation." 3 
To press home the inconsistencies involved in these various 
statements would be a superfluous task. 

Hutcheson's benevolent view of human nature is illustrated 
also by his denying that malevolence is an original principle 

8 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 3. 

9 Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, Sect. 6. 

1 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 3. 
8 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 17. 

o 2 



i 9 6 HUTCHESON. 



in the constitution of man. " Perhaps our nature is not 
capable of desiring the misery of any being" calmly, farther 
than it may be necessary to the safety of the innocent ; we 
may find, perhaps, that there is no quality in any object 
which would excite in us pure disinterested malice, or calm 
desire of misery for its own sake.'" 3 Against this position, 
which is maintained also by Butler, 4 it might be objected 
that, even amongst very young children, we often find a 
singular and precocious love of cruelty. This is, undoubtedly, 
one of the most curious facts in moral psychology, but it may 
perhaps be accounted for by supposing it to originate in a 
combination of morbid curiosity with an equally morbid love 
of power. 

The ultimate source of moral distinctions is, of course, placed 
by Hutcheson, as it is by Shaftesbury, in the original make 
of human nature. It would be superfluous to quote passages 
to show that the benevolent affections, and the moral sense, 
" or determination of our minds to approve every kind affec- 
tion, either in ourselves or others, and all publicly useful 
actions which we imagine flow from such affections/' are, 
according to Hutcheson's scheme of moral psychology, in- 
capable of analysis into simpler elements. 

In the analysis of the mental process preceding action, 
Hutcheson's view of the respective provinces of Reason and 
Desire is perfectly just. Our ends are suggested by the 
emotional part of our nature, while Heason discovers the 

8 On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, Sect. 3. 

* Sermon IX. " Resentment being out of the case, there is not, 
properly speaking, any such thing as direct ill-will in one man towards 
another." If this position be true, there seems to be no adequate reason 
for confining it to our feelings towards other human beings. 



HUTCHESONS ETHICAL THEORY. 197 

means for their attainment. 5 " We have indeed many con- 
fused harangues on this subject, telling us, ' We have two 
principles of action, — reason and affection or passion; the 
former in common with angels, the latter with brutes: no 
action is wise, or good, or reasonable, to which we are not 
excited by reason, as distinct from all affections; or, if any 
such actions as flow from affections be good, it is only by 
chance, or materially and not formally/ As if indeed reason, 
or the knowledge of the relations of things, could excite to 
action when we proposed no end, or as if ends could be 
intended without desire or affection." 6 "We may transiently 
observe what has occasioned the use of the word reasonable, 
as an epithet of only virtuous actions. Though we have 
instincts determining us to desire ends, without supposing 
any previous reasoning ; yet it is by use of our reason that 
we find out the means of obtaining our ends. When we do 
not use our reason, we often are disappointed of our end. We 
therefore call those actions which are effectual to their ends 
reasonable, in one sense of that word." 7 

Any direct discussion of the vexed question of liberty and 
necessity appears to be carefully avoided in Hutcheson's pro- 
fessedly ethical works. But, in the Synopsis Metapkysicce, he 
touches on it in no less than three places, briefly stating both 
sides of the question, but evidently inclining to that which 
he designates as the opinion of the Stoics in opposition to 
what he designates as the opinion of the Peripatetics. This 
is substantially the same as the doctrine propounded by 

5 For a more detailed analysis, see pp. 79 — 81, where I have discussed the 
same subject in relation to Shaftesbury. Hutcheson himself pursues the 
analysis into some detail, in his "Letters concerning the True Foundation 
of Virtue." 

6 Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, Sect. 1. 
? Ibid. 



198 HUTCHESON. 



Hobbes and Locke (to the latter of whom Hutcheson refers in 
a note), namely, that our will is determined by motives in 
conjunction with our general character and habit of mind, 
and that the only true liberty is the liberty of acting as we 
will, not the liberty of willing as we will. Though, however, 
his leaning is clear, he carefully avoids dogmatizing, and 
speaks of the difficulty as one which has always vexed the 
minds of pious and learned men, and on which both sides 
appeal in vain to our internal sense [that is to say conscious- 
ness]. 8 As a practical conclusion, he earnestly deprecates 
the angry controversies and bitter dissensions to which the 
discussions on this subject had given rise. 

On the independent character of Morality as a science, 
and on the various sanctions of conduct, less is said by 
Hutcheson than by Shaftesbury, though the two writers are 
in substantial agreement. Hutcheson's whole treatment of 
morals proceeds on the assumption that they constitute an 
independent branch of investigation, and in the "Illustrations 
upon the Moral Sense " there is a special section, 9 directed 
against those who " imagine that, to make an action virtuous, 
it is necessary that the agent should have previousby known 
his action to be acceptable to the Deity, and have undertaken 
it chiefly with design to please or obey him/' "Human 
Laws/' he says elsewhere, 1 " may be called good, because of 
their conformity to the Divine. But to call the laws of 
the Supreme Deity good, or holy, or just, if all Goodness, 
Holiness, and Justice be constituted by Laws, or the will of 

8 Sed qusestionem hanc vexatissimam, quae doctorum et piorum ingenia 
semper torserat, atque de qua utrinque frustra ad sensum cujusque 
internum provocatur, jam relinquamus." Metaphysial Synopsis, Pars II. 
cap. 2. 

9 Sect. 6. 

1 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 7. 



HUTCHESON'S ETHICAL THEOR Y. 199 

a superior any way revealed, must be an insignificant " [that 
is, a non-significant] " tautology, amounting' to no more than 
this, 'That God wills what he wills/ " In reply to those 
who allege that, " in those actions of our own which we call 
good, the ground of our approbation, and the motive to them, 
is that we suppose the Deity will reward them/ 7 he answers 
that " it is enough to observe that many have high notions 
of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Justice, who have scarce any 
opinions about the Deity, or any thoughts of future rewards, 
and that many abhor anything which is treacherous, cruel, or 
unjust, without any regard to future punishments.'" 2 More- 
over, as he remarks in another place, 3 " Benevolenoe scarce 
deserves the name, when we desire not nor delight in the 
good of others, further than it serves our own ends/'' Nay, 
on so limited a conception of the grounds of moral appro- 
bation and the motives to moral action, what right have we 
to ascribe benevolence to the Deity, or to expect Him to 
reward virtue ? " Virtue is commonly supposed, upon this 
scheme, to be only a consulting our own happiness in the 
most artful way, consistently with the good of the whole ; 
and in Vice the same thing is foolishly pursued, in a manner 
which will not so probably succeed, and which is contrary to 
the good of the whole. But how is the Deity concerned in 
this whole, if every agent always acts from Self-love ? " On 
the other hand, the higher religious sanction, the love and 
veneration of God, furnishes, together with the moral sanction 
strictly so called, the purest of all motives to the exercise of 
virtue. " This love" is approved by the moral faculty as 
" the greatest excellence of mind ; " and it " is too the most 
useful in the system, since the admiration and love of moral 

3 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 1. 

» Sect. 2, Art. 7. 



200 HUTCHESON. 

perfection is a natural incitement to all good offices." 4 It 
may be noticed that, in speaking of the sanctions supplied by 
human law, Hutcheson regards them as simply preventive 
and deterrent. " Human punishments are only methods of 
self-defence; in which the degrees of guilt are not the proper 
measure, but the necessity of restraining actions for the safety 
of the public." 5 This view is strictly in harmony with the 
criterion of morality adopted by Hutcheson, and forms 
another point of agreement with the later utilitarian school. 

Much of Hutcheson's posthumous work, A System of Moral 
Philosophy, as well as the short Introduction to Moral 
Philosophy, originally written in Latin, is occupied with the 
deduction of specific rights and duties. " His treatment of 
these," Mr. Sidgwick says, " though decidedly inferior in 
methodical clearness and precision, does not differ in principle 
from that of Paley or Bentham, except that he lays greater 
stress on the immediate conduciveness of actions to the 
happiness of individuals, and more often refers in a merely 
supplementary or restrictive way to their tendencies in respect 
of general happiness/' 6 

As Hutcheson's ethical system is so closely allied with that 
of Shaftesbury, it is unnecessary that I should devote any 
further space to it. Its relation to later systems will be 
briefly considered in my last chapter. 

« System of Moral Philosophy, Book I., ch. 10. 

5 Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, Sect. 6, Art. 6. 

6 Article on Ethics in the Encyclopedia Britannica. 



CHAPTER III. 

htjtcheson's writings on mental philosophy, logic, 
and .esthetics. 

In the sphere of mental philosophy and logic, Hutcheson's 
contributions are by no means so important or original as in 
that of moral philosophy, and, as they are rather curious in 
their relation to other systems than of much value in them- 
selves, I do not propose to examine them at any length. In 
the former subject, the influence of Locke is apparent 
throughout. All the main outlines of his philosophy seem, at 
first sight, to be accepted as a matter of course. Thus, in 
stating the theory of the moral sense, Hutcheson is peculiarly 
careful to repudiate the doctrine of innate ideas, admitting 
that " the vast diversity of moral principles, in various 
nations and ages, is a good argument against innate ideas or 
principles/'' though it does not "evidence mankind to be void 
of a moral sense to perceive Virtue or Vice in actions, when 
they occur to their observation." 1 At the same time, he 
acknowledges that we might call certain axioms " innate/' in 
the sense that it is natui'al to man, as he grows up, to recog- 
nize their truth, and that, as a fact, almost all men do so. 2 

All our ideas are, as by Locke, referred to external or 
internal sense, or, in other words, to sensation and reflection, 

1 Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. 4. Cp. sect. 1, ad 
fin. 

2 Synopsis Jtfttaphysicce, Pars I., cap. 2. 



202 HUTCHESON. 



or, as Hutcheson himself phrases it, sensation and conscious- 
ness. " These two powers of perception, sensation and 
consciousness'" (the latter being described as "an inward 
sensation, perception, or consciousness, of all the actions, 
passions, and modifications of the mind, by which its own per- 
ceptions, judgments, reasonings, affections, feelings may become 
its object "), "introduce into the mind all its materials of 
knowledge. All our primary and direct ideas or notions are 
derived from one or other of these sources. But the mind 
never rests in bare perception ; it compares the ideas received, 
discerns their relations, marks the changes made in 
objects by our own action or that of others; it inquires into 
the natures, proportions, causes, effects, antecedents, con- 
sequents of everything, when it is not diverted by some 
importunate appetite. All these several powers of external 
sensation, consciousness, judging, and reasoning, are com- 
monly called the acts of the understanding." 3 It is, how- 
ever, a most important modification of this doctrine, when he 
states that the ideas of extension, figure, motion, and rest 
" are more properly ideas accompanying the sensations of 
sight and touch than the sensations of either of these senses;" 
that the idea of self accompanies every thought ; and that 
the ideas of number, duration, and existence accompany every 
other idea whatsoever. 4 In this conception of ideas invariably 
concomitant with other ideas, Hutcheson is approximating very 
closely to the doctrine of innate ideas, and indeed it is difficult 

3 System of Moral Philosophy, Book I., ch. 1. Cp. Logicce Compend. 
Pars I., cap. 1 ; Syn. Metaph., Pars I., cap. 1. In tbe latter passage he 
says that the existence of things is made known either by " internal 
sense, as each man knows his own existence ;" or by external sense, 
" wbich, by its natural force, sufficiently establishes the existence of other 
tbings;*' or by Reasoning; or by Testimony. 

* See Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, Sect, i., Art. 
1 ; Syn. Metaph. , Pars I., cap. 1, Pars II., cap. 1. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 203 

to see on what other hypothesis the theory can be consistently 
maintained. For, though the "accompanying' ideas " require 
other ideas to excite them, it would seem as if they must 
already be latent in the mind, in order to be excited. The 
constantly repeated statement that all our ideas are ultimately 
to be traced to external or internal sensation (Sensation or 
Reflection) is certainly not easily reconciled with the existence 
of " accompanying ideas/'' unless indeed, which may possibly 
be the case; Hutch eson meant nothing more by this expres- 
sion than that such ideas are produced in us by a plurality of 
senses — that, in fact, they are " common sensibles." 5 

In addition to the repudiation of the doctrine of Innate Ideas, 
and the recognition of Sensation and Reflection as the 
ultimate sources of all knowledge, other important points in 
which Hutcheson follows the lead of Locke are his deprecia- 
tion ftf the importance of the so-called laws of thought, his dis- 
tinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies, 
the position that we cannot know the inmost essences of things 
(" intimse rerum naturae sive essentia^"), though they excite 
various ideas in us, and the assumption that external things 
are known only through the medium of ideas, though, at the 
same time, we are assured of the existence of an external 
world corresponding to these ideas. Hutcheson attempts to 
account for our assurance of the reality of an external world 
by referring it to a natural instinct. " Although our minds 

5 Sir William Hamilton (Ed. of Reid's Works, p. 124, note) points out 
that Reid was anticipated by Hutcheson, in representing the ideas of 
exterasion, figure, motion, and rest as concomitant rather than as direct 
ideas of touch and sight. Reid (Ed. Hamilton, p. 126) expressly says 
that these ideas cannot come either from sensation or from reflection. The 
reader who wishes to acquaint himself with the accounts given b} r modern 
psychologists of the mode in which we acquire these ideas should refer to 
Bain on the Senses and the Intellect, Herbert Spencer's Psychology, and 
Rihot's JPsychologie Allemande Contemporaine. 



204 HUTCHESON. 



can not attain to the knowledge of anything 1 , except by the 
intervention of some notion or idea (since not things them- 
selves, but ideas or notions, are what are proximately 
presented to the mind) ; yet are we compelled by nature 
herself to refer very many of our ideas to external things, such 
ideas being, as it were, the images or representations of the 
things themselves/' 6 This is what Sir William Hamilton 7 
calls the scheme of Cosmothetic Idealism or Hypothetical 
Realism, which, while positing the existence of an external 
world, maintains that we are only conscious of the ideas 
which are representative of it. The great majority of 
philosophers, as Hamilton points out, have maintained this 
opinion, though there have been some few who have been 
hardy enough, like Berkeley, to deny the reality of any non- 
mental prototype of our ideas, and others, like Sir William 
Hamilton himself and probably Reid, who have held, a with 
the vulgar, that not only does an external world exist but 
that we are directly conscious of it. Hutcheson does not rely 
solely on the testimony of a natural instinct to the reality of ex- 
ternal things. He proceeds to adduce arguments. One of these, 
which is an adaptation of an argument employed by Locke, 8 
is based on the contrast between the faint ideas of memory 
and the more vivid ideas which we derive from the present 
.impressions of sense. We have no doubt that the faint idea, 
which we are able to recall whenever we choose, represents 
the more vivid idea which we experienced before. And, 
similarly, we may be certain that the more vivid ideas them- 
selves represent external prototypes. Locke appears to state 
the argument more forcibly, when he asks whether a man 
" be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different percep- 

8 Metaph. Syn., Pars I., cap. 1. 

7 Essay on Idealism in Hamilton's Discussions. 

8 Essay, Bk. IV., ch. 2, § 14 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 205 

tion, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by 
night, when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or 
only thinks on that savour or odour ? " Of all the arguments 
emploj^ed against those who question the reality of non- 
mental 9 causes of our sensations, I think this one of the most 
effective. The difference between the presented and the 
reproduced sensation requires to be accounted for in some way 
or other, and no explanation is so simple or so adequate as that 
implied in the ordinary belief, that the presented, or more vivid, 
sensation is due to some force, of an order altogether different 
from the phenomena of mind, impressed from without. 
Another argument advanced by Hutcheson is that each man 
has a direct consciousness of himself, and of his own personal 
identity, as distinct from his fleeting sensations, emotions, 
and thoughts. By parity of reasoning, there must be things, 
having a real existence, independently of our ideas of them. 
As if aware that this latter argument is not a very cogent 
one, he recurs to the statement that we are led by a natural 
instinct to refer our ideasy or at least those which are derived 
through sensation, to external objects, as the causes of 
them. 

The secondary qualities of bodies, that is, the qualities 

9 I employ this expression rather than the word " external," because 
an absolute Idealist, who denies the real existence of anything in the 
Universe but Mind, may still refer our sensations to an external source, 
namely, the mind or will of God. Thus, Berkeley, in his Third Dialogue 
between Hylas and Philonous, says : " It is plain that sensible ideas have 
an existence exterior to my mind ; since I find them by experience to be 
independent of it. There is therefore some other mind wherein they 
exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them. 
And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, 
it necessarily follows there is an omnipresent eternal mind, which knows 
and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a 
manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and 
are by us termed the laws of nature." 



206 HUTCHESON. 



proper to some particular sense, as colours, odours, sounds, 
Hutcheson holds, with Locke, have no resemblance to any- 
thing- in the bodies themselves, though, by a fixed law of 
nature, the bodies have, through their primary qualities, a 
power of exciting such ideas in us. Of the correspondence or 
similitude between our ideas of the primary qualities of things 
(that is to say, duration, number, extension, figure, motion, 
and rest) and the primary qualities themselves God alone can 
be assigned as the cause. This similitude has been effected 
by Him through a law of nature. " Whether this first 
perception of the primary qualities be called an active or 
a passive operation of the mind, no other cause of the 
similitude or correspondence between ideas of this kind and 
the qualities themselves can be assigned than God Himself, 
who, by an established law of nature, brings it about that the 
notions, which are excited by present objects, may be like the 
objects themselves, or, at least, represent their habitudes or 
qualities, if not their true quantities.'' 1 Locke had repeatedly 
stated that " the primary qualities ©f bodies are resemblances 
of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies 
themselves " (see, for instance, Essay, Bk. II. ch. 8, sect. 15), 
and he also speaks of God "annexing-" certain ideas to 
certain motions of bodies {Ibid., sect. 13, and elsewhere); but 
nowhere, I believe, does he propound a theory so precise and 
definite as that here propounded by Hutcheson, which 
reminds us at least as much of the speculations of Male- 
branche as of those of Locke. 

Amongst the more important points in which Hutcheson 
diverges from Locke is his account of the idea of personal 
identity, which he appears to have regarded as made known 
to us directly by consciousness, though itself distinct from 
consciousness ; instead of being identical with, and there- 

1 Syn. Metaph.) Pars II., cap. 1. 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 207 

fore, of course, limited by, consciousness, present or remem- 
bered. " That his own mind remains the same, every one 
is conscious to himself, by an internal perception, most 
trustworthy, but inexplicable, by which he knows that his 
own mind is altogether different from every other mind/' 3 
"Every one retains a consciousness of himself, or a sense of 
such a kind, as does not permit him to doubt whether he 
remains the same to-day that he was yesterday, howsoever 
changed his thoughts may be, or even though they cease 
awhile altogether."" 4 It would have been better to derive the 
idea of the Same Self (which, of course, involves the idea of a 
Self or Ego, as distinct from its modifications), not from a 
single act of consciousness, but from the comparison of two 
or moi-e acts. Whenever I pass from some present sensation 
or idea to some sensation or idea which I have formerly 
experienced, or to some sensation or idea which I expect to 
experience in the future, this comparison is found, on reflec- 
tion, to imply the idea of Personal Identity, or of the Same 
Self as the subject of the two mental acts compared. And, 
when the idea of the Same Self has been thus gained, it may 

2 "Since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that that 
makes every one to be what he calls Self, and thereby distinguishes himself 
from all other thinking things, in this alone consists Personal Identity, 
that is the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this Conscious- 
ness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far 
reaches the Identity of that Person ; it is the same Self now as it was 
then, and 'tis by the same Self with this present one that now reflects on 
it that that action was done." Locke's Essay, Bk. II., ch. 27, § 9. 
This explanation seems to involve the extraordinary paradox that I am 
not the same person that I was this day twenty years ago, the events of 
which I have entirely forgotten, or even the same person that I was last 
night, during which I was in a sound, and, so far as I know, unconscious 
sleep. 

3 3fetaph. Syn., Pars I., cap. 3. 

4 Pars I., cap. 1. 



208 HUTCHESON. 



be regarded as the subject, in the past, of many acts which 
have now altogether passed out of recollection, as well as, in 
the future, of many acts of which we can now form no 
anticipation. 

The distinction between body and mind, " corpus " or 
"materia" and "res cogitans," is more emphatically accen- 
tuated by Hutcheson than by Locke, who, however, notwith- 
standing his suggestion that God might, if He pleased, 
" superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking," is by no means 
to be ranked as a Materialist. 5 Generally, Hutcheson speaks 
as if we had a direct consciousness of mind as distinct from 
body, 6 though, in the posthumous work on Moral Philosophy, 
he expressly states that we know mind as we know body " by 
qualities immediately perceived, though the substance of both 
be unknown/' 7 

The distinction between perception proper and sensation 
proper, which occurs by implication though it is not explicitly 
worked out, 8 the hint as to the imperfection of the ordinary 
division of the external senses into five classes already alluded 
to, the limitation of consciousness to a special mental facult}-, 
namely, that by which we perceive our own minds, and all 
that goes on within them, 9 and the disposition to refer on 

6 See my "Locke " in the series of English Men of Letters, pp. 139, 
140. Locke regarded his own suggestion, when applied to man, as an 
improbable one, and that the " Something," which has " existed from 
eternity," must " necessarily be a cogitative being," he held to admit of 
demonstration (Essay, Bk. IV., ch. 10). 

6 See, for instance, Syn. Metaph., Pars ii. cap. 3. 

7 Bk. 1. ch. 1. 

8 See Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. 24; Hamilton's 
edition of Dugald Stewart's Works, vol. v. p. 420. 

9 " Cujus ope nota sunt ea omnia, quae in mente geruntur." .... 
" Hac animi vi Se novit quisque." Syn. Metap/i., Pars ii. cap. 1. This 
limitation of Consciousness to a specific faculty of self-knowledge, in 
which Hutcheson is followed by Eeid and Stewart, is severely criticized 



COMPENDIUM OF LOGIC. 209 

disputed questions of philosophy not so much to formal 
arguments as to the testimony of " consciousness " and our 
natural instincts, 1 are also amongst the points in which 
Hutcheson supplemented or departed from the philosophy of 
Locke. The last point can hardly fail to suggest, to such of 
my readers as are acquainted with the later speculations of the 
Scottish school, the " common-sense philosophy " of Reid, 
and here it may be remarked that the interest attaching 
to Hutcheson's psychological and metaphysical views consists 
very largely in the intermediate position which they occupy 
between the system of Locke and that of Reid and the later 
Scottish school. If we confine ourselves to merely enumerating 
detached questions, he perhaps stands nearer to Locke, but in 
the general spirit of his philosophy he seems to approach 
more closely to his Scottish successors. 

The short Compendium of Logic, which is more original than 
such works usually are, is chiefly remarkable for the large 
proportion of psychological matter which it contains. In 
these parts of the book Hutcheson mainly follows Locke. 
The technicalities of the subject are passed lightly over, and 
the book is eminently readable. It may be specially noticed 
that he distinguishes between the mental result and its verbal 
expression [idea — term; judgment — proposition], that he 
constantly employs the word " idea," and that he defines 
logical truth as " the agreement of the signs with the things 

by Sir W. Hamilton, who, in accordance with the nomenclature and 
teaching of most philosophers, makes Consciousness coextensive with 
our knowledge and our cognitive faculties in general, — "the genus under 
which our several faculties of knowledge are contained as species," and of 
which " they are only modifications." See Hamilton's Lectures on 
Metaphysics, Lects. XII., XIII. ; Edition of .Reid, Notes H, I. 

1 " Ad gravissima quaedam in philosophia dogmata amplectenda, non 
argumentis aut ratiocinationibus, ex rerum perspecta natura petitis, sed 
potius sensu quodam interno, usu, atque naturae impulsu quodam aut 
instinctu ducimur." Syn. Ifetaph,, Pars II. cap. 3. 

P 



2io HUTCHESON. 



signified/' or " the agreement of the proposition with things 
themselves/' 2 thus implicitly repudiating a merely formal 
view of logic. This work is now only very rarely to be met 
with. 

Hutcheson may claim to have been one of the earliest 
modern writers on aesthetics. His speculations on this subject 
are contained in the Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, 
and Design, the first of the two treatises published in 17£5, 
which, Professor Veitch 3 reminds us, preceded the treatise of 
the Pere Andre in France (1741), and that of Baumgarten in 
Germany (1750). He maintains that we are endowed with a 
special sense by which we perceive beauty, harmony, and pro- 
portion. This is a reflex sense, because it presupposes the 
action of the external senses of sight and hearing. It may 
be called an internal sense, both in order to distinguish its 
perceptions from the mere perceptions of sight and hearing, 
and because "in some other affairs, where our external senses 
are not much concerned, we discern a sort of beauty, very 
like, in many respects, to that observed in sensible objects, 
and accompanied with like pleasure." 4 The latter reason 
leads him to call attention to the beauty perceived in universal 
truths, in the operations of general causes, and in moral 
principles and actions. Thus, the analogy between beauty 
and virtue, which was so favourite a topic with Shaftesbury, 
becomes also prominent in the writings of Hutcheson. 
Scattered up and down the treatise, there are many important 

8 " Veritas Logica est Ccmvenientia signorum cum rebus significatis." 
Log. Com fend., Pars II., cap. 1, He adds : " Veritas Ethica est Con- 
venientia signorum cum mentis sententia." In the Syn. MetafJi., Pars I., 
cap. 3, he defines "Veritas Logica" as " Propositicnis convenientia 
cum rebus ipsis." 

■ Mind, Vol. II., p. 211. 

4 Inquiry, &c, Sect. 1. 



AESTHETICS. 2H 

and interesting observations, such as that what we properly 
call the beautiful always implies uniformity amidst variety. 
" To speak in the mathematical style, it seems to be in a 
compound ratio of Uniformity and Variety; so that where 
the Uniformity of bodies is equal, the Beauty is as the 
Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as 
the Uniformity/' 5 Hence the internal sense, or Sense of 
Beauty, spoken of above, may be defined as "a passive power 
of receiving- ideas of beauty from all objects in which there is 
Uniformity amidst Variety.* That objects of this kind are 
calculated to give us the Sense of Beauty, is " probably not 
the effect of necessity but of choice in the Supreme Agent, 
who constituted our Senses," 7 His design being" to discover 
Himself to us not only as omnipotent, but also as wise and 
good. As in the human constitution, Hutcheson held that 
there is no original principle of malevolence, so he holds that, 
among the objects of nature and art, " there is no form which 
seems necessarily disagreeable of itself, when we dread no 
other evil from it, and compare it with nothing better of the 
kind.'" "Deformity is only the absence of Beauty, or defi- 
ciency in the Beauty expected in any species." cc Our Sense 
of Beauty seems designed to give us positive pleasure, but 
not positive pain or disgust, any further than what arises 
from disappointment/' 8 To the student of mental philosophy 
it may be specially interesting to remark that Hutcheson 
both applies the principle of association to explain our ideas 
of beauty and also sets limits to its application, insisting on 
there being u a natural power of perception or sense of beauty 
in objects, antecedent to all custom, education, or example," 
and on " some objects being immediately the occasions of this 



» Inquiry, &c, Sect. 2. 8 Sect. 6. 

» Sect. 8. 8 Sect. 6. 

p 2 



212 HUTCHESON. 



pleasm*e of beauty/' without any regard to their convenience 
and use. 9 

Though Hutcheson employs the principle of Association 
for the purpose of explaining our tastes and distastes, in the 
matter of Beauty and Deformity, more sparingly than many 
of his successors, some of his remarks on this head are 
peculiarly just and suggestive. Take, for instance, the 
following passages. " Associations of Ideas make objects 
pleasant and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give 
any such pleasures ; and, in the same way, the casual con- 
junctions of ideas may give a disgust, where there is nothing 
disagreeable in the form itself. And this is the occasion of 
many fantastic aversions to figures of some animals, and to 
some other forms. Thus swine, serpents of all kiuds, and 
some insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with aversion 
by many people, who have got some accidental ideas associated 
to them. And for distastes of this kind no other account can 
be given." " The beauty of trees, their cool shades, and their 
aptness toconceal from observation, have made groves and woods 
the usual retreat to those who love solitude, especially to the 
religious, the pensive, the melancholy, and the amorous. And 
do not we find that we have so joined the ideas of these 
dispositions of mind with those external objects, that they 
always recur to us along with them ? The cunning of the 
heathen priests might make such obscure places the scene of 
the fictitious appearances of their Deities ; and hence we join 
ideas of something divine to them. We know the like effect 
in the ideas of our churches, from the perpetual use of them 
only in religious exercises. The faint light in Gothic 
buildings has had the same association of a very foreign idea, 

9 See Inquiry, &c, Sects, 1, 6, 7j Hamilton's Lectures on Meta- 
physics, Lect. 44, ad fin. 



^ESTHETICS. 213 

which our poet shows in his epithet, — " A dim religious 
light." In like manner, it is known that often all the 
circumstances of actions, or places, or dresses of persons, or 
voice, or song, which have occurred at any time together, 
when we were strongly affected by any passion, will be so 
connected that any one of these will make all the rest recur. 
And this is often the occasion both of great pleasure and 
pain, delight and aversion to many objects, which of them- 
selves might have been perfectly indifferent to us : but these 
approbations or distastes are remote from the ideas of beauty, 
being plainly different ideas." " We know how agreeable a 
very wild country may be to any person who has spent the 
cheerful days of his youth in it, and how disagreeable very 
beautiful places may be, if they were the scenes of his misery. 
And this - " (namely, the fact that many other ideas, besides 
those of Beauty and Harmony, may either please or displease, 
according to persons' tempers and past circumstances) "may 
help us, in many cases, to account for the diversities of fancy, 
without denying the uniformity of our internal Sense of 
Beauty." 

1 Sect. 6. 



214 HUTCHESON. 



CHAPTER IV. 

RECEPTION AND INFLUENCE OF HUTCHESON's WRITINGS. 

The publication of Hutcheson's two first treatises soon 
provoked a friendly controversy in the columns of the London 
Journal, where his ethical theories were criticized by Mr. 
Gilbert Burnet, writing- under the signature of Philaretus, 
Hutcheson replying- under that of Philanthropus. " The 
debate/'' Dr. Leech man informs us, "was left unfinished, 
Philaretus' death having put an end to the correspondence, 
which was proposed to have been afterwards carried on in a 
more private manner/' Mr. Burnet, in his preface to the 
published letters, praises " the beautiful structure which the 
author has raised/' but regards it as resting on no sufficient 
foundation. Such a foundation for morality has, he thinks, 
been laid by Cumberland, Clarke, and Wollaston, and he 
enunciates it in this one simple proposition, " That virtue, or 
moral goodness, is founded on truth/' The main question 
at issue between the two correspondents is whether the 
ultimate grounds of moral action are supplied by reason or by 
feeling. " Philaretus/' says Hutcheson, " seems to me to 
maintain, ( That there is some exciting reason to virtue, 
antecedent to all kind affections or instinct toward the good 
of others : and that, in like manner, there are some justifying 
reasons, or truths, antecedent to any moral sense, causing 
approbation.' The author of the Inquiry, I apprehend, must 
maintain, ( That desires, affections, instincts, must be previous 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 215 

to all exciting reasons, and a moral sense antecedent to all 
justifying- reasons/ " The pursuit of the good of others, 
Hutcheson holds, is prompted by an instinct, and approved 
by the moral sense. " Our moral sense and affections deter- 
mine our end, but reason must find out the means/' Burnet, 
on the other hand, holds that the virtuous man follows his 
benevolent instincts and his moral sense, simply because 
reason approves of them. " We deem our affections and our 
moral sense to be reasonable affections, and a reasonable sense, 
from their prompting us to the same conduct which reason 
approves and directs. And thus reason is the measure of the 
goodness or badness of our affections and moral sense, and 
consequently of the actions flowing from them, and not vice 
versa." What makes the desire of public happiness a reason- 
able end is the truth " that it is best that all should be 
happy." " If any one asks, Why it is best, I would answer 
him as I would do, if he asked me why four is more than 
two : It is self-evident." '* The self-evident truth, ' That 
it is in itself best that all should be happy,' is immediately 
perceivable by all rational natures." We do not possess 
Hutehesoir's reply, but surely he might have asked, And why 
should I pursue what is best, or approve of the pursuit of 
what is best ? It is quite conceivable that I might in- 
tellectually assent to the proposition Ci that it is best that all 
should be happy," without having any desire to promote their 
happiness, or experiencing the slightest feeling of appro- 
bation, when I find that it is promoted. But if men were 
constituted in this way, would morality, as we understand it, 
have any existence ? The root of morals, the ultimate induce- 
ment to moral conduct, is surely to be discovered in those 
original impulses of our nature which urge us to seek the 
good of ourselves and of others, and in those reflex feelings 
which approve or disapprove of actions, according as they are 



216 HUTCHESON. 



or are not attended by these effects. Our emotions are, as it 
were, the raw material of morality. At the same time it 
must undoubtedly be granted that they are often transformed 
by the action of reason into what almost assumes the character 
of a new product. And perhaps Hutcheson and some other 
moralists, while rightly insisting on the ultimate origin of 
morality in the emotional part of human nature, have not 
laid sufficient stress on the office of the reason in constantly 
directing, co-ordinating, and adjusting our various desires, so 
as best to attain their ultimate ends. Those ends, however, 
it must be repeated, are, in the first instance, given by the 
self-regarding and sympathetic affections, largely as both 
such ends and the affections by which they are suggested 
may be purified, extended, and enlightened by the subsequent 
operations of reason, carrying effects up to their causes, 
tracing causes to their effects, and comparing the several 
consequences of our actions as well as the relative excellency 
and efficacy of our means. 

In the same year (1728) in which Mr. Burnet's letters 
appeared in the London Journal, John Balguy, who has 
already been mentioned in connexion with Shaftesbury, pub- 
lished anonymously a tract on " the Foundation of Moral 
Goodness/' which, like Burnet's letters, was designed as a 
refutation of Hutcheson's theory that Virtue has its ultimate 
origin in the affections and the moral sense. He begins with 
a well-turned compliment to Hutcheson, but soon proceeds to 
state that he conceives the question between them to be one 
of the utmost gravity. Balguy is a follower of Clarke, and 
thinks that he is investing morality with a more exalted 
character and a more binding force by laying its foundations, 
not in the constitution of human natare, which he regards as 
uncertain and relative, but in " the truth or nature of things 
themselves/' which he regards as fixed and absolute. " The 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 217 

reasons of things and the relations between moral agents" 
(terms, it may be noticed, which are sufficiently vague) 
are discoverable by the faculty of Reason, and are generally as 
plain as the truths of Mathematics. As for the Affections, 
they " are useful, in respect of human nature/' yet they are 
" by no means essential to Virtue." " Nor can I think/' he 
adds, " that any Instinct has a place in its constitution. To 
speak properly, Reason was not given us to regulate natural 
affection, but natural affection was given us to reinforce 
Reason, and make it more prevalent. The inferior principle 
must be intended as subservient to the superior, and not vice 
versa/' But, however clear might be our perception of the ten- 
dency of actions or of the relations subsisting between rational 
or sensitive agents, how could we ascribe the epithets right 
and wrong, moral and immoral, either to our acts or judg- 
ments, unless we had exciting affections impelling us to 
pursue certain ends, and unless these ends, and the means by 
which they are attainable, were the objects of those peculiar 
reflex affections which we call moral approbation and dis- 
approbation ? We perceive a purely intellectual truth, but we 
do not desire it or approve it. And surely this difference is 
an essential one, and is wholly to be referred to the fact that 
moral actions and moral distinctions originate in the affections 
and not in the reason. The affections and the reason are 
both undoubtedly necessary factors in morality, but the 
initiative is not in the reason, but in the affections; and the 
true relation between the two is expressed, not by saying 
that the affections reinforce the reason, but by saying that the 
reason modifies, controls, and co-ordinates the affections. It 
may be remarked that Balguy does not, as Burnet apparently 
does, accept Hutcheson's practical test or criterion of moral 
conduct. " Is Virtue," he asks, " no otherwise good or 
amiable, than as it conduces to public or private advantage ? 



218 HUTCHESON. 

Is there no absolute goodness in it ? Are all its perfections 
relative and instrumental ? " One would have been glad to 
see some instances of actions which are " absolutely good/' 
though they neither contribute to public nor private advan- 
tage, but Balguy, like other writers of the same school, does 
not condescend to supply them. In the following year 
(1729), there appeared a " Second Part of the Foundation of 
Moral Goodness," " being an answer to certain remarks com- 
municated by a gentleman to the author." This work also was 
published anonymously. Both tracts are well written, and 
show considerable acuteness, but, on the main point at issue, 
they leave Hutcheson, I think, in possession of the field. 

Bishop Butler's Fifteen Sermons, which supply the prin- 
cipal materials for forming an estimate of his opinions on 
Ethics, were first published in 1726, the year after the publi- 
cation of Hutcheson's two first treatises. They contain no 
reference to Hutcheson, or, so far as I can ascertain, any 
allusion to him, though, as I have already pointed out, there 
is a very close affinity between the " Conscience " of Butler and 
the " Moral Sense" of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. In the 
Preface to the Second Edition of the Sermons, published in 
1729, which contains the criticism of Shaftesbury, already 
examined, Hutcheson's works are still unnoticed. But, when 
Butler published the Analogy in 1736, he appended two short 
dissertations, one on Personal Identity, the other on the 
Nature of Virtue, in the latter of which, though Hutcheson's 
name is not expressly mentioned, his system was evidently in 
the author's mind throughout. Butler agrees with Hutche- 
son in recognizing a special Moral Faculty, nor does he 
question its emotional character. At the same time, he 
rightly suggests that there is a rational element in it. He 
seems indifferent, whether it be called " conscience, moral 
reason, moral sense, or divine reason." Whatever the name 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 219 

we employ, "it is manifest, great part of common language 
and of common behaviour, over the world, is formed upon 
supposition of such a moral faculty ; whether considered as a 
sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the 
heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both." 
Huteheson's apparent limitation of virtue to benevolence is 
very properly criticized, though, perhaps, his position is 
slightly exaggerated. " It deserves to be considered, whether 
men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make them- 
selves miserable without reason than to make other people 
so; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good, for the 
sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect 
the good of others whom nature has committed to their care. 
It should seem that a due concern about our own interest or 
happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote 
it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word 
prudence in our language — it should seem that this is virtue, 
and the contrary behaviour faulty and blameable ; since, in 
the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first, and 
condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others." 
The point, however, in Huteheson's system to which Butler 
takes the gravest exception is his identification of the test 
or criterion of moral conduct with the tendency of actions to 
promote the general good. Butler himself confuses the moral 
criterion with the moral faculty ; in other words, he leaves 
the Conscience to pronounce its judgments arbitrarily, with- 
out any rule to guide itself by. " Man/' he says, " hath the 
rule of right within ; what is wanting is only that he honestly 
attend to it." l Hence it is not surprising that he regards 
our moral nature as so constituted as to condemn some kinds 
of acts and to approve other kinds, " abstracted from all con- 
sideration which conduct is likeliest to produce an over- 
1 Sermon III. 



220 HUTCHESON. 



balance of happiness or misery/' But had he taken any 
pains to analyze the instances which he gives, namely, the 
condemnation of falsehood, unprovoked violeuce, and injustice, 
and the approbation of " benevolence to some preferably to 
others," he must have seen that all kinds of evil consequences 
would follow, if we did not condemn the one and approve the 
other. Men, of course, are constantly approving- or con- 
demning acts, without expressly thinking of their effects on 
the general happiness, and it is most desirable that we should, 
in practice, be able to have recourse to minor or intermediate 
rules of conduct, such as those of veracity, fidelity, justice, 
&c. ; but the question is whether, on reflection, the moralist, 
or indeed any normally-constituted man, ever approves of any 
action which he believes likely to bring about more harm 
than good, and whether any clearer, more intelligible, and 
more universally applicable principle of conduct can be pro- 
posed than that of promoting the general welfare. To make 
the conscience, as Butler does, a law to itself, is to substitute 
for a general and reasonable rule of conduct a particular and 
arbitrary one. 

This Dissertation contains a curious misrepresentation, of 
course wholly unintentional, of the theory which it is at- 
tacking. " It is certain," the author says, "that some of the 
most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, 
and even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not 
have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance 
of misery in the present state ; perhaps sometimes may have 
the contrary appearance." But no moralist has ever delibe- 
rately maintained that the test .of consequences is a sufficient 
one, when applied to individual actions, considered wholly in 
themselves ; actions must be tested as a class, and we must 
consider what would happen, not if we did this or that act, 
but if acts of this or that kind were generally prevalent. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 221 

Mr. Sidgwick 2 thinks that we may take Butler's Disser- 
tation as the earliest treatise " in the development of English 
ethics, in which what were afterwards called ' utilitarian ' and 
1 intuitional ' morality were first formally opposed.'" The 
passage from Balguy, quoted on pp. 217-1 8, is sufficient to show 
that this statement requires some modification. But Mr. 
Sidgwick is quite right, I think, when he draws a distinction 
between the different points of view with which Butler 
regards the relation of virtue to happiness in the Sermons 
and the Dissertation respectively. " In the Sermons," he 
says, " Butler seems to treat conscience and calm benevolence 
as permanently allied though distinct principles, but in the 
Dissertation on Virtue he maintains that the conduct dictated 
by conscience will often differ widely from that to which 
mere regard for the production of happiness would prompt.'" 
Indeed there are occasional, though, it must be acknowledged, 
exceptional passages in the Sermons, in which Butler seems 
to adopt the benevolent, t>r, as we should now call it, with a 
slight difference of connotation, ■ the utilitarian theory of 
morals, without any qualification or reservation. Such are 
the following. "That mankind is a community, that we all 
stand in a relation to each other, that there is a public end 
and interest of society which each particular is obliged to 
promote, is the sum of morals." 3 " It is manifest that 
nothing can be of consequence to mankind or any creature, 
but happiness. This then is all which any person can, in 
strictness of speaking, be said to have a right to. We can, 
therefore, owe no man anything, but only to further and 
promote his happiness, according to our abilities. And, there- 
fore, a disposition and endeavour to do good to all with whom 
we have to do, in the degree and manner which the different 

$ Essay on Ethics in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
3 Sermon IX 



222 HUTCHESON. 

relations we stand in to them require, is a discharge of all the 
obligations we are under to them." 4 One of the very 
reasons, perhaps, which has made this moralist so popular is 
the fact that, from the want of system and consistency in his 
writing's, he is able to reflect so many phases of ethical 
sentiment. 5 

The most elaborate criticism of Hutcheson's ethical theories 
was that offered by Dr. Richard Price in his Review of the 
Principal Questions in Morals, first published in 1757, but 
considerably altered in the third edition, published in 1787. 
Price proceeds generally on the same grounds as Burnet and 
Balguy, but the intrinsic value of his work is incomparably 
greater than that of theirs. Instead of being a mere criticism 
of another author's opinions, "it becomes, as the argument 
advances, a substantive work on ethical theory of very con- 
siderable merit. In fact, of the various writings of what has 
been called the iC Rational School " of English Moralists 
Price's treatise is undoubtedly the most important, and it is 
specially interesting on account of the close similarity which 
obtains between many of the theories and even expressions 
contained in it and those which subsequently became so cele- 
brated in the Practical Philosophy of Kant. The mam 
positions propounded in this work may be summed up under 
three heads. First, actions are in themselves right or wrong. 
What is meant by the expression " in themselves " is by no 
means clear; for it can hardly mean that actions are right or 
wrong irrespectively of the circumstances under which they 

4 Sermon XII. 

5 Even in his later work, the Analogy, there occurs a passage as distinctly 
utilitarian in its character, as could well be written. " God instructs us 
by experience (for it is not reason, but experience, which instructs us) 
what good or had consequences will follow from our acting in such and 
such manners ; and by this He directs us how we are to behave our- 
selves." Pt. II., ch. 5. 



INFL UENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 223 

are performed. From a comparison of various passages, it 
would seem as if Price intended by this phrase to exclude all 
reference to consequences as well as to intimate that the per- 
ceptions of right and wrong in actions are identical in the 
case of all intelligent beings. The perception of right and 
wrong, he may be taken as saying, does not depend on any 
special constitution of human nature, nor, in pronouncing any 
action to be right or wrong, have we any occasion to ti'ace 
consequences or to look beyond the action itself. The second 
position is that right and wrong are simple ideas, incapable 
of analysis or definition ; in other words, they cannot be 
resolved, as so many previous moralists, including Shaftes- 
bury and Hutcheson, had resolved them, into ideas of good 
and evil. " If we will consider why it is right to conform 
ourselves to the relations in which persons and objects stand 
to us ; we shall find ourselves obliged to terminate our views 
in a simple perception, and something ultimately approved 
for which no justifying reason can be assigned/' 6 Thirdly, 
these simple ideas of Right and Wrong are perceived im- 
mediately by the intuitive power of the Reason or Under- 
standing, terms which he employs indifferently, just in the 
same way that colour is perceived by the eye or sound by the 
ear. Hutcheson also regards our moral perceptions as imme- 
diate, but Price maintains against him, in an elaborate course of 
argument, that the faculty thus immediately perceiving moral 
qualities is the Reason, and not a Sense. By the Reason he, 
of course, means, as Cudworth does, when using the word in 
the same connexion, the so-called intuitive, and not the 
discursive Reason or faculty of comparison. As for the 
emotions, they are the source of all vicious actions, though, 
when enlightened by reason, they may also aid in the pro- 
duction of virtuous conduct. The author fails to see that the 

6 Price's Review, &c, ch. 6. 



224 HUTCHESON. 



emotions are, in the last analysis, the original source of all 
conduct, be it virtuous or vicious. 

Two years after the appearance of Price's work, Dr. John 
Taylor of Norwich, 7 a Presbyterian minister of considerable 
reputation in his day, published a short pamphlet, entitled 
" An Examination of the Scheme of Morality advanced by 
Dr. Hutcheson." Dr. Taylor exaggerates, and indeed does 
not very clearly understand, Hutcheson's position. His own 
theory seems to coincide pretty nearly with that of Price, 
though the Reason, which is " the principal in the affair of 
virtue/' appears to be the discursive, and not, as in the 
systems of Price and Cud worth, the intuitive reason. Reason 
not only devises the means, but proposes the end. Virtue 
consists, not in following any instincts, or in aiming at any 
consequences, but " in acting faithfully according to what we 
know of the true natures of objects, persons, things, actions, 
relations, and circumstances duly considered and attended to." 
A " sketch " of his own system, in which he borrows largely 
from Wollaston and Price, was published by Taylor in 1760. 

Passing from Hutcheson's critics to those of his successors, 
in the line of English Moralists, on whom he may be sup- 
posed to have exerted any influence, the first name which 
arrests our attention is that of Hume. That part of Hume's 
Treatise of Human Nature (vol. iii.), which is concerned with 
morals, was first published in 1740. The Enquiry concerning 
the Principles of Morals, which is at once more popular and 
more matured than the eailier work, appeared in 1751. Both 
these writings betray the most evident marks of Hutcheson's 
influence. 8 The very first section of the Book on Morals, in 

7 Dr. Taylor's descendants are frequently mentioned in Crabb Robin- 
son's diary. 

8 In saying this, 1 do not, of course, mean to imply that they were not 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 225 

the Treatise, is devoted to show that " Moral distinctions are not 
derived from Reason." " Morals excite passions, and produce 
or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in 
this particular/'' " Moral distinctions are not the offspring 
of reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the 
source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of 
morals." To the admirable passages in the Enquiry in which 
Hume assigns to reason and sentiment their respective parts 
in determining or estimating moral conduct, I have already 
referred in my account of Shaftesbury. 9 I shall here quote a 
few sentences, which will serve both to illustrate his position 
and also to show his superiority, in respect of clearness and 
force of expression, to most of his predecessors in this branch 
of philosophy. " I am apt to suspect .... that reason and 
sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and 
conclusions. The final sentence, it is probable, which pro- 
nounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praiseworthy 
or blameable ; that which stamps on them the mark of honour 
or infamy, approbation or censure ; that which renders morality 
an active principle, and constitutes virtue our happiness, and 
vice our misery : it is probable, I say, that this final sentence 
depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has 
made universal in the whole species. For what else can have 
an influence of this nature ? But in order to pave the way 
for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its 
object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning 
should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just con- 
clusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated 

also largely influenced by Shaftesbury, whose writings would, in some 
respects, probably commend themselves to Hume more than those of 
Hutcheson. Minor traces of Shaftesbury's influence are to be found in 
Hume's peculiar use of the words "taste" and "relish," and in hi» 
frequent comparisons of moral with natural beauty. 
» See p. 166. 



226 HUTCHESON. 

relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained ." ' 
In the Treatise, Hume calls this sentiment " a moral sense/' 
and devotes his second section to showing that " moral 
distinctions are derived from a moral sense/' But in the 
Enquiry , so far as I can recollect, this phrase never occurs, 
and indeed, from the circuitous expressions which he some- 
times employs, it would seem as if he purposely avoided it. 
I think it is tolerably plain that, instead of recognizing a 
distinct and original faculty in the " Moral Sense/' Hume 
regarded moral approbation and disapprobation as arising 
simply from the satisfaction or disappointment of our sym- 
pathetic feelings. Thus, he speaks of " conduct gaining my 
approbation by touching my humanity," and of " humanity 
making a distinction in favour of those actions which are 
useful and beneficial." 2 And, at the end of the Treatise on 
Human Nature, he says expressly : " Those who resolve the 
sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind 
may defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority; but 
want the advantage which those possess, who account for that 
sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind." I suppose 
the approbation and disapprobation which we accord to our 
own acts would be explained, on this theory, by supposing us 
to transfer to ourselves the feelings with which we have been 
accustomed to regard the acts of others. 

Hume agreeing with Hutcheson in regarding the final act of 
moral approbation as emotional, it follows almost as a matter 
of course that he agrees with him also in referring the 
suggestion of our ultimate ends to the desires, and not to the 
reason. "'It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human 
actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, 
but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and 

1 Enquiry, &c, Section 1. 

2 Enquiry, Section I., Appendix I. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 227 

affections of mankind, without any dependence on the in- 
tellectual faculties. Ask a man, why he uses exercises ; he 
will answer, because he desires to keep his health. If you 
then inquire, why he desires health, he will readily reply, 
because sickness is painful. If you push your inquirie 
farther, and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible 
he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never 
referred to any other object. " 3 

The test or criterion of actions, we have seen, is, with 
Hutcheson, their tendency to promote or retard the public- 
good. " The greatest happiness of the greatest number" is 
the formula by which he expresses the end which the virtuous 
agent ought to have in view. Hume, though he devotes a 
much larger proportion of his treatise to a discussion of the 
qualities which we praise and blame in actions, proposes no 
equally definite rule of conduct. The circumstance common 
to all the objects of our approbation, he conceives, is the fact 
that they are regarded as being either useful or agreeable 
either to ourselves or others. A little reflection will show 
that this statement admits of a much more simple expression. 
The agreeable is that which affords immediate pleasure. The 
useful is that which, in its ultimate effects, either diminishes 
pain or augments pleasure. Directly or indirectly, they both 
contribute to the same result. The one circumstance, there- 
fore, which merits approbation, might be described as the fact 
of conducing to the happiness either of ourselves or of others. 
But, in those very numerous cases where our own happiness 
comes into competition with that of our fellow-creatures, 
Hume's system appears to offer no guidance other than the 
predominant sentiment at the moment of action. As, how- 
ever, according to the genius of his philosophy, that sentiment 
ought to be a sympathetic one, the virtuous man would 
3 Enquiry, Appendix I. 
Q 2 



228 HUTCHESON. 

always be predisposed to sacrifice himself to others rather 
than others to himself. 

The prudential virtues are fully recognized in Hume's 
scheme of Morals. The reason why we admire them, and 
why, therefore, we account them virtues, is that they promote 
the happiness of their possessors, which is "not a spectacle 
entirely indifferent to us/' but which, " like sunshine or the 
prospect of well-cultivated plains, communicates a secret joy 
and satisfaction." 4 The fact that these qualities are esteemed 
and praised thus affords a new illustration of the sympathetic 
character of human nature. 

Like Hutcheson and Butler, Hume does not recognize any 
original principles of malevolence. " Absolute, unprovoked, 
disinterested malice has never, perhaps, place in any human 
breast." 5 

There is one respect in which Hume's treatment of morals 
marks so great an advance as that of his predecessors, that, even 
in this brief notice, it ought not to be passed over in silence. 
In drawing attention to the wide variation of moral sentiment 
existing in different ages and countries, and by his inductive 
investigation of the acts and qualities which men approve, he 
initiated that comparative and historical method of treating 
moral and social questions which has since thrown so much 
light on the origin and growth both of morality and society. 
Preceding moralists (though we ought, to a certain extent, to 
except Locke) took the average men of their own age and 
country as typical of all men. Hume recognized that, though 
the fundamental constitution of human nature is the same, all 
the world over, it may be affected by such differences of ex- 
ternal circumstances as to assume the most various forms and 
result in the most divergent sentiments. This diversity in 

4 Enquiry, Section 6. 
• Section 6. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 229 

the acts and opinions of men does not, however, prevent the 
moralist from determining what, under any given circum- 
stances is the best course of action. 

Adam Smith, who had been a pupil, and was subsequently, 
after a brief interval, during which the chair was occupied by 
a Mr. Thomas Craigie, the successor of Hutcheson at Glasgow, 
published his Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759. In this 
work, he speaks in highly laudatory terms of his old master. 
After enumerating various authors who have made virtue to 
consist in benevolence, he says : " But of all the patrons of 
this system, ancient or modern, the late Dr. Hutcheson was 
undoubtedly, beyond all comparison, the most acute, the most 
distinct, the most philosophical, and, what is of the greatest 
consequence of all, the soberest and most judicious." 6 This 
u amiable system " did not, however, wholly commend itself 
to Adam Smith himself. While according the highest place 
to the "supreme virtue of beneficence," he pleads that the 
inferior qualities of prudence, vigilance, temperance, economy, 
industry, and the like, which are " apprehended to deserve 
the esteem and approbation of everybody," should at least be 
admitted into the rank of virtues. 

In Part VII., Sect. 3, Ch. 8, Adam Smith expressly 
examines Hutcheson's theory of a Moral Sense, and rejects it 
as a superfluous assumption. Moral approbation, he main- 
tains, is not the result of a peculiar sentiment, answering one 
particular purpose and no other, but may be fully accounted 
for by the familiar feeling of Sympathy. We must not 
indeed limit sympathy, as Hume did, to sympathy with the 
happiness of those who are affected by the action. This is 
included, but it is only one of the directions which, in 
experiencing the feeling of approbation, our sympathy, takes. 
" When we approve of any character or action, the sentiments 
6 Part VII., Sect. 2, ch. 3. 



230 HUTCHESON. 



which we feel are derived from four sources, which are, in 
some respects, different from one another. First, we sympa- 
thize with the motives of the agent ; secondly, we enter into 
the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions ; 
thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the 
general rules by which those two sympathies generally act ; 
and, last of all, when we consider such actions, as making a 
part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the 
happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear 
to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we 
ascribe to any well-contrived machine/'' The approbation we 
bestow upon our own acts arises from a kind of inverted 
sympathy. We place ourselves in the position of an im- 
partial spectator, and, " viewing our own conduct with his 
eyes and from his station," we " enter into and sympathize 
with the sentiments and motives which influenced it." " We 
can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can 
never form any judgment concerning them, unless we remove 
ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, and 
endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us. But 
we can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view 
them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are 
likely to view them.'" 7 These elaborate explanations seem to 
be all open to the objection that the processes described, when 
they occur at all, precede the act of approbation, which is 
consequent upon them, and not identical with them. To 
sj^mpathize with a man, to enter into his feelings and motives, 
generally leads to our approving of his conduct, but surely 
the two emotions are quite distinct. Huteheson's conception 
of a Moral Sense, as an original and independent part of 
human nature, involves a needless multiplication of principles, 
besides being open to other objections which have been already 
? Part III., ch„ 1. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 231 

stated in the course of this work, but the supposition which 
seems best to accord with facts is that we are capable of 
acquiring 1 a reflex feeling", gradually formed by the inter- 
action and combination of the various sympathetic and self- 
regarding emotions, and constantly enlightened hy the Reason, 
to which we may not inappropriately give the specific name of 
the Moral Faculty, the Conscience, or even, providing we 
bear in mind its origin, the Moral Sense. It may be re- 
marked that, though Adam Smith rejects Hutcheson's theory 
of the Moral Sense, it is pretty plain that his own theory of 
Sympathy is intimately connected with the benevolent aspect 
under which Hutcheson had attempted to represent what 
others have so often regarded as the austere forms of Virtue 
and Duty. 

It is almost superfluous to say that Adam Smith agrees 
with Hutcheson and Shaftesbury in regarding the benevolent 
feelings as incapable of analysis into self-love, or, to adopt his 
own expression, as " original passions of human nature/'' 8 The 
position, also common to him with them, that our ultimate 
ends, and, consequently, our first impulses to right action, are 
given, not by reason, but by the affections, is stated with great 
force and perspicuity. " Though reason is undoubtedly the 
source of the general rules of morality, and of all the moral 
judgments which we form by means of them, it is altogether 
absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions 
of right and wrong can be derived from reason, even in those 
particular cases upon the experience of which the general 

rules are formed Reason may show that this object 

is the means of obtaining some other which is naturally either 
pleasing or displeasing, and in this manner may render it 
either agreeable or disagreeable, for the sake of something else. 
But nothing can be agreeable or disagreeable for its own sake, 
8 Part I.; Sect. 1, ch. 1. 



232 HUTCHESON. 

which is not rendered such by immediate sense and feeling-. 
If virtue, therefore, in every particular instance, necessarily 
pleases for its own sake, and if vice as certainly displeases the 
mind, it cannot be reason, but immediate sense and feeling-, 
which in this manner reconciles us to the one and alienates us 
from the other/'' "Dr. Hutcheson/' he adds, "had the merit 
of being the first who distinguished, with any degree of pre- 
cision, in what respect all moral distinctions may be said to 
arise from reason, and in what respect they are founded upon 
immediate sense and feeling." 9 

Adam Smith curiously adopts two criteria of actions, their 
propriety and their merit. " The sentiment or affection of the 
heart, from which any action proceeds, and upon which its 
whole virtue or vice must ultimately depend, may be con- 
sidered under two different aspects, or in two different rela- 
tions : first, in relation to the cause which excites it, or the 
motive which gives occasion to it ; and, secondly, in relation 
to the end which it proposes, or the effect which it tends to 
produce. In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the pro- 
portion or disproportion, which the affection seems to bear to 
the cause or object which excites it, consists the propriety or 
impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness, of the consequent 
action. In the beneficial or hurtful effects which the affection 
aims at, or tends to produce, consists the merit or demerit of 
the action, the qualities by which it is entitled to reward, or 
is deserving of punishment. " Y It does not require much 
penetration to see that the two criteria, here proposed, really 
coincide. For, how are we to determine " the suitableness or 
unsuitableness, the proportion or disproportion, which the 
affection seems to bear to the cause or object which excites it," 
except by some external signs, and what external signs are 

9 Part VII., Sect, 3, ch. 2. 
1 Part I., Sect. ], ch. 3. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 233 

there, on which we can place any reliance, except the " effects 
which the affection aims at " ? A man experiences, say, the 
affection of resentment. The affection was excited by an act 
of injustice, and it issues in an act of punishment. Now, if 
we approve of the punishment, its merit, according to this 
theory, consists in the fact tnat it is beneficial ; its propriety in. 
the fact that the feeling- of resentment, from which it pro- 
ceeds, is suitable or projjortional to the act of injustice which 
excited it. But how are we to determine the suitability or 
proportion of the feeling, except by the acts in which it 
results or to which., by gestures or other external signs, it 
points ? It may be true that, at first, the agent exhibited 
more or less of the feeling of resentment than we considered 
to be justified by the circumstances, or than g-uided his sub- 
sequent action. But then, if we condemn the feeling at this 
stage, it is simply because of the conduct which would result 
from it, were it at once to be acted upon. And suppose it to 
be said that we often praise the man who exhibits consistently 
the same degree of feeling rather than the man whose feelings 
oscillate, even though the same conduct ultimately results in 
both cases, the reason surely is that, in the one case, we can 
always calculate on a right course of action, whereas, in the 
other, the character of the action may vary according to the 
particular moment at which it happens to be performed. To 
estimate the relation of feelings, at least of other persons' 
feelings, to their exciting causes, in any other way than by 
the actions which they produce or by the gestures or other 
signs, indicative of approaching action, which they exhibit, 
seems to me impossible. Thus, when closely examined, A-dam 
Smith's two criteria can be reduced to the one criterion proposed 
by Hutcheson, that is, as it was afterwards called, the utili- 
tarian test or standard of conduct. 

Reid and Stewart recurred, though, with various qualifica- 



234 HUTCHESON. 



tions, to the ethical teaching represented by Cudworth, Clarke, 
and Price. They do not object to the expression " Moral 
Sense/' provided that faculty be understood to be not simply 
emotional, but the source of ultimate moral truths. Indeed, 
as Sir William Hamilton says, the Moral Sense or Moral 
Faculty of these writers does not differ essentially from the 
"Practical Reason " of Kant. They always speak respect- 
fully of Hutcheson, but their ethical theories can hardly be 
said to have been influenced by his. On their relation to him, 
in the sphere of mental philosophy, I spoke in the last 
chapter. 

Dr. Thomas Brown, once a highly popular writer, though 
now seldom read except by professed students of the History 
of Philosophy, agrees with Hutcheson's theory of the Moral 
Sense, so far as to maintain that " we come into existence 
with certain susceptibilities of emotion, in consequence of 
which it is impossible for us, in after-life, but for the influence 
of counteracting circumstances, momentary or permanent, not 
to be pleased with the contemplation of certain actions, as 
soon as they have become fully known to us, and not to have 
feelings of disgust on the contemplation of certain other 
actions/' 2 He objects, however, to the expression " Moral 
Sense," as implying more than emotions, and suggesting the 
analogy of the perceptions or sensations attendant on the 
exercise of our external senses. " The moral emotions," he 
rightly says, " are more akin to love or hate, than to percep- 
tion or judgment/-' His own account of the part taken by 
the "moral principle" in our estimate of actions seems 
eminently just. "It is not the moral principle which sees 
the agent, and all the circumstances of his action, or which 
sees the happiness or misery that has flowed from it ; but 
when these are seen, and all the motives of the agent divined, 
2 Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lecture lxxiv. 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 235 

it is the moral principle of our nature which then afToi'ds the 
emotion that may afterwards, in our conception, be added to 
these ideas derived from other sources,, and form with them 
compound notions of all the varieties of actions that are classed 
by us as forms of virtue or vice. " z On the vague and loose 
way in which Hutcheson employs the word " sense " I have 
already had occasion to speak. But his conception of the 
" Moral Sense/" I take it, is more analogous to that of the 
" Public Sense," that is, " our determination to be pleased 
with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their 
misery," 4 than it is to that of the external senses ; in other 
words, though he does not distinguish with sufficient precision 
between emotions and ideas, his conception of the Moral 
Sense is more that of an emotional than of a perceptive 
faculty. His system would, however, have been far clearer, 
as well as truer to facts, had he more carefully discriminated 
between the ultimate feeling of approbation or disapprobation 
and the complicated intellectual processes which often 
precede it. 6 

Brown agrees with Hutcheson in maintaining the disin- 
terested character of the benevolent affections, though he 
emphatically repudiates the theory that " whatever is felt by 
us to be virtuous is felt to deserve that name merely as in- 
volving some benevolent desire." 6 

To go back to two earlier writers, — Paley and Bentham, 
though they reject, the latter with scorn, the idea of an 
original moral sense, 7 both agree in adopting the tendency to 

3 Lecture lxxxii. This lecture is well worth the close attention of 
any student of Moral Philosophy. 

4 Hutcheson on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, Sect. 1. 
6 See my remarks on this subject at the beginning of ch. 2. 

6 Lecture Ixxxvi. 

7 See Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I., ch. 5 ; 
Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 2. 



236 HUTCHESON. 



promote happiness as the ultimate test of action. Neither of 
them seems to have been familiar with the works of Hutcheson, 
and indeed what may be called the psychological questions of 
ethics, such as the origin of the moral sentiments and the 
nature of the moral faculty, appear to have possessed no interest 
for them. Their object was almost exclusively to determine 
specific duties, and hence an intelligible criterion of actions, 
easily capable of application, was all that they asked from the 
theory of ethics. Such a criterion they found in what has been 
called the eudsemonistic or "greatest happiness " principle, 
and the body of their works is occupied in testing by it 
received maxims of conduct, or deducing from it general rules 
of action. It is curious that the earliest shape in which 
Bentham stated the utilitarian formula was in the very words 
of Hutcheson, " The greatest happiness of the greatest 
number," for which he afterwards substituted the simpler ex- 
pression, " The greatest happiness.'''' 8 Bentham, as is well 
known, included the lower animals among the objects of moral 
action. It is a point of similarity that Hutcheson not infre- 
quently speaks of " sensitive natures " 9 as the recipients of 
those pleasures which it is the duty of the virtuous man to 
diffuse. 

In France, Huteheson's writings do not appear to have 
attracted much attention, though the Essays on Beauty 
and Virtue were translated into French in 1749, and the 
posthumous work, A System of Moral Philosophy, in 1770. 

And yet Bentham constantly assumes that we have a natural disposition to 
take a pleasure in promoting the happiness of others, and, consequently, 
a natural tendency to approve of beneficent action. So far, therefore, as 
it is simply emotional, he virtually recognizes an original moral sense. 

8 See Mr. Burton's Introduction to Bentham's "Works, Bowling's 
Edition, Vol i., pp. 17, 18. 

9 See, for instance, Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, Sects. 4, 6. 






INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS. 237 

A recent writer, Jouffroy, places Hutcheson at the head of 
those authors, amongst whom he includes Butler, who 
advocated the theory of a moral sense. 1 " Butler was a 
preacher, and Shaftesbury a man of the world, while 
Hutcheson was a metaphysician by profession. It is not 
remarkable, therefore, that the doctrine, which the two 
former merely indicated, should have received from the latter 
a full development under a precise and philosophic form. 
Shaftesbury and Butler suggested the idea, Hutcheson formed 
the system, of the moral sense.'" Cousin, in his Cows 
d'Histoire de la P/tilosop/iie Morale du XVIIIieme Siecle, 
devotes two lectures to an examination of Hutcheson's system, 
of which, though, of course, differing from it, he speaks with 
great respect. 

Hettner 2 tells us that the teaching of the early Scottish 
philosophers, of whom Hutcheson may be regarded as the 
chief, so thoroughly represented the spirit of the age that, 
when it passed over into Germany, it penetrated not only 
into the sermons, but even into the catechisms and children's 
books (Kinderfreunde) of the rationalizing divines of that 
period. The writers, through whose instrumentality it was 
mainly propagated, were Abbt (who wrote a book on Merit), 
Garve, and Mendelssohn. The four essays, he further tells 
us, were several times translated into German. It may be 
added, as a striking proof of the popularity of Hutcheson and 
the Scottish philosophy in Germany, at that time, that the 

1 Jouffroy 's Lectures on the Introduction to Ethics, translated by 
Channing (Boston, 1860), Lecture xix. 

2 Liter •aturgeschichte des achtzeJinten Jahrhunderts, Erster Theil. 
Much detailed information on the relation of Hutcheson, as well as 
Shaftesbury, to various German Philosophers of the eighteenth century, 
will be found in a recent monograph, " Einfluss der englischen Philo- 
sophen seit Bacon auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18 Jahrhunderts," by 
G. Zarfc, Berlin, 1881. 



238 HUTCHESON. 



System of Moral Philosophy was translated into German in 
1756, the very year after its appearance at Glasgow. An 
entirely different turn, however, was soon to be given to the 
ethical philosophy of Germany by Kant, who, pursuing the 
principles alreadj' rendered familiar in England by Cud worth, 
Clarke, and Price, attempted to construct a system of morals 
on a purely intellectual basis. All ethical ideas, according to 
Kant, have their origin and seat altogether a priori in reason ; 
they are not susceptible of explanation upon any a posteriori 
system ; and the reason from which they and the laws of 
morality are derived must be the pure or naked reason, not the 
particular human reason, but reason as such, abstractedly and 
apart from the nature of man. 3 There is indeed a moral 
feeling, but it never operates antecedently to the reason, and 
indeed is produced solely by reason. It is simply a capacity 
of taking an interest in the law or reverence for the law itself, 
and cannot be reckoned either as pleasure or pain. 4 This 
moral feeling, it need hardly be said, has little relation to the 
moral sense of Hutcheson. Of later German philosophers the 
only one who bears any affinity to Hutcheson is Jacobi, in the 
earlier period of his speculative activity. 

Hutcheson's principal contributions to the subsequent de- 
velopment of moral philosophy (and to ethics, as representing 
the main stream of his influence, I have thought it best to 
confine myself in the present chapter) may be briefly summed 
up under four heads. First, his writings must have power- 
fully aided the tendency to detach ethics from theology, and 
to treat questions of morality as an independent branch of 

3 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Meta- 
physie of Ethics), Zweiter Abschnitt (2nd Section). 

4 Kritik der praktischen Vera un ft, Erstes Buch, Drittes Hauptstiick. 
(Analytic of the Practical Reason, Bk. I., ch. 3). 



INFLUENCE OF HIS WRITINGS- 239 

investigation, capable of a methodical and scientific handling-, 
Hutcheson's professional and ecclesiastical position was calcu- 
lated to lend great weight to his example in a matter V>f this 
kind; and though Butler was, at the same time, vijfcually 
pursuing the same method, it was less patent to his Headers 
that he was doing so. Another mode in which Hutoeson, 
like Shaftesbury, powerfully contributed to a sounder treat- 
ment of the problems of ethics was by laying a psychological 
basis for the science. The ultimate difficulties in these 
inquiries, such as the origin of moral distinctions and the 
nature of moral obligation, he saw could only be solved by a 
careful examination of the human mind. Such an examination 
requires, of course, to be supplemented by a historical survey 
of society, in all its varieties anA stages, and, as this branch of 
the investigation is wanting in Hutcheson, his results are 
necessarily imperfect. But the study of moral action in 
reference to the constitution of the human mind at all, how- 
ever limited the area from which the instances were taken, 
was a great and decided advance on the merely arbitrary 
procedure of most of the earlier moralists. More specifically, 
the psychological analysis of the mental processes preceding 
action, as well as the less successful attempt to analyze the 
act of moral approbation or disapprobation, formed most 
important contributions to the subsequent discussion of the 
question on the exact relations between the operations of the 
reason and the emotions in our moral acts. And lastly, 
Hutcheson did more than, perhaps, any preceding movalist 
towards supplying an adequate expression for the moral 
criterion of actions, affections, and characters. His writings, 
together with those of Shaftesbury and Hume, undoubtedly 
paved the way for the general reception, towards the end of 
the century, of what is now called Utilitarianism. Whether 
that theory provides a sufficient guide and test of action will 



240 HUTCHESON. 



always, perhaps, be open to, some dispute. But it cannot be 
questioned, I think, that Hutcheson occupies an important 
place in its history. 

Shaftesbury and Hutcheson do not stand in the first rank 
of philosophers). Neither in the roll of fame nor in that of 
merit, do they compete with Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, 
Hume, Descartes, Spinoza, or Kant. But, in the history of 
literature and philosophy, as in that of war and politics, 
posterity is often unjust to names of secondary importance, 
and is apt to pass over considerable services, because the 
recollection of them is not associated with that of illustrious 
persons. In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to repair 
this injustice in the case of two of our own countrymen, with- 
out whose intervention the development of at least one branch 
of philosophy in England might have been deprived of many 
of the most characteristic features which we now recognize 
in it. 



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